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Abstract !
Homeric scholarship has a long history dating back to the 19th century of elucidating 
Homeric poetry through examining its kinship structures and how kinship is performed. 
Of particular note has been the focus on the father-child dynamic both per se and with 
respect to its widespread use as a prototype for a diverse range of relationships. 
Agamemnon, for example, can be profitably viewed as a kind of dysfunctional father to 
the Achaeans, and many of the Odyssey’s characters are implicitly judged based on the 
extent to which they fill the role of the gentle father (ēpios patēr) in various ways. 
Central to all of this scholarship, however, has been the essentially structural assumption 
that kinship is a binary concept. Some people are related; others are not. However, recent 
anthropology has exploded this idea of ‘pseudo-kinship’, concluding that ‘relatedness’, 
the belief that someone even outside of one’s genetic or marital family is kin, is a more 
accurate measure of how kinship actually works than more prescriptive approaches have 
been.  
 In light of these conclusions, I attempt to expand upon our understanding of how         
kinship is portrayed in the Homeric poems by taking claims of relatedness more 
seriously. In a series of studies, I examine how more marginal relationships, those 
potentially outside of the patrilocal joint family, namely those involving bastards, slaves, 
and fugitives, function nonetheless as kinship relations. My model for this approach will 
be the oikos, with the father at its centre. Homeric kinship is portrayed as centripetal, with 
its various members jockeying for position relative to the patriarch. With this in mind, I 
focus especially on how my marginal subjects negotiate their position and how their role 
is portrayed with respect to the patriarch of their oikos. 
!!
Keywords !
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Epigraph !
Patria est, ubicumque est bene. !
“One’s fatherland is wherever things go well.” !
– Pacuvius fr. 250 Schierl !!
τὸ τᾶς ῥικνᾶς χελώνας µναµόνευε· 
οἶκος γὰρ ἄριστος ἀλαθέως καὶ φίλος !
“Recall what the shrivelled tortoise said: for truly the best oikos is also one’s own.” !
– Cercidas fr. 7 Lomiento = 2 Powell !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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I retain the traditional English spelling for Greek proper nouns. Greek words are 
transliterated unless a specific context is being quoted. I generally follow the LSJ and 
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INTRODUCTION 
  
 This project’s objective is to expand our understanding of the portrayal of the social 
dynamic of the Homeric oikos (‘household’) by examining figures on its margins, namely 
bastards (especially Teucer and Heracles), Eumaeus in his role as slave, and Phoenix as exile. 
Fundamental to this study will be the assumption that these characters are portrayed as the kin of 
the central patrilines of their oikoi, namely Telamon/Ajax, Zeus, Laertes/Odysseus/Telemachus, 
and Peleus/Achilles respectively. This assumption runs against prevailing attitudes about 
Homeric kinship, and to some extent kinship in antiquity overall, which has tended to be treated 
as a binary category. For any given individual, a prescribed group of people are family, and 
everyone else is not. Recent social anthropology, however, has shown this idea to be problematic, 
and it should be fruitful to examine how a more mobile and contextual approach to the portrayal 
of kinship in Homeric poetry can elucidate the relationships between individual characters within 
various kinship groups. Most importantly I observe that kinship, like much in Homeric poetry, is 
both the basis for and subject of continual negotiation and struggle. Kinship groups can unite 
against a common enemy, but they are just as capable of internecine discord and even fatal 
violence.  There is constant jockeying for position, perhaps most easily observable among a 1
group’s marginal members, who are striving to belong. But these marginal members are no less 
kin for all that. Their position is simply less secure than that of the more central members. The 
difference is one of degree rather than kind. 
 By Homeric poetry, I mean the Iliad and Odyssey. Other evidence, especially from 
 See Herzfeld (1985, 11-13) on the tendency of feuding kin groups in a modern Cretan village to come together in 1
the face of an external threat.
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Hesiod, the Homeric Hymns, and the fragments and epitomes of the epic cycle, will also prove 
useful, especially when, as with bastards, for example, the evidence in Homer is fairly slight. I 
will also use later (and especially Athenian) evidence, but only for comparative and 
supplementary purposes. By itself, later evidence can prove nothing. But when used cautiously in 
conjunction with evidence from the poetry itself, there can be a cumulative effect. It is now 
almost universally accepted that the Iliad and Odyssey represent crystallized forms of oral 
traditions.  The different epic traditions, represented by Homeric epic, the Hesiodic corpus, and 2
at least the earlier of the Homeric Hymns, are seen as representations of the same bardic practice. 
There is a growing trend that views these early corpora as “potentially allusive to shared aspects 
of mytho-poetic traditions, including mythological narratives and the epic phraseology 
commonly employed to express them.”  Furthermore, “the relative date of two texts may not 3
well replicate the relative date of their respective performance traditions.”  This means that we 4
cannot ignore the potentially informative nature of alternative traditions with respect to Homeric 
epic, even if iterations of these other traditions were transcribed at a later date.  This relatively 5
recent development in the general view of Homeric scholarship will be advantageous for my 
study, since, as I have mentioned, the body of evidence on certain subjects is extremely limited.   
 Because the use of formulae in early epic is not necessarily a topic of general agreement, 
it is necessary to outline my approach to them here. M. Parry supplied the classic definition of 
the Homeric formula: “a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical 
 Lord (1960), Nagy (1996 and 2004). The collection assembled by Honko (2000) offers some thought-provoking 2
comparanda. On my use of ‘tradition’ and ‘traditional’, see J.-M. Foley (1999, 13-34) and more recently Bakker 
(2013, 158-9).
 Burgess (2012a, 170).3
 Ibid. 171.4
 For a more detailed discussion, see Tsagalis (2008). Scodel (2002) takes a more skeptical view.5
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conditions to express a given essential idea.”  While the work of M. Parry (and his pupil, Lord) 6
constitutes the great watershed moment in Homeric studies, such a definition will satisfy few 
Homerists today for two major reasons. The first is that it holds metre – as opposed to semantics, 
for example – to be the primary criterion for the selection of a particular formula. A bard needing 
to fill out a line in which Odysseus was the subject simply selected an epithet to complete the 
hexameter. That epithet, regardless of its meaning, communicated nothing more than 
“Odysseus.”  On the contrary, while the more common epithets are unlikely to be marked in 7
many contexts, it is simply not the case that they bear no semantic meaning.  The second 8
objection is that M. Parry’s formulation does not allow the bard to have taken narrative context 
into account. As Bakker characterizes Parry here, “‘essential idea’ is thought to exist before its 
expression, which, in turn, is separate from the narrative context in which a poet uses it.”  So, 9
‘much-enduring Odysseus’ means the same thing each time it is uttered, regardless of context. 
Again, while it is true that the more common epithets can be relatively colourless in most 
contexts, the context in which they are applied is not meaningless.  10
 Various more nuanced conceptions of formulae have subsequently been proposed, and I 
am inclined to follow closely Bakker’s recently formulated ‘scale of interformularity’.  The 11
 M. Parry (1971, 272); cf. Lord (1960, 30).6
 This is the so-called ornamental epithet (epitheton ornans): J.M. Foley (1999, 213-14).7
 See, for example, A. Parry (1972).8
 Bakker (2013, 160).9
 The best proof of this, I would argue, is precisely some of the evidence adduced by A. Parry in defence of his 10
definition of the formula. He argues that there are particular applications of epithets that are nonsensical, and so it 
follows that these epithets were applied for the most part without thought for particular context (1971, 331). One 
example of this is a ship being described as swift (νῆα θοήν, Od. 13.167) after it has been turned to stone. A stone 
ship cannot be swift, but surely the epithet can be understood as deliberately incongruous, or even ironic, in such a 
context.
 Bakker (2013, 157-69). Burgess (2012a) uses the expression ‘intertext without text’. Barker and Christensen 11
(2014) provide a fine application of Bakker’s approach.
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basic principle is that, the more a formula is used, the more generic its meaning. Therefore, the 
most common formulae, such as the more frequently used name-epithet combinations, are 
unlikely to constitute much beyond “a regularized adaptive response to a recurrent need.”  In 12
this case, the only quibble with M. Parry would be that, when Odysseus is described as ‘much-
enduring’, it is likely that his capacity to endure is pertinent in the immediate context. But the 
frequency with which this epithet is used indicates that it is very unlikely to be marked in the 
vast majority of contexts. On the other end of the scale, the less frequently a formula is used, the 
more likely it is that its iterations will refer to one another, or that there will be a prototypical 
character or event to which the other attested iterations refer. So, for example, Stocking has 
shown that Apollo’s recognition of Hermes and Maia in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes (γνῶ δ᾽ 
οὐδ᾽ ἠγνοίησε (“he knew and did not fail to recognize,” 243)) alludes to Zeus’ ability to see 
through Prometheus’ trickery (Th. 551, the only other attestation of the formula in early epic).  13
But attestations of this phenomenon seem to be fairly rare – although we will see two potential 
examples in the second chapter. Much more common are uses of formulae somewhere between 
the two extremes on the scale, where a formula is restricted to a particular character or context. 
In this case, when such a formula is used outside of its ordinary context, it can often highlight an 
incongruity or implicitly show how the apparently unordinary context is more like the ordinary 
context than one would otherwise have thought. This last kind of interformularity is quite useful 
for the present study because it provides us with another way of seeing how closely associated 
marginal characters can be with their patriarchs. For example, as we shall see, there are particular 
 Bakker (2013, 163).12
 Stocking (2013, 189-91). The classic example of this kind of interformularity is µέγας µεγαλωστί (“great in his 13
greatness”), which is ordinarily used of Achilles (Il. 18.26; Od. 24.39-40), but is applied once to the corpse of 
Cebriones (Il. 16.776) to foreshadow Achilles’ death: Burgess (2012a, 171-6).
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formulae ordinarily used only of Odysseus’ patriline that are occasionally applied to Eumaeus as 
well. This would seem to imply that we are to understand a very close association between 
Eumaeus and Odysseus’ patriline. The advantage of Bakker’s method is that it allows for 
formulae to have varying degrees of markedness, as well as showing how a kind of 
intertextuality is possible even in situations where there is no text. 
 The present project involves examining the representation of social phenomena in works 
of fiction. Such an undertaking is problematic to start with, and it is exacerbated in the case of 
early hexameter poetry by the fact that we have very little contemporary evidence, no matter 
what one decides to define as contemporary to the Iliad and/or the Odyssey. In the interests of 
clarity, then, let me define the parameters of my project more narrowly. Thalmann aptly 
describes Homeric epic as “a representation rather than a reproduction of reality.”  And, as with 14
all poetry, the representation offered by the Homeric epics is a skewed one, being essentially 
from the point of view of a patriarchal, slave-owning aristocracy.  The fact that I am looking at 15
social elements of the poem does mean that I will have to be especially aware of the aristocratic 
and gender biases Thalmann describes. But it is worth emphasizing that my focus is essentially 
literary. I will come to some conclusions about how kinship and social relationships are 
portrayed in Homer. In doing so, I am following Graziosi and Haubold in assuming that, 
although they do not represent a historical society, “from the perspective of historical audiences, 
the Homeric poems depict a specific stage in the development of the world, the age of heroes 
[…] The world depicted in the poems is a coherent whole which made sense to early 
 Thalmann (1998a, 1). He is referring only to the Odyssey, but I see no reason why this description should not 14
apply just as well to the Iliad and other early Greek hexameter. Thalmann’s statement is likely intended as a kind of 
corrective for Finley’s (1978) brilliant but ultimately positivist treatment of the Odyssey.
 Finley (1978, 112), Thalmann (1998a, 243-249).15
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audiences.”  In other words, the culture and society portrayed in the poems are not ad hoc 16
inventions. They rather correspond to a common understanding that contemporary audiences 
shared about the Heroic Age. It is also necessary that, in order for the poems to be effective, they 
must feature stories that are probable.  And it follows from this that the portrayal of the 17
interaction of the poems’ characters is sufficiently consistent and plausible to merit systematic 
investigation. Of course oral poetry is rife with inconsistencies, with local motivation playing a 
relatively significant role.  But a common understanding of such a basic building block of 18
society as kinship is a requirement for the communication of a complex poem, and it is not 
generally subject to the requirements of a given scene. None of this is to say that the poems 
represent Greek society at any particular point in time, nor do I intend to imply this at any point. 
In this set of studies, the goal is merely to examine how closely reading the portrayal of certain 
marginal kinship roles can enrich our understanding of early epic. 
 Since the family is so central to this project, it is necessary to define the term. The family 
has traditionally been the domain of anthropology, and, as a group, anthropologists have roundly 
rejected the notion that there can be any objective, cross-cultural definition of ‘family’ or 
‘kinship.’  Even within a given community, there can be fairly significant disagreement about 19
what constitutes a familial relationship. For this reason, the term ‘relatedness’ is now preferred to 
‘kinship.’ ‘Relatedness’ describes familial relation from the point of view of ego, “without 
relying on an arbitrary distinction between biology and culture, and without presupposing what 
 Graziosi and Haubold (2005, 97). On the dangers of conceiving of a historical Homeric society, see especially 16
Snodgrass (1974).
 On the probable (to eikos) in ancient stories, see Arist. Po. 1451a36-8 and Redfield (1994, 56-60).17
 On local motivation in Homer, see Scodel (1999, 33-47), who examines in great detail how credibility is achieved 18
in Homer and elsewhere.
 The most influential proponents of this view are Godelier (2011, 1-10) and Sahlins (2013, 1-59).19
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constitutes kinship.”  Relatedness falls into the conceptual category of ‘interdigitation,’ which 20
refers to the idea that social roles are ultimately determined by the individual’s point of view.  I 21
will continue to use the term ‘kinship’ with the understanding that it cannot be objectively 
defined. The reason for this is that I want to retain the term ‘relatedness’ for occasions when I 
wish to emphasize an individual’s point of view about a particular relationship. 
 For the purposes of this project, then, I will define ‘family’ as the set of people to whom 
the poem portrays a given character as related. This set is fluid to a certain degree.  After all, 22
like us, a Greek could gain relatives through such means as marriage or adoption. He could also 
lose them through death or divorce. Again, however, there is the all-important question of point 
of view. So, for example, Phoenix tells the story of how he was alienated from his father’s oikos 
and in his flight reached the house of Peleus (Il. 9.447-77), who loved him as a father loves his 
only darling son (καί µ᾽ ἐφίλησ᾽ ὡς εἴ τε πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φιλήσῃ/ µοῦνον τηλύγετον (9.481-2)).  23
Then Phoenix in turn, since he could not have children (cf. 9.453-457), worked to make Achilles 
a son (ἀλλὰ σὲ παῖδα, θεοῖς ἐπιείκελ᾽ Ἀχιλλεῦ,/ ποιεύµην (9.494-5)).  Phoenix has quite clearly 24
been incorporated into a new oikos and lineage as a sort of foster-son/father.  He saw himself as 25
severed from his natal household to the extent that he would have killed his father if doing so 
 Carsten (2000, 5). For a more thorough placement of the term in its scholarly context, see Carsten (2004, 20
109-162). Fragoulaki (2013, 3-10) uses the concept in his study of interstate relations in Thucydides.
 Carsten (2004, 153).21
 This fluidity appears to be a universal property of kinship: Carsten (2004, 154).22
 As will become clear, my interpretation of Peleus treating Phoenix ‘as if he were his son’ is that this is the poet’s 23
way of saying that they share a kind of father-son relationship that they do not have the vocabulary to describe more 
precisely, which has been a frequent problem in many cultures: Carsten (2004, 144-6).
 It is true that pais (‘child’), as opposed to, say, hyios (‘son’), can have meanings that do not pertain to kinship 24
(Gates 1971, 11). Considering that the relationship between biological fathers and sons is regularly described using 
pais, however (e.g. 9.481, 11.750, Od. 16.17), and that it would be absurd to read the present passage as Phoenix 
making Achilles a boy, it seems unavoidable that he is referring to a father-son relationship.
 So Felson (2002a, 41-2 and 2002b, 262-3).25
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would not have had such a negative effect on his tīmē (‘respect’; 9.458-461).  From the point of 26
view of his fellow townsmen and kinsmen (ἔται καὶ ἀνεψιοί), however, he was still a member of 
his natal oikos (9.464-473). In Homeric poetry, therefore, interdigitation can be a significant 
enough factor that even what oikos a character does (or at least should) belong to can be a matter 
of perspective. 
 As abstract and relative as these terms and concepts can be, we do need a fairly concrete, 
corporate unit of kinship around which to base our investigation. This unit must be native to the 
Homeric poem. Genos, while it can often be translated satisfactorily as ‘family’, is not 
sufficiently concrete. While it does generally appear to refer to a “descent-construct,”  the extent 27
and nature of the group to which it refers is very frequently somewhat vague. As C. Patterson 
puts it, “the genos was not a group to which one longed to return or for which one fought.”  28
Phulon probably does not refer to kinship at all but to a band of followers.  The most suitable 29
unit is in fact one to which I have already referred several times: the oikos.  The oikos is ideal 30
both because it is a fairly well-defined unit and because it problematizes the boundaries of 
Homeric kinship in fruitful ways. As Thalmann defines the term, the oikos “consists of a male 
head, his family, and their house, but it is more significantly an extended household, which 
includes also farmland and herds, dependent workers and slaves. As such, it is the basic social 
 For a defence of my use of these un-Iliadic lines, see the third chapter.26
 Donlan (2007, 36).27
 C. Patterson (1998, 49). See Fraser (2009, 1-11) on how it is even frequently difficult to tell the difference 28
between genos and ethnos. For example, genos seems literally to refer to a breed of Paphlagonian mules at Il. 
2.851-2.
 Donlan (1985, 295-8).29
 C. Patterson (1998, 49): “the oikos… was the focus of both sentiment and action.”30
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unit of ‘Homeric’ society.”  Similarly, Walter Donlan says that the oikos is a combination of a 31
“kernel kin-group” (i.e. the patrilocal joint family) and non-kin.  Significantly, both of these 32
formulations make a distinction between the ‘family’ at the conceptual centre of the oikos and the 
rest, the unrelated, on the margins. It is my contention that some members of the oikos outside of 
the patrilocal joint family are portrayed as kin as well. This is not to say that the oikos is the same 
as the family, or that all members of an oikos are necessarily members of a particular family. But 
it does give us a useful unit to work with. Of particular advantage here is the oikos’ spatial 
component. It is the land on which its members live and raise livestock. But where they live is 
also frequently an expression of their status and their relationship with the various other 
members of the oikos. For example, it is no accident that Odysseus and Penelope sleep in the 
palace, while Eumaeus lives in a hut on the outskirts. Odysseus is the patriarch, the centre of the 
oikos, whereas Eumaeus is still a member of the oikos, but he is more of a marginal case. 
 To reinforce this point, let us return to our example of Phoenix in the Iliad. He says that 
Peleus treated him like a son. Phoenix also worked to make Achilles his son. Despite the fact that 
Phoenix ends up dwelling on the furthest edges of Phthia (9.484), he does seem to have been a 
member of Peleus’ oikos at least during Achilles’ infancy. In his description of his caregiving 
relationship with the child Achilles, the iterative ἐθέλεσκες (9.486) and the adverb of frequency 
πολλάκι (9.490) give the sense that Phoenix’ tending to Achilles was his usual practice. The fact 
that it was his toiling for Achilles’ sake that made him hope he would make Achilles his son 
 Thalmann (1998a, 9); cf. Wöhrle (1999, 11-48) on the centrality of the head male’s line in the oikos and in 31
Homeric epic in general. 
 Donlan (2007, 35); so Finley (1978, 56-63 and 74-107) and C. Patterson (1998, 44-56). So too Nevett (1999, 32
12-20 and 2010, 3-4) from a historical point of view. Donlan is concerned with defining the oikos of the Iron Age. 
Since all of his evidence is from Homer, I feel no need to distinguish between his definition and Thalmann’s in this 
case.
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(9.492-496) also seems to imply that they used to live in the same oikos, since it reinforces the 
sense that he played a parental and even maternal role.  If this reading is correct, and Phoenix 33
was indeed a member of the oikos at that time, then he does not fit comfortably into either of the 
usual binary categories of the oikos, namely kin (patrilocal joint family) and non-kin.  Phoenix’ 34
description of his relationship with Peleus as like that of a son to a father and with Achilles at 
least ideally as that of a father to a son indicates that he is trying to incorporate himself into the 
Aeacid patriline – not in the sense that he occupies a spot on the family tree, but rather in that he 
gains the benefits of such close relations, for example “in order that you [i.e. Achilles] might 
save me from unseemly destruction in the future” (ἵνα µοί ποτ᾽ ἀεικέα λοιγὸν ἀµύνῃς (9.495)). 
Avery shows that Phoenix presents himself “as a second father in order to exert emotional 
pressure on Achilles to relent, pressure that could not be applied by Odysseus… or by Ajax.”  It 35
is also the case that, while the extent to which Phoenix’ speech actually persuades Achilles is a 
matter of debate, Achilles does not reject Phoenix’ expression of relatedness, but rather himself 
expresses the warmth of his affection for the old man, points out in a menacing manner that 
Phoenix is supposed to be supporting him and not Agamemnon, and bids him stay the night so 
that they can consider together whether to depart for Phthia (9.607-19).  This interaction 36
suggests that we are to understand an (at least formerly) intra-oikos relatedness between Phoenix 
and Achilles that does not fit into the category of family as it is formulated in recent classical 
scholarship. For example, Thalmann and Donlan follow Pitt-Rivers in distinguishing between the 
 See Hainsworth (1993 ad Il. 9.485-495) on Phoenix as at least rhetorically replacing Thetis during Achilles’ 33
childhood in this passage.
 The tendency has been to view Phoenix as an outsider to the house of Peleus: see especially Köhnken (1975 and 34
1978).
 Avery (1998, 390).35
 On the warmth of Achilles’ response, cf. Hainsworth (1993 ad Il. 9.609-10) and Avery (1998, 390). 36
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categories of ‘kin’ and ‘pseudo-kin’.  Pitt-Rivers does at one point offer the suggestion that “it 37
seems advisable to consider as genuine kin those to whom the custom of the society ascribes 
such status, whatever the criteria for ascription may be, and to regard as pseudo-kin those who 
achieve the role otherwise.”  However, in practice he tends to refer to modes of kinship that are 38
achieved through means other than consanguinity or affinity as ‘pseudo-kinship.’  This 39
presupposition regarding what kinship constitutes in a given community is closely linked to the 
nature-versus-culture polarity, which is no longer considered a tenable generalization in 
anthropology.  As opposed to viewing the interaction between Phoenix and Achilles as a 40
momentary, figurative usage of kinship, “as when an old man is addressed as ‘grandad’ [sic] in 
order to imply intimacy and age difference,”  I think it is necessary to take what Phoenix says 41
literally. The long history that he relates is not simply invented for rhetorical convenience. We 
are surely to understand that he actually did leave his natal oikos, join Achilles’, and form close 
bonds within it, bonds which he and possibly Achilles perceive to be kinship. It is precisely 
ambiguous cases like that of Phoenix with respect to the oikos of the Aeacids that I believe 
require further examination. If we are to take seriously the possibility that marginal members of 
the oikos can be viewed as related to the patrilocal joint family that forms its core, and that all 
forms of kinship can be fluid to a certain degree, then it would appear that a potentially crucial 
social dynamic of the Homeric poems has gone under-appreciated. 
 Thalmann (1998a, 124-5), Donlan (2007, 33), both of whom refer to Pitt-Rivers (1977). For our purposes, 37
however, Pitt-Rivers (1968) is more direct.
 Pitt-Rivers (1968, 408). It is unclear to me in any case to what the “otherwise” would refer if all kin from the 38
native point of view are eliminated. The examples he provides (408-410) are only nominally kin even from the point 
of view of ego. In this case, surely the relationships simply do not belong in the category of kinship at all.
 E.g. ibid. 408-9.39
 Carsten (2000, 9-10 and 2004, 136) and Fragoulaki (2013, 23).40
 Pitt-Rivers (1968, 408).41
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 Regarding the structure of the Homeric oikos, it is, I think, uncontroversial to claim that 
the male head generally stands at the conceptual centre. We must surely conclude from the 
Odyssey, for example, that a virile male head is a sine qua non for a household. Without a 
continuous Laertid line, Odysseus’ oikos would simply cease to exist in its current form. It is 
furthermore the case that, at least to a certain extent, the rest of the household defines itself with 
reference to the male head. It will be fruitful, therefore, to explore the potential boundaries of 
kinship in Homer by examining some relationships between the heads of households and 
characters on the margins of those households. And, while kinship can be enacted in any number 
of ways, it will be useful to examine briefly two central aspects of kinship in order to illuminate 
how I intend to proceed. First, kinship unsurprisingly has a decisive influence on the portrayal of 
identity in Homeric poetry. According to King and Stone’s recent study of patriliny in Eurasian 
cultures, “males alone possess the ability to bequeath to their offspring certain identity 
categories, or what might be called ‘social ontology,’ such as membership in a family, tribe, or 
religious, ethnic, or other group.”  It is hardly revelatory to observe that a fundamental element 42
of masculine identity in a patriarchal society is the patriline. And, as we have already noted, oikoi 
in Homeric poetry centre around patrilines. It is little wonder, then, that the ‘familial ontology’ of 
the marginal family members tends to be centripetal, to be faced toward and to long to approach 
the centre. For any member of an oikos who is not the patriarch, one’s relationship with and 
position relative to him is a vitally important part of their identity. 
 The second aspect of kinship that I will explore in this introduction is the rearing of 
children, which is primarily denoted in Homer by the Greek trephein and atitallein. As we will 
 King and Stone (2010, 330).42
!13
see, participation in rearing is one of the main reasons one character will give to justify his 
relatedness to another. Rearing or being reared is seen to create familial bonds, regardless of 
whether or not bonds of blood or marriage are involved. Τrephein has a fairly broad semantic 
range. It seems to have two radically different basic meanings, ‘to make solid,’ and ‘to nourish, 
rear’, and the general opinion is that the latter is a metaphorical extension of the former.  43
Griffith describes this extension as follows: “Not only… does the act of trephein turn inanimate 
objects literally, and living beings metaphorically, from liquid to solid, but it shapes and 
improves both.”  The idea is presumably that young people and animals require care while they 44
are still too ‘moist’ to have formed fully enough to survive on their own.  So, Hesiod’s Silver 45
Generation is seen to by its unfortunate mothers for a century because the children take that long 
to form (Hes. Op. 131). I agree with Griffith, and it is useful to consider some further extensions 
as well.  For example, Calypso describes her keeping of Odysseus in the following terms: τὸν 46
µὲν ἐγὼ φίλεόν τε καὶ ἔτρεφον ἠδὲ ἔφασκον/ θήσειν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήραον ἤµατα πάντα (“I 
welcomed him and looked after him, and kept saying that I would make him immortal and 
ageless for all days,” Od. 5.135-6; similarly 7.255-257 and 23.335-6). Odysseus is hardly a child. 
He is a fully-formed adult and needs no caretaker. Nor is Calypso any ordinary mother or nurse. 
 Moussy (1969, 39-43), Benveniste (1971, 251-4), Chantraine (1968-1980, s.v. τρέφω), Griffith (2010). Demont 43
(1978, 375 and 1981, 111-12) argues that the two meanings are so dissimilar that they must represent two 
homonymous verbs; cf. Beekes (2010, s.v.), who is agnostic. Gernet (1955, 26-7) correctly observes that trephein is 
de rigueur when a child is raised in a house other than the paternal one, but this hardly captures the whole range of 
the word’s application.
 Griffith (2010, 307).44
 The corollary to this is that old age is characterized by dryness and a lack of menos (‘strength’): Giacomelli (1980, 45
14).
 In addition to the following, other extensions include Zeus ‘rearing’ Achilles as a great pain for the Trojans (µέγα 46
µιν Ὀλύµπιος ἔτρεφε πῆµα Τρωσὶν, Il. 6.282; cf. Od. 14.175 and h. Ap. 305-6, but contrast Il. 22.421; cf. Cunliffe 
(1963, s.v. τρέφω 2) and Achilles’ growing out a lock of his hair for the river Spercheius (Il. 23.141-2; see Griffith 
(2010, 305) on this passage in more detail).
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And she is not interested in treating Odysseus like a child. On the contrary, she makes it quite 
clear that she wants to make Odysseus her husband (5.118-136). Calypso compares her situation 
to that of Eos with Orion and Demeter with Iasion (5.121-128), but the most obvious extant 
parallel in early epic is that of Eos and Tithonus in the Hymn to Aphrodite (218-238).  At the 47
beginning of Book 5 of the Odyssey, Eos leaves Tithonus’ bed to mark the beginning of the day 
(5.1-2 = Il. 11.1-2).  But the couple is not mentioned elsewhere (although Tithonus does appear 48
in Aeneas’ genealogy: Il. 20.237). The story of Eos and Tithonus is obviously similar to what 
Calypso would prefer to experience with Odysseus, however, inasmuch as she desires to have a 
mortal as her immortal husband.  While, as Stanford notes, there is no direct evidence that the 49
tradition that produced our Odyssey was aware of the story of Eos and Tithonus that we see in the 
Hymn to Aphrodite, Sappho (fr. 58 Voigt),  or Mimnermus (fr. 4.2 West), there is a similar use of 50
formulaic language in the Hymn.  Like Calypso, Eos wants Tithonus to be immortal for all days 51
(ἀθάνατόν τ᾽ εἶναι καὶ ζώειν ἤµατα πάντα, 221). While she famously forgets that she also does 
not want him to age (223-4), she does take care of him in her halls when he grows old and grey, 
feeding him mortal food and ambrosia (αὐτὸν δ᾽ αὖτ᾽ ἀτίταλλεν ἐνὶ µεγάροισιν ἔχουσα/ σίτῳ τ᾽ 
ἀµβροσίῃ τε, 231-2).  As N. Richardson points out, atitallein is always used of nursing children 52
 See C. Brown (2011) for the tradition on Eos and Tithonus in general. 47
 On dawn formulae, see Austin (1975, 89-97).48
 Peradotto (1990, 55) refers to Od. 5.1-2 as “definite if muted prolepsis” of the desire which Calypso is about to 49
voice.
 See Obbink (2009) for the inclusion of the most recent papyrological evidence.50
 Stanford (1959 ad 5.1).51
 Faulkner (2008 ad loc.): “the combination of mortal and immortal food is representative of Tithonus’ intermediary 52
status between mortal and divine… Odysseus in contrast receives mortal food from Calypso (Od. 5.195-9).” This is 
true, but it is important to note that Calypso only feeds Odysseus mortal food after it has been established once and 
for all that he will leave.
!15
in early epic.  Atitallein is virtually equivalent in meaning to trephein,  so that it is interesting 53 54
to observe that, in the case of both verbs, the only exception to their being used exclusively of 
nursing young children or animals is in the case of a goddess taking care of a mortal man whom 
she desires as a husband. It may be the case that the goddesses wish to make their men more 
durable by nourishing them in a certain way. One is reminded, for example, of Demeter 
anointing Demophoön with ambrosia (χρίεσκ᾽ ἀµβροσίῃ, H. Dem. 237).  But what we can assert 55
with some confidence is that trephein and atitallein, which are ordinarily used of nursing 
children, are also used in the present kind of type-scene to denote a particular process.  Outside 56
of this type-scene, however, there is unsurprisingly no example of trephein where it is used of the 
nursing of an adult.  57
 In the passive, trephein strictly speaking translates as ‘to be reared,’ but, when it appears 
without an agent, it seems simply to mean ‘to grow up, develop.’  So, for example, the formulae 58
ἠµὲν τράφεν ἠδ᾽ ἐγένοντο (“they were raised and born:” Il. 1.251, Od. 4.723, 10.417, 14.201) 
and γενέσθαι τε τραφέµεν τε (“to be born and raised:” Il. 7.199, 18.436; Od. 3.28), does not 
 N. Richardson (2010 ad 230-232). As with trephein, it is also used of young animals: Il. 5.271, 24.280; Od. 14.41, 53
15.174.
 Hsch. s.v. ἀτίταλλον [α 8098 Latte]· ἔτρεφον, and also s.v. ἀτίταλλε [α 8099 Latte]· ἀγάπα. µετὰ ἐπιµελείας 54
τρέφε.
 Cf. also the newborn Apollo gaining strength once he has eaten nectar and ambrosia (ad Ap. 123-129).55
 On the type-scene, see M. Edwards (1992).56
 The only other apparent exception is Dolius’ wife, who cares for his (their?) children (σφεας τρέφε, Od. 24.389). 57
While Russo et al. (1992 ad 24.388-390) say that σφεας refers to Dolius and his sons, I think it refers more naturally 
to the sons alone. Since Dolius is old (γέρων, 387), one might hypothesize that the sons are adults. However, since, 
with the exception of the aforementioned type-scene, trephein is always used of children elsewhere, we should 
assume that Dolius’ sons are also children. It is probably a different Dolius who is the father of Melanthius (17.212, 
22.159) and Melantho (18.322), since, as Harris (2012, 358) observes, he is apparently not bothered by their murder 
at his masters’ hands; contra Haller (2013, 267-9), who summarizes each side of the argument.
 As early as Aeschylus (Eu. 664; Th. 754), it can refer in the passive to what we would call the gestation of a fetus. 58
This usage becomes standard in Aristotle and the Hippocratic corpus: E. Lesky (1951, 1252). LfgrE s.v. τρέφω Β 
suggests that the formation of Aphrodite at Hes. Th. 192 and 198 constitutes the same usage, but I think it is rather 
different. 
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generally emphasize the activity of raising a child, but rather the fact that a person or group of 
people has been born and reached adulthood.  In Odyssey 4, Penelope addresses her 59
handmaidens, saying, κλῦτε, φίλαι· περὶ γάρ µοι Ὀλύµπιος ἄλγε᾽ ἔδωκεν/ ἐκ πασέων, ὅσσαι µοι 
ὁµοῦ τράφεν ἠδ᾽ ἐγένοντο (“listen, friends. For of all the women, as many as were raised and 
born with me, the Olympian has given me surpassing sorrow,” Od. 4.722-3). The reason that 
Penelope’s peers are relevant is because they were born and reached adulthood, meaning that 
they can be compared to her.  Similarly, Nestor has outlived two generations, οἵ οἱ πρόσθεν ἅµα 60
τράφεν ἠδ᾽ ἐγένοντο/ ἐν Πύλῳ ἠγαθέῃ (“who long ago were raised and born with him in holy 
Pylos,” Il. 1.251). This phrase has no point if these generations had not reached maturity before 
fading away.  
 So, we can see that trephein and atitallein apply fairly strictly to the care of children 
(almost always boys) until they reach their youthful prime (ἥβης µέτρον ἵκοντο, Od. 11.317).  61
The hēbēs metron “marque le passage à la majorité.”  The rearing of the young until they reach 62
their hēbē is at the core of Homeric kinship. The beneficiary of this care then owes a lifelong 
debt (threptra) to his caretaker. The prototype of this reciprocal relationship is the debt that the 
 Demont (1978, 375) claims that the τράφεν in ἠµὲν τράφεν ἠδ᾽ ἐγένοντο must refer to the development of the 59
fetus, since it would be a hysterology to say that a child “was raised and born.” But this kind of hysteron proteron is 
normal in epic: Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 ad Od. 14.201), who compare θρέψασα τεκοῦσά τε (Od. 12.134) and 
γαµέοντί τε γεινοµένῳ τε (4.208).
 Because the τράφεµεν at Il. 18.436 is active, this iteration of the formula is an exception to my general point. The 60
phrase γενόµην καί µ᾽ ἔτρεφον αὐτοί (Od. 14.141) similarly places emphasis on the rearing because ἔτρεφον is 
active.
 Cf. Il. 11.225, 24.728, Od. 4.668, 15.366, 18.217, 19.532, Hes. Op. 132, fr. 205.2 M.-W, H. Dem. 166 = 221; 61
conversely of death: λιποῦσ᾽ ἀνδροτῆτα καὶ ἥβην (“having left behind his manliness and youthful prime,” Il. 16.857 
= 22.363), on which formula see T. Barnes (2011), who finds in it an allusion to the death of Achilles.
 Gernet (1955, 24 n. 1). In later poetry, the age of majority is called hōra (Griffith (2010, 305), citing Mimn. fr. 2.1 62
West² in particular).
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son owes to his parents, and especially his father.  The Iliad tends to express this concept in 63
negative terms, since dead warriors are unable to give their parents their due. So, when 
Simoeisius and Hippothous are killed in the Iliad, the poet says of each, οὐδὲ τοκεῦσιν / θρέπτρα 
φίλοις ἀπέδωκε (“and he did not render to his dear parents return for his rearing,” 4.477-8 = 
17.301-2). And Achilles laments that he is not at home to take care of his father Peleus as he ages 
(οὐδέ νυ τόν γε / γηράσκοντα κοµίζω, 24.540-1). But, to return again to the example of Phoenix, 
who, as we have established, demands that Achilles protect him in return for the care he gave 
him as a child and uses this relationship as the basis for their relatedness, it is clear that the 
trephein/threptra link is not limited to biological parents and their children.   64
 Eumaeus the swineherd is also informative in this regard, responding to Odysseus’ query 
about his mother Anticleia as follows: 
     ὄφρα µὲν οὖν δὴ κείνη ἔην, ἀχέουσα περ ἔµπης, 
     τόφρα τί µοι φίλον ἔσκε µεταλλῆσαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι, 
     οὕνεκα µ᾽ αὐτὴ θρέψεν ἅµα Κτιµένῃ τανυπέπλῳ, 
     θυγατέρ᾽ ἰφθίµῃ, τὴν ὁπλοτάτην τέκε παίδων· 
     τῇ ὁµοῦ ἐτρεφόµην, ὀλίγον δέ τί µ᾽ ἧσσον ἐτίµα. 
     αὐτὰρ ἐπεί ῥ᾽ ἥβην πολυήρατον ἱκόµεθ᾽ ἄµφω, 
     τὴν µὲν ἔπειτα Σάµηνδ᾽ ἔδοσαν καὶ µυρί᾽ ἕλοντο, 
     αὐτὰρ ἐµὲ χλαῖνάν τε χιτῶνά τε εἵµατ᾽ ἐκείνη 
     καλὰ µάλ᾽ ἀµφιέσασα ποσὶν θ᾽ ὑποδήµατα δοῦσα 
     ἀγρόνδε προΐαλλε· φίλει δέ µε κηρόθι µᾶλλον. !
     “So, when that woman was alive, even though she sorrowed, then it was rather important to  
     me to ask questions and inquire after her because she herself had reared me along with long- 
     robed Ctimene, her beautiful daughter, to whom she gave birth, the youngest of her children.  
     Along with her I was reared, and she [Anticleia] paid me only a little less respect. But when  
     we both reached our very desirable youthful prime, then they gave her to a man on Same and  
     received boundless recompense. But that woman clothed me in a cloak and tunic, very fine,  
 See Felson (2002a, 36 n. 3). Her definition of threptra (35) is also useful: “what you gratefully give back to the 63
parents who reared you.” Falkner (1995, 12-17) traces the development of this concept into later periods. See also B. 
Richardson (1969) on Pl. Lg. 4.717b-c and DL 1.7.55.
 Cf. Hera’s claim to have reared Thetis: ἣν ἐγὼ αὐτή / θρέψα τε καὶ ἀτίτηλα (Il. 24.59-60). 64
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     gave me sandals for my feet, and sent me to the field. And she loved me all the more in her  
     heart” (Od. 15.361-70). !
The reciprocal nature of Eumaeus’ relationship with Odysseus’ mother is explicit. He made it a 
priority to ask after her because she tended to him until he and her daughter, who receives no 
other mention in the poem, came of age. At that point, recompense was due. Ctimene was 
essentially sold off as a bride and fetched a good price (as well as establishing or strengthening a 
kinship connection). And Eumaeus went to work for the family as a slave in the fields. Of 
particular interest in this passage is the claim that Anticleia paid him nearly as much respect as 
she paid to Odysseus’ sister (365), and that she loved him all the more once he had gone off to 
the fields (370). Both phrases contain comparatives to stress the depth of her regard, so that it 
seems important to Eumaeus that his childhood caregiver valued him. He presents his labour and 
solicitude as threptra, and this is probably to be taken as a natural attitude. But his assertion of 
his value in her eyes raises a further point. Like Phoenix, Eumaeus is family to an established 
and relatively powerful oikos. And, like Phoenix, Eumaeus jockeys for position within that 
system. If someone as central as the wife of the patriarch held him in high regard, then he must 
be a valuable family member. So, we find that rearing is a central familial institution. It is a 
means by which one ensures the loyalty and service of one’s children and other young members 
of the oikos. And, on the other side, the quality of rearing and the value in which the child is held 
is a metric of the social status of the child, even when he is fully grown. In other words, rearing 
is governed by the honour (tīmē) culture which is so central to the Homeric poems.  In the 65
present passage (365), and ubiquitously elsewhere, the raising of a child is measured in tīmē. 
 The bibliography on honour culture in Homer is considerable, but see especially Dodds (1951, 1-27), van Wees 65
(1992), Redfield (1994, 30-68), Cairns (2001), and Scodel (2008, 1-32).
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And, as we shall see, the amount of tīmē accorded the child by his caretakers is expressed in 
comparison to the amount given to legitimate children.  The tīmē conferred upon Eumaeus by 66
the nature of his rearing probably signals the kind of fixed tīmē he can expect as a mature adult.   67
So, when Eumaeus claims that Anticleia honoured him only slightly less than her own daughter, 
he is claiming a status comparable to Ctimene’s. While comparison between a daughter’s status 
and a son’s is not a straightforward matter, it is evidently the case that it is a mark of special 
privilege for a slave to receive such treatment.  Of course the beggar Odysseus has only 68
Eumaeus’ word on this claim, but that is the nature of the honour game. Eumaeus has or wants a 
certain position with respect to his oikos, and he can be expected to say and do what he can to 
promote himself, even – or indeed especially – at the expense of its unfriendly members. None of 
this is to suggest that there is much fluidity in the fairly rigid hierarchy in Homeric poetry – 
although there is some. It is nonetheless the case that even the lowliest of slaves jockeys 
jealously for position both within society at large and within his oikos. 
 The chapters in this thesis each explore both a role that is felt to be marginal to the oikos 
and a way in which characters occupying this role either attempt to gain position or assert their 
current one, frequently in creative ways. In the first chapter, I look at bastards. While there are 
different kinds of bastards in Homeric poetry, they all fall under the rubric of extramarital 
children. The position of a bastard within an oikos can vary dramatically, depending most 
importantly on the attitude of its more central figures. It is for this reason that I focus on the 
 See the following chapter.66
 Scodel (2008, 12) distinguishes between fixed tīmē and flexible tīmē: “high position brings tīmē with it; 67
Agamemnon is entitled to tīmē because he is king. Tīmē can also depend on individual meritorious actions or on a 
history of achievement. Achilles claims tīmē as the greatest warrior.” Similarly Wilson (2002, 34-8).
 In any case, as we will observe in the first chapter, Homeric poetry surprisingly does not seem to make any 68
distinction between the rearing of a boy versus that of a girl.
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means by which the bastard’s position within the oikos can be negotiated by interested parties 
and what factors can be influential in determining his status. Some exploration of the 
terminology and fate of bastards is necessary as a preliminary study. Then, using Teucer and 
Heracles as extreme examples on either end of the spectrum, I conclude that the possibilities for 
a bastard range from full incorporation into the oikos to being cast out and forced to search for a 
new home. In most available Archaic iterations of the Heracles myth, he is dear to Zeus and 
entirely unwelcome to Hera. While Hera’s hatred plagues him during his mortal life, it appears 
that he is fully incorporated into the Olympian oikos through his posthumous marriage to Hebe, 
the only daughter of Zeus and Hera. In Teucer’s case, he is initially at least tolerated as a member 
of Telamon’s household, particularly as his half-brother Ajax’ companion, the two fighting in 
close and coordinated proximity in the Iliad. Interestingly, while it has often been asserted that 
his archery is a symptom of his bastardy, it is much more likely that he is an archer because of 
his Trojan ancestry on his mother’s side. His mother’s Trojan identity ultimately proves 
catastrophic for him, however, when Ajax commits suicide, and Telamon blames him for this, 
apparently assuming that Teucer has surreptitiously sided with his mother’s people in the war.  69
A fair amount of negotiation is apparently possible in the case of bastards, depending especially 
upon the attitudes of more central family members and the abilities of the bastard. 
 In the second chapter, I look at slavery in the person of Eumaeus. As with women, slaves 
can be intimately located within the innermost confines of an oikos, while simultaneously being 
accorded little of the power, prestige, or personhood of a free man. But the possibility and even 
encouragement of intimacy can lead to a striking degree of assimilation. Eumaeus’ incorporation 
 The suicide of Ajax and Telamon’s subsequent exile are not related in Homer, but I will argue that they betray a 69
knowledge of these details.
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into Odysseus’ oikos leads him to adopt the man’s persona to the extent that he becomes his 
double. Using Freud’s theory of the uncanny, I examine how, with Odysseus’ long absence from 
home forcing him to work his way back into the centre of his own oikos, Eumaeus’ similar 
characteristics and current position on the margins of the household reflect the distance Odysseus 
still has to travel, even though he has finally reached Ithaca. The end result of all this for 
Eumaeus is that Odysseus promises to make him and his own doublet Philoetius companions and 
brothers of Telemachus (Od. 21.214-16). While it is unclear precisely what this promotion 
entails, it is clearly a promotion within the oikos. Eumaeus’ successful assimilation into 
Odysseus’ oikos and his loyalty eventually result in a more central position therein. 
 In the third chapter, I examine Phoenix as exile. He has abandoned the dysfunctional 
house of his father and has been as closely incorporated into Peleus’ oikos as he is likely to be. 
What is of central interest here is not only his position in his new oikos, but also how he exploits 
it rhetorically in his lengthy speech to Achilles (Il. 9.434-605). As Thalmann helpfully observes, 
“the relations between the head of the household and his dependents (or slaves) is [sic] presented 
in the poem as the paradigm for all hierarchical social relations.”  In other words, the male head 70
of, say, an army, can be presented metaphorically as the head of an oikos. And Phoenix brilliantly 
takes advantage of the slippage between the metaphorical and literal concepts of the father to 
argue that Achilles, as the ‘son’ of Agamemnon, should obey him. In making this implication, 
Phoenix explores the possibility of violent confrontation between parent and child, and even 
filicide. He relates to Achilles how his own father cursed him with sterility, and also how 
Meleager’s mother cursed her son with death. The natural reaction of each of these men was to 
 Thalmann (1998a, 17); so Finley (1978, 83).70
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sever ties with the aggressive parent and withdraw. Phoenix’ emphasis here is on the mutability 
of kinship relations. If ties even with one’s parents can be severed, then any relationship is 
necessarily fragile. Phoenix found a new home with a new father. So Achilles has left Phthia 
never to return. For all intents and purposes, his home is the Achaean camp, and his loyalties lie 
there. In his speech, Phoenix takes full advantage of his marginal position relative to Achilles by 
transposing his actual situation onto Achilles’ potential future should Achilles not do what the 
embassy asks. While this speech is ultimately not successful, it does show the malleability of the 
concept of home and exile as well as the rhetorical potential of relatedness. 
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CHAPTER ONE: BASTARDS  
               1.1: THE NOTHOS 
 No detailed study has ever been done on bastardy in Homer,  although Ogden has 71
established that it does not carry any especial stigma.  But, should the father also have 72
legitimate children, we might prima facie expect the bastard’s position to be tenuous. While, as 
we shall see, there are examples of the bastard being at odds with his legitimate brothers over 
inheritance, the overwhelmingly more common pattern is that of harmony within the bastard’s 
paternal oikos. I suggest three reasons for this. First, in honour societies, it seldom hurts to have 
an extra sword-arm handy.  Second, we find that bastards are not infrequently described as 73
having been raised along with their legitimate brothers in their paternal oikos, and sometimes 
even with the same level of care. With one exception, that of Odysseus qua beggar, the 
understanding seems to be that this arrangement tends to foster an intimate relationship of the 
sort that is perhaps epitomized by Ajax and Teucer. Third, in the extreme circumstance of an 
oikos lacking a legitimate son, a bastard may sometimes stand as heir.  At first blush, these three 74
points appear to be at odds with the expectation created by Ogden’s theory of ‘amphimetric’ 
strife, according to which familial discord can ordinarily be expected to occur in an oikos with 
 Diller (1937, 73-7), C. Patterson (1990, 47-50), and Ogden (1996, 21-6) address bastardy in Homer, but mostly 71
only inasmuch as they see it to differ from bastardy in the Classical Period.
 Ogden (1996, 22); cf. L. Patterson (2010, 5-12). Contrast Σ Α and T ad 5.70 Erbse, who say that it was a 72
βαρβαρικὸν ἔθος (“foreign custom”) to have children with more than one woman, with T citing Od. 1.433 as 
evidence (on this passage, however, see below). I think that in this case the attitude of the scholia reflects the fact 
that they were written in a later time period.
 Pitt-Rivers (1966, 35-9) discusses the advantages of having brothers in honour societies. Cf. Od. 16.97-120, where 73
Telemachus laments that he has no brothers to help him drive the suitors out of his oikos. See also Hes. Op. 342-5.
 I do agree with Ogden’s (1996, 13-14) argument, however, that there was probably never any consistent legal 74
system regarding bastards before the Classical Period.
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children from the same father but more than one different mother.  And there is no doubt that 75
this is frequently the case later in antiquity.  Nor is anyone likely to be surprised that a 76
stepmother might not find her husband’s sexual activity with another woman entirely to her 
liking.  However, while we certainly find some evidence of friction between the bastard son and 77
his stepmother – and her natal family more generally – this is almost always where the 
dysfunction ends. It does not spread to the rest of the oikos. On the contrary, the bastard seems to 
occupy a fairly standard but accepted role that is inferior to but not at all incompatible with that 
of the legitimate son. That the bastard has a more comfortable position in Homer than in most of 
later antiquity is not entirely surprising. Most of the characters in the Iliad and Odyssey, even the 
minor, illegitimate ones, were seen to be the illustrious ancestors or even founders of the ruling 
families of Archaic Greece, no doubt a crucial audience for the performers of the later iterations 
of the Homeric poems.  
 Let us begin with the terminology. The Greek term for ‘bastardy’ is notheia, the quality of 
being nothos, bastard or baseborn, which is to be distinguished from the legitimate gnēsios.  78
There remains some debate as to whether the early Greek concept of bastardy includes 
extramarital children or the products of unequal or ‘mixed’ parents.  In Homer, the former is 79
almost certainly the rule, as we will see. And the usual understanding is that the nothos in Homer 
 Ogden (1996, 19-21 and especially 24). Eur. Ion 599-647 is a later and hypothetical example of why the 75
relationship between son and stepmother was often not harmonious in Greek antiquity.
 See, for example, Ogden (1996, 189-99).76
 For lack of a better option, I use the term ‘stepmother’ to apply to the bastard’s father’s wife, even if, as in most 77
cases, their marriage seems to have been prior to the bastard’s birth. Certainly the Greek mētryiē can refer to both.
 Ogden (1996, 17-18) rightly argues that gnēsios and nothos do not constitute a strict polarity, that we have gnēsios 78
on the one hand and nothos and poiētos (“adopted”) on the other. We will not deal with the poiētos here, however, as 
it is not attested early enough.
 Ogden (1996, 13-15) champions the former theory; C. Patterson (1990) the latter. Gates (1971) never addresses 79
the term.
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– for the word does not appear elsewhere in early Greek hexameter – is the offspring of a heroic 
father and a concubine or, more generically, a slave-woman.  This may or may not be the case. 80
Mothers are mentioned so infrequently in Homer. But even if this understanding is correct, it 
does not take into account that not all slave-women are equal in Homer. After all, as we will see, 
a slave-woman can be the daughter of noble parents, or a woman of obscure or even unknown 
origins. And the nothoi from these two women are not necessarily portrayed as having the same 
status. There are also terms other than nothos, such as skotios (“shadowy”) and parthenios (“son 
of an unmarried woman”), which fall under the same conceptual umbrella. And, as we will see 
below, these terms can be differentiated fairly clearly from nothos, with the former likely 
applying to a child who has not been acknowledged by his father, and the latter describing the 
child of a god and a mortal. The existence and precision of these terms further promote the sense 
that ‘illegitimacy’ is a fairly variegated concept in early Greek thought.  
 Donlan, who unfortunately confines his insight to a single paragraph, says that, “while 
nothoi are always identified as such, they are nonetheless full members of the patrilineage.”  81
The first claim is probably true, inasmuch as, with one exception (dealt with below), a child with 
any divine parentage does not seem to be called nothos in the Iliad. For example, I think we have 
to assume that the twins Aesepus and Pedasus are born out of wedlock, since their mother is the 
nymph Abarbarea, and their father, Boucolion, is mortal (6.21-6). But they are not called nothoi. 
In fact, there are a number of sets of twins who could be addressed here, since, as Steinrück has 
 Buchholz (1881, 2.2.33), Diller (1937, 79 and n. 44), both apparently with unfortunate ideological undertones. To 80
my knowledge, this view has never been challenged, although more recent scholars, with the exception of Donlan 
(2007, 34) and Ndoye (2010, 259-60), do not tend to reiterate it.
 Donlan (2007, 34).81
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shown, heroic twins tend to result from the union of their mother with more than one male.  To 82
cite just one further example, the conjoined twins, Cteatus and Eurytus, are referred to 
collectively as the Moliones (11.709, 750) after their mother, Moline, or as the Actoriones 
(2.621, 11.750, 23.638) after Actor, their putative father. But in fact they appear to have two 
fathers: 
     καὶ νύ κεν Ἀκτορίωνε Μολίονε παῖδ᾽ ἀλάπαξα, 
     εἰ µή σφωε πατήρ, εὐρῦ κρείων Ἐνοσίχθων, 
     ἐκ πολέµου ἐσάωσε καλύψας ἠέρι πολλῇ. !
     “And now I would have slain the two Moliones, the sons of Actor, if their father, the Earth- 
     shaker, whose rule is wide, hadn’t saved them, having hidden them from war with thick mist” 
     (Il. 11.750-2).  83!
A scholion to this passage reports that, according to Hesiod, the Moliones are nominally (κατ᾽ 
ἐπίκλησιν) the sons of Actor, but they are the sons of Poseidon by birth (γόνῳ).  And this 84
interpretation is usually accepted.  However, a papyrus fragment thought to be from the 85
Catalogue of Women does not appear to bear this out: 
  Ἄ]κτωρ [θαλ]ερὴν ποιήσατ᾽ ἄκοι[τιν 
     ]εος γαιηόχου ἐννοσιγαίου· 
     ἣ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἐνὶ µεγ]άροις διδυµάονε γείνατο τέκ[νω 
     Ἄκτορι κυσαµ]ένη καὶ ἐρικτύπῳ ἐννοσιγαί[ῳ, 
     ἀπλήτω, Κτέα]τόν τε καὶ Εὔρυτον… !
     “Actor made her (Moline?) his [blooming] wife… of the earth-holder, earth-shaker; and she,  
     [pregnant by Actor] and the loud-sounding earth-shaker, gave birth to two twin children [in  
 Steinrück (1999, 396-400).82
 On the Moliones as conjoined twins, see Gantz (1993, 424-5), Snodgrass (1997, 571-2 and 1998, 28-31); pace 83
Giuliani (2013, 35-7). On the form of Μολίονε, see West (1985, 63 n. 73) and Hirschberger (2004, 201). They are 
more usually called the Molionidae later in antiquity (e.g. Ibycus 285 PMGF, Pherecyd. fr. 79a Fowler; cf. Eust. 
1321). For a different explanation for the name of the Moliones, see Steinrück (1999, 391), who prefers to derive it 
from µολεῖν.
 Ἡσίοδος Ἄκτορος κατ᾽ ἐπίκλησιν καὶ Μολιόνης αὐτοὺς γεγενεαλόγηκεν, γόνῳ δὲ Ποσειδῶνος (Σ Α ad Il. 11.750 84
Erbse = Hes. fr. 17b M-W); cf. Hes. fr. 19 M-W.
 Hainsworth (1993 ad Il. 11.750). Hirschberger (2004, 202) refers to Actor simply as “der Stiefvater der Aktorione-85
Molione.”
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     the halls, terrible children, Cteatus] and Eurytus…” (Hes. fr. 17a.12-16 M-W).  86!
Assuming the restoration of  Ἄκτορι κυσαµ]ένη is correct, we have a slightly different account, 
in which Moline is impregnated by both Actor and Poseidon (on the same night?), a situation 
potentially not dissimilar to that of Alcmene with Zeus and Amphitryon (Hes. fr. 195.14-56 M-
W, on which see the third section of this chapter). This state of affairs is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the Moliones being simultaneously referred to in the Iliad as the sons of both 
Actor and Poseidon. After all, Heracles is called both the son of Zeus (Il. 14.266, 19.132, Od. 
11.620, 21.26, Hes. fr. 33a.28 M-W; also h. Hom. 15.1, 9) and of Amphitryon (Il. 5.392, Hes. fr. 
25.23, 33a.32 M-W, and possibly also at fr. 26.33), or even both at the same time (Od. 
11.267-270, Hes. Th. 317-18). It is entirely possible in ancient myth for twins to have two 
fathers.  Presumably no distinction seems to be made between the Moliones – as we might 87
expect when one father is mortal and one a god – because they are conjoined twins. Again, 
however, they are never called nothoi, even though they are at least partially extramarital 
children. The Moliones, in being sometimes called Μολίονε, are very unusually given a 
matronymic.  And West shows how, in Hes. fr. 17a M-W, the twins are attached to Moline’s 88
genealogy and not to Actor’s or Poseidon’s.  This association of the Moliones with their mother 89
is consistent with the Greek tendency to attach deformed children, and especially deformed 
 On the restoration of line 15, Hirschberger (2004, 203) compares Ζηνί τε κυσαµένη καὶ Ἐπωπέι ποιµένι λαῶν 86
(Asius fr. 1.3 Bernabé); also cf. Hes. Th. 125. Pindar refers to Cteatus as Ποσειδάνιος (O. 10.26).
 Ogden (1996, 134-5) refers to this phenomenon as ‘parallel insemination’.87
 Cf. Robbins (1978, 93) on the rarity of matronymics. Finglass (2007 ad S. El. 365-7) also compares fr. 564.3 88
Radt, and Eur. El. 933-5 and 1103-4 (cf. also Eur. fr. 1064 Kannicht) for the practice in tragedy of calling children 
their mother’s as opposed to their father’s if they show a preference for the former.
 West (1985, 62-3).89
!28
bastards, to their mothers.  The Moliones may not be called nothoi. But they are hardly ordinary, 90
legitimate children, whether by heroic standards or otherwise.  We may say, however, that 91
Donlan is correct to assert that nothoi are always referred to as such in the Iliad, since they seem 
based on usage to be defined as extramarital children of mortal parents. 
 More importantly, the second part of Donlan’s statement, namely that nothoi are full 
members of their patrilineage, also appears to be correct. There are seven men called nothos in 
the Iliad: Medon (2.727, 13.694, 15.333), Democoön (4.499), Pedaeus (5.70), Teucer (8.284), 
Doryclus (11.490), Isus (11.102 and 103), and Cebriones (16.738). There is also a nothē, 
Medesicaste (13.173).  They are all given patronymics, although only Doryclus is given a true 92
one (Πριαµίδης, 11.490). Of these eight bastards, five of the six Trojan nothoi, namely 
Cebriones, Democoön, Doryclus, Isus, and Medesicaste are children of Priam, with no mother 
mentioned for any of them.  In addition, all of the male bastards of Priam are killed in battle in 93
 Ogden (1995, 220-1 and 2009, 118), citing especially ad Ap. 311-18 and Plut. Mor.. 145d-e. The fact that, at least 90
in later tradition, Heracles kills the Moliones (Ibycus 285 PMGF, Pi. O. 10.26-34, and Pherecyd. fr. 79a Fowler) 
could indicate that they are monstrous figures, especially since they are at least partly sons of Poseidon.
 Steinrück (1999, 396-8) finds an interesting pattern when he observes that, of the 40 or 41 women who have 91
children by gods in the Catalogue, the seven who have twins are all married, and the 33 or 34 who do not are 
maidens. I am not sure that Bellerophon has a twin, however (Hes. fr. 43a.81-3 M.-W.), and it is not entirely clear in 
the Catalogue whether he has a double paternity: Hirschberger (2004 ad loc., who observes that uncertainty about 
Bellerophon’s paternity is typical in the mythological tradition). The clearest indication that Poseidon is 
Bellerophon’s father in this passage would be if the [πα]τὴρ on line 84 refers to Poseidon. This would certainly be 
consistent with the content of Pi. I. 7.43-7. At Il. 6.191, Glaucus does refer to Bellerophon as θεοῦ γόνον (“offspring 
of a god”), but this phrase, which is unique in early Greek hexameter, does not necessarily denote paternity. Eust. 
636.4-8 believes that it essentially means agathos (‘noble’) here, but contrast Pi. O. 6.36 (θεοῖο γόνον), where the 
phrase clearly refers to Iamus, Apollo’s son.
 I agree with Fenik (1968, 18) that G. Strasburger (1954, 21-2) is unjustified in emphasizing that the nothoi of the 92
Iliad tend to be born from nobles. Almost every character in the Iliad has a noble pedigree of some sort. After these 
eleven appearances of the word nothos, we do not see it again until Pindar (O. 7.27). Σ b ad Il. 16.175 Erbse 
suggests the distant possibility that Polydora, who is said at Il. 16.175 to be the daughter of Peleus, is a nothē. But 
there does not appear to be any good reason to suppose this: Gantz (1993, 227).
 The only nothos whose mother is mentioned is Medon, son of Rhene (2.727-8), about whom we know nothing 93
else. Only Cebriones and Doryclus are mentioned in Hyginus’ list of Priam’s children (Fab. 90). Apollodorus 
(3.12.5) includes all but Isus.
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the Iliad.  And, while Medesicaste herself is safe in Pedaeum, her husband Imbrius is killed by 94
Teucer (13.169-74). Priam tells Achilles that he has fifty sons, and only nineteen of these are by 
Hecuba (24.495-7).  But it does not seem to be the case that Priam’s children from women other 95
than Hecuba are considered illegitimate. Gorgythion, whom Teucer kills instead of Hector, is 
called Priam’s son (υἱός), and he is never referred to as nothos.  And his mother, Castianeira is 96
specifically described as married (ὀπυιοµένη), presumably at least at some point to Priam 
(8.300-5).  The precise distinction between gnēsioi and nothoi is therefore not always clear on 97
the Trojan side, at least in terms of the legalities of their birth.  They nonetheless are all 98
acknowledged and apparently welcome to contribute to the defence of their house. 
 It is with the nothoi on the Greek side that we get a better sense of a home life. In Book 5 
of the Iliad, Meges kills Pedaeus, son of Antenor, ὅς ῥα νόθος µὲν ἔην, πύκα δ᾽ ἔτρεφε δῖα 
Θεανώ / ἶσα φίλοισι τέκεσσι, χαριζοµένη πόσεϊ ᾧ (“who was actually a bastard, but godlike 
 Patroclus slays Cebriones (16.733-43); Democoön is killed by Odysseus (4.494-500); Doryclus dies at the hands 94
of Ajax (11.489-90); and Agamemnon kills Isus (11.101-9). Of the twenty-two sons of Priam who appear in the 
Iliad, eleven die in battle. Latacz et al. (2003 ad Il. 2.727) propose that “generell bot eine Bezeichnung als 
außerehelicher Sohn die Möglichkeit, bedeutendere Figuren im Kampf sterben zu lassen, ohne Eingriffe in den 
Kernbestand des mythologische Personals vornehmen zu müssen.” So similarly G. Strasburger (1954, 30) and Janko 
(1992 ad Il. 13.694-7). This suggests an artificiality to the inclusion of these bastards which I cannot easily accept.
 Cf. Hellanic. fr. 141 Fowler = Σ T ad Il. 24.495 Erbse. Apollod. (3.12.5) speaks of a prior marriage to Arisbe, 95
whom Priam gave (ἐκδούς) to Hyrtacus prior to taking Hecuba as his wife.
 Gorgythion is listed along with several Iliadic nothoi of Priam in Apollodorus (3.12.5) as having been born from 96
women other than Hecuba (ἐκ δὲ ἄλλων γυναικῶν). A nothos can be called the hyios (‘son’) of his father: cf. 
Μέδων… Ὀϊλῆος νόθος υἱός (2.727; similarly 13.694-5 and 15.332-3) and Κεβριόνην, νόθον υἱὸν… Πριάµοιο 
(16.738).
 That Priam is given such a large collection of offspring by a variety of women might be a result of Greek 97
chauvinism. Certainly more than one scholiast finds Priam’s polygamy to be typical of the Other: βαρβαρικὸν ἔθος 
τὸ ἐκ πλειόνων γυναικῶν παιδοποιεῖσθαι (“to have children with very many women is a barbarian custom,” Σ A ad 
Il. 5.70 Erbse). The T scholiast says virtually the same thing. One wonders what these commentators made of 
Heracles’ innumerable wives and children. But the scholia to the Iliad have a strong tendency to be anti-Trojan: 
Nünlist (2009, 13). H. Mackie (1996, 161) says of the portrayal of the Greeks and the Trojans in the Iliad that “the 
ethnic, cultural, and linguistic differences the poet imagines appear to be descriptive and aesthetic, not prescriptive 
and evaluative.” So Morris (2000, 179).
 So C. Mackie (2008, 116): “the Iliad seems to make a clearer and more significant distinction between wives and 98
mistresses on the Greek side than on the Trojan side.”
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Theano reared him carefully, equally with her own children, as a favour for her husband,” 
5.70-1). Pedaeus is an obscure enough figure that there was orthographical debate about his 
name in antiquity.  But we can infer something from this passage about the relationship between 99
Pedaeus and his stepmother Theano. There appears to have been an exchange of symbolic 
capital.  The ῥα is emphatic here,  indicating perhaps that Pedaeus’ bastardy should cause 100 101
some surprise, given the following, namely that Theano should have given him as much care as 
her own children. The χαριζοµένη then motivates this apparently unusual situation by explaining 
that she reared the boy to obtain charis from Antenor.  Theano might perhaps have been 102
expected to provide some care for a boy who could potentially benefit the oikos as a man. But 
she could not presumably have been expected to provide the same level of care to him as to her 
own children. On the other hand, it goes without saying that being in Antenor’s good graces 
could only strengthen Theano’s position in his oikos. And rearing his bastard son with especial 
care appears to have been a means to achieve that end. The combination of her interest in charis 
from Antenor and the quantitative (ἶσα) comparison of her treatment of Pedaeus and her own 
children leads us to read a calculation of symbolic capital into this nexus of relationships. 
Pedaeus gains a better upbringing, Theano gains the gratitude of her husband, and Antenor adds 
another son to his oikos. 
 Σ A ad 5.69 and T ad 5.70 Erbse.99
 On symbolic capital, see Bourdieu (1977, 171-83).100
 Sometimes referred to as the “visualizing” ara. I do not wish to engage here in the debate regarding whether we 101
should prioritize the “consequential” or “visualizing” ara in Homer. I see no reason why some usages cannot be one, 
and others the other. On this debate, see Denniston (1950, 32-3) and Bakker (1993, 16-23) for the visualizing side, 
and Grimm (1962) for the consequential side.
 On charis as part of the process of the exchange of symbolic capital, see MacLachlan (1993, 7-10). In Eur. Andr. 102
(222-5), Andromache similarly expresses her rearing of Hector’s nothoi in terms of charis, and we have a scholion 
which compares this passage to Il. 5.69-71 (Σ MOA ad Eur. Andr. 224 Schwartz). Stevens (1971 ad Eur. Andr. 
224-5) suggests that the Hectoridae in Hellanic. fr. 31 Fowler are an early reference to Hector’s nothoi.
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 The phrase ἶσα… τέκεσσι has several interesting parallels which require some attention. 
In Book 13, Teucer kills Imbrius, the aforementioned husband of Priam’s illegitimate daughter 
Medesicaste, who, when he reached Troy, lived with Priam and was honoured equally with his 
children (ναῖε δὲ πὰρ Πριάµῳ· ὁ δὲ µιν τίεν ἶσα τέκεσσι, 13.176). The nothē attracted a 
beneficial marriage alliance for her father, resulting in another sword-arm to defend the city. That 
Imbrius was treated with respect equivalent to Priam’s children must also have reflected 
positively upon Medesicaste. In this one attested example, at least, the bastard daughter of a 
particularly powerful man fetches an alliance at least moderately comparable to one that a 
legitimate daughter could.  Similarly, Melanippus, son of Hicetaon and one of Hector’s 103
kinsmen (κασίγνητοι), lives with Priam and is honoured in the same way as Imbrius.  In fact, 104
the same three lines are used to describe Melanippus’ reception at Troy as Imbrius’ (13.174-6 = 
15.549-51). It may be the case that Priam has enough kin of this sort that formulae were 
developed to describe their reception at Troy when they come to fight in the War. On the Greek 
side, Ajax, in Teucer’s company, laments the death of Lycophron, ὃν νῷ Κυθηρόθεν ἔνδον ἐόντα/ 
ἶσα φίλοισι τοκεῦσιν ἔτίοµεν ἐν µεγάροισι (“whom, when he was in our halls from Cythera, we 
honoured equally with our own parents,” 15.438-9). Here it is parents instead of children who are 
the basis of comparison for the amount of tīmē given and received. But the sense of proportion is 
the same. And finally, in a passage we will examine in more detail below, Odysseus fraudulently 
 Little more can be said about the nothē, since, as far as a I am aware, there are no good comparanda until very 103
late in antiquity. The only other uses of the word have to do with ill-attested variant traditions of particular myths, 
such as, for example, Pausanias’ (9.26.3) claim that it is said (λέγεται) that the Sphinx was Laïus’ nothē. 
 The use of kasignētos is peculiar here, being the only instance in Homer where it refers to a cousin (Hicetaon is 104
Priam’s brother: 20.237-8) and not a brother or half-brother. Σ bT ad Il. 15.545 offers that τινὲς δὲ ἔτι καὶ νῦν παρ᾽ 
Ἴωσι τοὺς συγγενεῖς κασιγνήτους φασὶ καλεῖσθαι (“Even now, some among the Ionians say that relatives are called 
kasignētoi”). Many, such as Chantraine (1960) and Janko (1992 ad Il. 15.545-6) have taken this scholion at face 
value, with Hdt. 1.171.6 and 4.104.3 being used as comparanda because Herodotus wrote in Ionian. I prefer 
Gainsford’s (2012, 458-9) contention that the T scholiast (ad loc. Erbse) is correct when he suggests that what we 
have at Il. 15.545 is an elision of the formula κασίγνητοί τε ἔται τε.
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claims to be the bastard son of an important man, who nonetheless paid him as much respect as 
his legitimate brothers (ἀλλά µε ἶσον ἰθαιγενέεσσιν ἐτίµα, Od. 14.203).  In the case of all four 105
characters, one of whom is a (fictitious) bastard, and another of whom is the husband of a 
bastard, men live in an oikos and are treated by its central members like the closest of kin.  The 106
crucial difference between the four latter cases and Theano’s rearing of Pedaeus is that the 
treatment of Melanippus, Imbrius, Lycophron, and pseudo-Odysseus is measured in terms of 
tīmē, and Pedaeus’ in terms of rearing (trephein). The similar language used to describe the 
apportionment both of tīmē and of rearing probably implies, as suggested in the introduction, that 
the rearing bestowed upon a youth can be quantified in a similar fashion – and perhaps even 
understood as part of the same conceptual space – as the fixed tīmē that an adult possesses. As I 
have argued, a youth receives rearing until he reaches the hēbēs metron, at which point he is a 
man and expected to fend for himself and serve those who reared him. In the present light, it is 
possible that the kind of rearing a youth receives confers symbolic capital upon him. After all, 
with the singular exception of the beggar Odysseus, every use of the phrase ἶσα… τέκεσσι 
appears in the context of the death of the warrior who was reared in such a way. The implication 
seems to be that, in addition to obtaining tīmē from defeating his enemy, the victor in battle 
receives additional tīmē on account of the fact that the man he has killed had fixed tīmē partially 
 This usage of ithagenēs is only attested here. It seems literally to mean “born here” but to be synonymous with 105
gnēsios in the present context: von Kamptz (1982, 199, discussing Ithamenes at Il. 16.586); Beekes (2010 s.v. 
ἰθαγενής); cf. Poll. 3.21.
 Cf. also µὴ δὲ κασιγνήτῳ ἶσον ποιεῖσθαι ἑταῖρον (“don’t treat a companion in the same way as a brother,” Hes. 106
Op. 707) and ἶσα δέ µιν κεδνῇ ἀλόχῳ τίεν ἐν µεγάροισιν (“and he honoured her equally with his devoted wife in the 
halls,” Od. 1.432, on which see below). Similar formulations lacking the crucial īsos will not be dealt with here (ὃν 
Τρῶες ὁµῶς Πριάµοιο τέκεσσι/ τῖον (“whom the Trojans honoured in the same way as (they honoured) the children 
of Priam”, Il. 5.536-7); εὖ ἔτρεφεν ἠδ᾽ ἀτίταλλεν… ὡς εἴ θ᾽ ἑὸν υἱὸν ἐόντα (“he raised and reared him well… as if 
he were his own son”, 16.191-2); τῇ ὁµοῦ ἐτρεφόµην, ὀλίγον δέ τί µ᾽ ἧσσον ἐτίµα (“Along with her I was reared, 
and she [Anticleia] paid me only a little less respect”, Od. 15.365 (discussed in the introduction)); παῖδα δὲ ὧς 
ἀτίταλλε, (“and she reared her like a daughter”, 18.323).
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denoted by the kind of rearing he received.  In the case of the bastard Pedaeus, the fact that he 107
receives rearing equivalent to his legitimate half-brothers would therefore imply that his status is 
also comparable – although certainly by no means equal – to theirs, despite the difference in the 
circumstances of his birth. If this is correct, then Theano has done Antenor a great favour indeed 
by placing his son on a par with their shared children. A passage from the Catalogue of Women 
describing Teuthras’ treatment of Auge appears to bear this idea out: κούρη]ν δ᾽ [ἐ]ν µεγάροισιν 
ἐΰ τρέφεν ἠδ᾽ ἀτ[ίταλλε / δεξάµ]εν[ο]ς, ἶσον δὲ θυγατράσιν ᾗσιν ἐτίµ[α (“and, [having received 
the maiden in] his halls, he reared and [raised] her well, and he honoured her equally with his 
daughters,” Hes. fr. 165.6-7 M-W).  We appear to have a variant of the usual Auge narrative. 108
Here the gods probably command Teuthras to take Auge into his home.  In any case, Teuthras 109
rears and confers honour upon Auge in equal proportion to his own daughters. It is difficult to 
construct a chronological sequence from a paratactic series of clauses, and so it is not obvious 
whether the tīmē is to be understood as being conferred upon Auge after or at the same time as 
she reaches her hēbē. This passage does not therefore help us determine whether tīmē can be 
conferred upon children. On the other hand, we can surely assume that Teuthras also raises his 
own daughters with attention. It is possible that the combination of trephein and atitallein in line 
six prevents the comparison between the rearing of Auge and that of the daughters from being 
made more explicitly or precisely, since the two verbs when used together always refer to the 
 This is not to suggest that the acquisition is commensurate with zero-sum tīmē: Cairns (2001, 15-16), Scodel 107
(2008, 16-30).
 I am less confident about the restoration of κούρην than I am with the rest. Αὔγην (Robert) and κείνην (Grenfell/ 108
Hunt) also seem possible. However, it makes little difference for the present purpose which of the three we choose to 
read, and, as Hirschberger (2004 ad loc.) rightly asserts, the poet must be talking about Auge in any case.
 So Gantz (1993, 432) and Hirschberger (2004, 338-9), who also relate the better attested version of the myth.109
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rearing of someone else’s children, and usually fosterage.  Nonetheless I think it is safe to say 110
that Auge and the daughters receive the same level of treatment and respect in accordance with 
the same value having been placed upon them.  In this light, there would seem to be a fairly 111
precise correlation between the amount or kind of attention paid to a child and the fixed honour 
he or she possesses in adulthood. And more importantly we observe that, while an equivalence in 
the quality of rearing is considered to be surprising in the case of the stepmother caring for the 
nothos, a similar expression of surprise is lacking when kin from the paternal family are 
involved. There is at the very least an acceptable and recognizable domestic arrangement, 
according to which the nothos lives in apparent harmony in the oikos and is even accorded a fair 
amount of honour, if not necessarily from his stepmother.  
 A slightly different situation may be found in the case of Medon, the nothos of Oïleus 
(2.727, 13.694), and therefore the illegitimate half-brother of Oïlean Ajax. Unlike Pedaeus and 
the other nothoi, Medon is a fugitive from his paternal oikos. It is twice reported that  
     ἦ τοι ὁ µὲν νόθος υἱὸς Ὀιλῆος θείοιο 
     ἔσκε Μέδων, Αἴαντος ἀδελφεός· αὐτὰρ ἔναιεν  
     ἐν Φυλάκῃ, γαίης ἄπο πατρίδος, ἄνδρα κατακτάς, 
     γνωτὸν µητρυιῆς Ἐριώπιδος, ἣν ἔχ’  Ὀϊλεύς· !
     “The one, Medon, brother of Ajax, was actually a bastard son of godlike Oïleus. But he lived  
     in Phylace, away from his fatherland, because he had killed a man, a kinsman of his       
     stepmother Eriopis, wife of Oïleus” (13.694-7 = 15.332-6).  112!
It is sometimes thought odd that Medon should have lived in Phylace, whence Protesilaos came 
 Il. 14.201-2 = 14.303-4, 16.191-2, 24.60, Od. 19.354-5, Hes. Th. 480. This pattern is also observed by Moussy 110
(1972, 163) and Hirschberger (2004, 339). The combination is possibly avoided at Od. 11.250 (σὺ δὲ τοὺς κοµέειν 
ἀτιταλλέµεναί τε (“and you look after them and rear them”) for this reason, as Poseidon is telling Tyro to raise her 
own children and not someone else’s.
 We should, however, bear in mind Felson’s (2002a, 36) salutary warning that the rearing of boys should be 111
compared to that of girls only with great caution.
 According to Gates (1971, 14) and Gainsford (2012, 441 and 452), in Homer, adelpheos is an archaism that can 112
be used indiscriminately of brothers and half-brothers.
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to Troy (2.695; Hes. fr. 199.4-6 M-W), but command Philoctetes’ troops (Il. 2.724-8). In this 
light, Janko believes that Medon was originally one of Philoctetes’ men but “re-invented to 
replace Protesilaos,” a theory that has gained some currency.  Like Willcock, I see no “absolute 113
need for Medon, the substitute commander, to have been resident in the area from which his 
troops came.”  Commentators are also wont to dismiss Medon’s story of murder and flight as a 114
throwaway device to motivate his emigration (Lokomotionssaga).  However, Schlunk and 115
others have shown that the reception of the exile is a fairly important leitmotif which runs the 
length of the Iliad, culminating in the last extended simile of the poem, in which Priam clasping 
Achilles’ knees is compared to a murderer seeking refuge in the house of a wealthy man 
(24.477-84). This leitmotif is traced through a number of exiles, including Tlepolemus 
(2.661-70), Lycophron (15.431-41), Epeigeus (16.571-6), and perhaps most prominently 
Patroclus (23.85-8).  One might also include Theoclymenus in the Odyssey (15.272-8) and  116
Phoenix (Il. 9.447-84), although his exile is a self-imposed one.   117
 The description quoted above of Medon’s emigration bears some similarities to the other 
exiles. We will start with the simile because it necessarily describes a generic stage in the 
 Janko (1992 ad Il. 13.694-7), the only secondary source cited in HE s.v. “Medon.” Latacz et al. (2003 ad Il. 113
2.727) go further and suggest that the use of Medon in the Iliad is an example of how the poem sometimes 
incorporates nothoi as stopgap measures in various subplots. Janko (again 1992 ad 13.694-7) also prefers the T 
scholiast’s (ad 13.333 Erbse) alternative genealogy for Medon, despite the fact that it would, as he himself points 
out, fail properly to motivate Medon’s murder and exile. C. Mackie (2009, 8-9) suggests that Medon replaces 
Philoctetes because he is nothos and therefore an archer, an argument which I attempt to refute in the section of this 
chapter that discusses Teucer.
 Willcock (1984 ad Il. 13.696).114
 G. Strasburger (1954, 29-30), A. Lesky (1966, 426-8), Fenik (1968, 153-4), Janko (1992 ad Il. 13.694-7), 115
Willcock (1984 ad Il. 13.696).
 Schlunk (1976), who focuses on Medon on 202, and Perry (2010). The simile’s importance is analyzed in more 116
detail by Heiden (1998) but is ignored in the two major, recent studies of Homeric similes, W. Scott (2009) and 
Ready (2011).
 Cf. also the case of Amphitryon in Hes. fr. 195.11-13. Martin (1992, 14-21) argues that the persona of Hesiod and 117
his father in Works and Days is similar to that of the exile.
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emigration of a murder-exile: ὡς δ᾽ ὅτ᾽ ἂν ἄνδρ᾽ ἄτη πυκινὴ λάβῃ, ὅς τ᾽ ἐνὶ πάτρῃ / φῶτα 
κατακτείνας ἄλλων ἐξίκετο δῆµον, ἀνδρὸς ἐς ἀφνειοῦ, /θάµβος δ᾽ ἔχει εἰσoρόωντας (“as when 
overpowering delusion seizes a man, who, having killed a man in his fatherland, has reached a 
township of other men, to the house of a wealthy man, and wonder takes hold of the onlookers” 
24.480-2). The generic exile is at a liminal point in his emigration. He has killed a man (φῶτα 
κατακτείνας) and left his fatherland (πάτρῃ). Having reached the house of a potential host, the 
simile pauses at the point when the murderer is first noticed.  Similarly, Medon is described as 118
having killed a man (ἄνδρα κατακτάς) and left his fatherland (γαίης ἄπο πατρίδος). Since the 
generic story of the simile ends shortly after this point, the similarities end there. But with 
Lycophron’s history, for example, we have an account at the same stage as Medon’s: ὅς ῥα παρ᾽ 
αὐτῷ / ναῖ᾽, ἐπεὶ ἄνδρα κατέκτα Κυθήροισι ζαθέοισιν (“who lived with him [Telamonian Ajax], 
since he had killed a man in holy Cythera, 15.431-2). Lycophron also killed a man and left. He 
then came to live (ναῖ᾽) with a new host, just as Medon did (ἔναιεν). Medon’s short history, 
which is reiterated just before he is slain (15.334-6), is, to a certain extent, as Fenik describes it, 
“an excellent example, in miniature, of the formulaic technique of biography.”  The elements of 119
this little biography contribute to the larger leitmotif mentioned above. On the other hand, his 
particular combination of characteristics is atypical in the Iliad. While Medon’s history as exile 
fits into a larger theme, he is the only exile who is also nothos. Or, to put it the relevant way 
around, he is the only nothos to be driven from home. In fact, of all the portrayals of nothoi we 
have examined so far, Medon’s is the only one that shows even a trace of disharmony in the 
 Theoclymenus is in a similar state when he first meets Telemachus: οὔτω τοι καὶ ἐγὼν ἐκ πατρίδος, ἄνδρα 118
κατακτὰς / ἔµφυλον (“so I too am away from my fatherland because I killed a member of my band”, Od. 15.272-3).
 Fenik (1968, 153).119
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oikos. While the wording describing Theano’s equitable treatment of Pedaeus certainly allows for 
the possibility that she could have been less welcoming or even hostile to her stepson, it is 
nonetheless the case that she accorded him full honour.  
 The uniqueness of Medon’s situation is noteworthy, therefore, but perhaps not entirely 
inexplicable. As mentioned above, Medon is the only nothos whose mother is named: ἀλλὰ 
Μέδων κόσµησεν Ὀϊλῆος νόθος υἱός, / τόν ῥ᾽ ἔτεκεν Ῥήνη ὑπ᾽ Ὀιλῇ πτολιπόρθῳ (“But Medon 
commanded them, the bastard son of Oïleus, whom Rhene had given birth to by Oïleus the city-
sacker,” Il. 2.727-8). That Rhene is named is possibly significant. There are other Iliadic nothoi 
whose mothers’ absences have been noted. We hear, for example, about Teucer’s mother, 
Hesione, in later sources (S. Aj. 1299-1303, TGrF 579a Radt, X. Cyn. 1.9., Ov. Met. 11.211-20, 
Apollod. 3.12.7, and Hyg. Fab. 89.3-4), but not in the Iliad.  And Hesione is potentially a 120
figure of interest with respect to the Iliad. In the later traditions, she is a Trojan princess, the 
daughter of Laomedon, given to Telamon by Heracles for his part in the earlier sack of Troy. 
Obviously this would make Teucer half-Trojan, a fact that is conspicuously not mentioned in the 
Iliad, given that the Trojans are the enemy.  The T scholiast is apparently alive to this fact when 121
he glosses ἀστόξενος (‘guest-friend to a city’) as ὁ ἐκ προγόνων ἐπιχώριος, ὡς Ἀτρεὺς Φρυξὶ καὶ 
Τεῦκρος Τρωσίν (“the native through his progeny, such as Atreus to the Phrygians and Teucer to 
the Trojans,” ad Il. 4.377 Erbse).  I suspect that Teucer’s mother is not mentioned because his 122
 Gantz (1993, 400) and Lyons (1997, 198) suggest that Hesione is understood to be involved in Heracles’ 120
struggles at Il. 5.638-42 and 20.144-52.
 Cf. Higbie (1995, 11-12): “Teukros, the bastard son of Telamon, may reflect in his name the Trojan origins of his 121
mother, Hesione.” So Edgeworth (1985, 27 n. 4) and Gantz (1993, 224). Wilamowitz (1920, 49 n. 1) finds Hesione’s 
name to be “Asiatin.” This appears all the more likely when we take into account that there is another, Trojan 
Teucer: Hellanic. fr. 24bc Fowler, Scamon Mytilenaeus fr. 1 Fowler, Lyc. 1301-8, and DS 4.75.
 Cf. Σ bT ad 8.284 Erbse.122
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relationship with his father and half-brother receives emphasis in the Iliadic tradition, emphasis 
which could potentially be undercut by reference to Teucer’s Trojan lineage.  Medon’s mother 123
can receive mention, on the other hand, because his dysfunctional relationship with his 
stepmother is prominent, even to the extent that it receives its own formula. Ogden’s 
‘amphimetric strife,’ then, seems to be an important part of the tradition surrounding Medon. But 
it scarcely figures elsewhere, except, as I will argue in the following section, in an allusive 
manner in Teucer’s case. In other words, except in the cases of murder and suicide, amphimetric 
strife does not appear to cause a rift between anyone other than the bastard and his stepmother 
and her natal kin.  
 Harmony is most certainly the norm between bastard and legitimate brothers. We catch a 
glimpse of half-brotherly cooperation when we see the nothos Isus driving chariot for his 
legitimate brother, Antiphus (11.101-6). Similarly Cebriones, nothos of Priam, is recruited as 
charioteer after the death of Archeptolemus (8.311-21), and he apparently continues in that 
position.  Later, Hector leaves a man worse (χερείονα) than Cebriones by the chariot in 124
(12.91-2), implying that Cebriones was in charge of it before then. Finally, Cebriones dies at 
Patroclus’ hands driving Hector’s chariot (16.737-43). And it is fighting over his body that 
Patroclus is slain by Hector (751-822). Of particular interest in the current context is the famous 
description of Cebriones’ corpse: ὁ δ᾽ ἐν στροφάλιγγι κονίης / κεῖτο µέγας µεγαλωστί, 
λελασµένος ἱπποσυνάων (“but in the whirl of dust he lay, great in his greatness, forgetful of his 
horsemanship,” 16.775-6). It has frequently been noted that the formula µέγας µεγαλωστί is used 
 So Kelly (2007, 57 n. 192). I return to Teucer’s relationship with Telamon and Ajax in the following section.123
 The use of nothoi as charioteers among the Trojans has been noted since Friedrich (1856, 222). Trypanis (1963, 124
289-90) helpfully lists all close kin who fight in close proximity in the Iliad.
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only three times in early epic, and in the other two instances it describes Achilles (18.26; Od. 
24.39-40). Since the formula clearly suits Achilles better than Cebriones, and Achilles is a more 
central character, its application to Cebriones' corpse is usually thought to be an anticipatory 
doublet of the enactment of Achilles’ death in Book 18.  Burgess notes that it would be highly 125
controversial to claim that this description of Cebriones “evokes the traditional death of Achilles, 
for Cebriones in no other way resembles Achilles.”  But it must be the case that µέγας 126
µεγαλωστί anticipates the sequence of revenge which will ensue, at least inasmuch as Cebriones’ 
death constitutes a part of this motif sequence.  From the point of view of kinship, it is also 127
interesting to recall that, while Patroclus is not Achilles’ bastard brother, he does occupy a 
similarly liminal position in Achilles’ oikos, being an exile whom Peleus took in at a young age 
(23.85-8). So, Cebriones, Patroclus, Hector, and Achilles are all linked in a sequence of death, 
and each pair can also be divided into one insider and one outsider.  While this does not mean 128
that we should read Cebriones as particularly comparable to Patroclus either, the fact that he 
occupies the position he does in both the narrative and thematic structures necessarily indicates 
that we are to understand him as Hector’s close companion.  We can see, therefore, that, while 129
their position is clearly inferior, brothers and other members of the same patriline are generally 
 Burgess (2012a, 171-6), with a review of the long history of scholarship surrounding this formula. On 125
anticipatory doublets, see Sammons (2013, 529-36). There is then the debate, not relevant here, about where the 
Odyssey passage comes from. Usener (1990, 105) thinks that it alludes to the Iliad 16 passage because the two are 
nearly identical. Danek (1998, 468) argues – I think rightly – that the passage from Iliad 16 appropriates formulae 
which properly belong to Achilles.
 Burgess (2012a, 175).126
 On the motif sequence, see Nagler (1974, 112-30).127
 C. Mackie (2009, 4-5) links Hector’s killing of Patroclus to Patroclus’ killing of Sarpedon (16.426-505), but the 128
proximate cause of Hector’s pursuit of Patroclus is Cebriones’ death.
 One might compare Patroclus to Cebriones as a charioteer. At 17.426-440, Achilles’ horses mourn Patroclus as 129
one (ἡνιόχοιο, 427). There is also a famous early seventh-century amphora fragment (Mykonos Museum 666 = 
LIMC s.v. “Achilleus,” no. 506) which identifies Patroclus as a warrior on a chariot, and he is accompanied by a 
charioteer. But Burgess (2001, 75-6) does not think that he is normally a charioteer.
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portrayed as supportive of and friendly to their illegitimate kin.  130
 Turning to the Odyssey, we find no one explicitly called a bastard at all. However, there 
are two bastards, who, as does not ordinarily seem to be the case in the Iliad, are the sons of 
slave-women. Because of the nature of the Odyssey, these two examples provide more domestic 
detail than the Iliad generally offers, allowing us to flesh out our picture of the bastard in 
important respects. The first bastard is mentioned on Telemachus’ arrival at Sparta. Menelaus’ 
legitimate daughter by Helen, Hermione, is getting married (Od. 4.5-9). So is Megapenthes: 
     υἱέϊ δὲ Σπάρτηθεν Ἀλέκτορος ἤγετο κούρην, 
     ὅς οἱ τηλύγετος γένετο κρατερὸς Μεγαπένθης 
     ἐκ δούλης· Ἑλένῃ δὲ θεοὶ γόνον οὐκέτ᾽ ἔφαινον, 
     ἐπεὶ δὴ τὸ πρῶτον ἐγείνατο παῖδ᾽ ἐρατεινήν, 
     Ἑρµιόνην, ἣ εἶδος ἔχε χρυσῆς Ἀφροδίτης. !
     “And he [sc. Menelaus] was bringing from Sparta the daughter of Alector for his son, the  
     strong, well-beloved Megapenthes, who was born to him by a slave woman. For Helen, the  
     gods no longer brought offspring to light, once she had first given birth to a lovely daughter,  
     Hermione, who had the form of golden Aphrodite” (Od. 4.10-14). !
Megapenthes is clearly the product of an extramarital union between two mortals, but he is not 
called nothos. There are nonetheless markers that he is accorded high value in his father’s oikos. 
He is tēlygetos, the precise meaning of which is disputed, but it probably describes a child who 
holds a prominent place in the affections of his parents.  In addition, if we believe the early 131
commentators, Menelaus is marrying him into a worthy family. According to Eustathius 
(1479.23) and a scholiast (Μª ad Od. 4.10 Pontani; see also HTVesy and E ad loc.), Alector is the 
 In addition to the preceding examples, also compare the relationship between Ajax and Teucer discussed in the 130
following section.
 Ciani (1964-5). The adjective’s use at Il. 13.470 is clearly sarcastic and insulting, but I see no reason why it 131
cannot be genuine elsewhere. The phrase ek doulēs also appears at Theognis 538, Eur. Ion 837, and Hdt. 1.7, as well 
as in later sources; cf. Ar. Th. 564-5. See also Ndoye (2010, 223), who argues that, in Homer, “la doulè partage le lit 
de son maitre en tant que concubine et s’oppose ainsi à l’épouse légitime.” 
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son of Pelops and Hegesandra, the daughter of Amyclas. Megapenthes is presumably of especial 
value to Menelaus because his marriage with Helen has not produced any gnēsioi.  And in fact 132
“Megapenthes” is likely a speaking name, translating as “Great Sorrow.” Von Kamptz contends 
that Megapenthes is called such because he is an unworthy son to Menelaus,  but I think it is 133
more likely that the name is to be linked to Menelaus’ suffering on account of the rape of 
Helen.  Helen’s absence would have caused a twofold pain. For she herself was gone, along 134
with the opportunity to produce gnēsioi. It would seem, therefore, that Menelaus, in the absence 
of any male offspring from his wife, has invested his future in a child by a slave. C. Patterson 
goes too far, I think, when she assumes that Menelaus has freed Megapenthes out of desperation 
for an heir.  But let us consider the other evidence from the Odyssey before drawing our 135
conclusions. 
 Our next child is a figment of Odysseus’ hyperactive imagination: 
     ‘ἐκ µὲν Κρητάων γένος εὔχοµαι εὐρειάων, 
     ἀνέρος ἀφνειοῖο πάις· πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι 
     υἱέες ἐν µεγάρῳ ἠµὲν τράφεν ἠδ᾽ ἐγένοντο 
     γνήσιοι ἐξ ἀλόχου· ἐµὲ δ᾽ ὠνητὴ τέκε µήτηρ 
     παλλακίς, ἀλλά µε ἶσον ἰθαιγενέεσσιν ἐτίµα 
     Κάστωρ Ὑλακίδης, τοῦ ἐγὼ γένος εὔχοµαι εἶναι· 
     ὃς τότ᾽ ἐνὶ Κρήτεσσι θεὸς ὣς τίετο δήµῳ 
     ὄλβῳ τε πλούτῳ τε καὶ υἱάσι κυδαλίµοισιν. 
 This reading goes back to Diller (1937, 79). Returning to the present passage, the typically Homeric, paratactic 132
de, as opposed to, say, an explanatory gar on line 12 makes the precise link between lines 10-11 and 12-14 difficult 
to assess. Lines 12-14 could simply be an explanation of why no legitimate sons are mentioned, rather than of why 
Megapenthes is tēlygetos in Menelaus’ eyes. Cf. Hdt. 5.62, claiming that Pisistratus made his nothos son 
Hegesistratus tyrant of Sigeum.
 Von Kamptz (1982, 32 and 207).133
 Cf. Heubeck et al. (ad Od. 4.11); Σ E ad Od. 4.11 Pontani: ὁ γὰρ Μενέλαος κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῆς ἁρπαγῆς τῆς 134
Ἑλένης ἐµίγη τινὶ δούλῃ, καὶ ἔτεκεν υἱὸν καὶ ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὸν φερωνύµως Μεγαπένθην· κατὰ γὰρ τὸν καιρὸν τοῦ 
διὰ τῆν Ἑλένην πένθους ἐτέχθη (“for Menelaus, at the time of the kidnapping of Helen, had sex with a certain slave-
woman, and she gave birth to a son and aptly called him Megapenthes. For he was born at the time of the sorrow on 
account of Helen”).
 C. Patterson (1990, 48).135
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     ἀλλ᾽ ἦ τοι τὸν κῆρες ἔβαν θανάτοιο φέρουσαι 
     εἰς Ἀίδαο δόµους· τοὶ δὲ ζωὴν ἐδάσαντο 
     παῖδες ὑπέρθυµοι καὶ ἐπὶ κλήρους ἐβάλοντο, 
     αὐτὰρ ἐµοὶ µάλα παῦρα δόσαν καὶ οἰκί᾽ ἔνειµαν.’ !
     “I claim that I am from broad Crete with respect to my kin, the offspring of a wealthy man.  
     And many other sons were reared and born in the megaron, legitimate ones from a wife. My  
     mother, a purchased concubine, gave birth to me, but Castor, son of Hylax, whose child I  
     claim to be, showed me as much respect as his legitimate sons. He at that time was honoured  
     by the Cretan people like a god for his vast wealth and praiseworthy sons. But the fates of  
     death went, carrying him to the halls of Hades. And his insolent sons divided his livelihood  
     and put it into lots, but they gave me very little and allotted a dwelling” (Od. 14.199-210).  136!
Odysseus qua beggar does not use any specific vocabulary to describe his status, but we can 
infer that he is illegitimate because of the contrast between his birth from a concubine and the 
fact that the other sons are called gnēsioi, which would have no point if he were portraying 
himself as such as well.  That his mother is a slave is made explicit by the reference to her 137
purchase.  At this point, the interpretation of the passage becomes difficult, however. Ogden 138
argues in reaction to C. Patterson that the division of the klēroi at the beggar’s expense is 
mentioned because he has been cheated of his normal share, and this certainly seems to be the 
most natural reading of the passage.  On the other hand, it is also possible that Castor’s 139
treatment of a concubine’s child with the same respect as his legitimate children is invented 
because it would be perceived by Eumaeus as unusual.  The legitimate children might be 140
described as insolent by the beggar in their unequal division of the inheritance simply because 
 It is possible that τράφεν should be τράφον, which in any case could also be read as “they grew up” (Chantraine 136
(1953, 390). See A. Bowie (2013 ad 14.202 and 203) for a different reading of this passage.
 That these legitimate children are born ἐξ ἀλόχου by way of contrast to the beggar’s concubine mother may be 137
strange. Alochoi, who are literally just ‘bed-mates,’ can be either concubines or wives in Homer: C. Patterson (1990, 
48), contra Lacey (1968, 42).
 Cf. von Wickert-Micknat (1983, 139) on ōnētē.138
 Ogden (1996, 23), contra C. Patterson (1998, 48).139
 This is the reading of Buchholz (1881, 2.2.33-4).140
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the beggar interprets Castor’s treatment of him as implying that he should have received an equal 
share, and not because such a division is seen to be normal. While the beggar implies some level 
of equality between himself and his legitimate brothers when he reports that Castor was 
renowned for his wealth and his sons – thereby subtly including himself in a collective as if it is 
a uniform one – the parallel of Megapenthes tilts the scales in Ogden’s favour. Megapenthes 
might be promoted in the absence of a gnēsios, but that situation does not apply to Odysseus’ 
invention. 
 The reader may have noticed that I have avoided referring to Megapenthes and the beggar 
as nothoi. As mentioned above, the word does not appear between the Iliad and Pindar. Its 
absence from the Odyssey is noted by Ogden, who nonetheless concludes that Megapenthes and 
the beggar are not to be distinguished from the nothoi of the Iliad.  But surely it is significant 141
that both Megapenthes and the beggar have slaves as mothers, while the same cannot be said for 
certain of any nothos in the Iliad. Certainly there are a number of Iliadic nothoi whose mothers 
are never mentioned. But the difference between the two groups remains stark, particularly when 
we take into account later evidence. For example, it is likely the case that even in Classical 
Athens, a polis that was characterized by an extreme level of concern for the legitimacy of its 
citizens at the time, pallakai (‘courtesans’) could be kept for the production of free children 
(Dem. 23.52).  It is probable, therefore, that Megapenthes and the beggar are to be understood 142
as having been born from slave women maintained in the oikos at least partially for the purpose 
of producing children by their masters. In this light, the fact that Megapenthes comes ek doulēs 
 Ogden (1996, 21-2). C. Patterson (1990, 47-8) simply assumes that the two are the same as the nothoi of the 141
Iliad.
 On this subject, see Sealey (1984, 113-14), Demand (1994, 29-30), and Kamen (2013, 62-67).142
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can possibly be understood not simply as the by-product of Menelaus having enjoyed himself in 
his spare time, but as the result of a concerted effort to produce an heir in Helen’s absence.  Of 143
course a son by Helen would be preferable for at least two reasons. Firstly, it would be ideal to 
pass her desirable lineage on to a son. Secondly, it would at least ordinarily be better for 
Menelaus’ relationship with his in-laws to produce an heir by his wife than otherwise. But any 
son is better than no son at all. Correspondingly, the beggar’s fictional situation with his 
legitimate brothers is plausible because of the possibility that a concubine’s son might inherit. 
We can certainly imagine that a father’s placement of his illegitimate sons on a similar footing as 
his gnēsioi when it comes to their inheritance could be expected to be unpopular with both the 
legitimate sons and their potentially influential maternal kin, but this does not necessarily mean 
that the father is categorically prevented from doing so. In this light, the deprivation by the 
legitimate sons of the beggar’s equal share is likely perfectly believable – and even probable – to 
Eumaeus.   144
 The first description of Eurycleia at the beginning of the Odyssey is potentially relevant 
here as well: 
     Εὐρύκλει᾽, Ὦπος θυγάτηρ Πεισηνορίδαο, 
     τήν ποτε Λαέρτης πρίατο κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν 
     πρωθήβην ἔτ᾽ ἐοῦσαν, ἐεικοσάβοια δ᾽ ἔδωκεν, 
     ἶσα δέ µιν κεδνῇ ἀλόχῳ τίεν ἐν µεγάροισιν, 
     εὐνῇ δ᾽ οὔ ποτ᾽ ἔµικτο, χόλον δ᾽ ἀλέεινε γυναίκος. !
     “Eurycleia, daughter of Ops, son of Peisenor, whom Laertes once purchased with his property 
     when she was still at the beginning of her youthful prime, and he paid the value of twenty  
     oxen, and he honoured her equally with his dear wife in the halls, but he never mingled with 
 Beringer (1961, 279-80) and Ndoye (2010, 224 and 257) argue for a distinction between the dmōiē on the one 143
hand and the doulē and the pallakis on the other. In the next chapter, I side with Thalmann (1998a, 75-7), who shows 
convincingly that such nice distinctions are problematic.
 Cf. de Jong (2001 ad Od. 192-359) on how Odysseus is trying to impress Eumaeus.144
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     her in bed, and he avoided the anger of his wife” (Od. 1.429-33). !
Unlike Menelaus’ doulē and the beggar’s pallakis mother, Eurycleia is given a name, and a good 
one with proper ancestry (1.429 = 2.347 = 20.147).  In fact, Karydas observes that the only 145
other servant or slave whose father and grandfather are named is Eumaeus, and he provides their 
names himself (15.413-14).  Despite her lack of freedom, therefore, Eurycleia is in a different 146
class from these other slave women, which probably helps to explain her purchase-price.  No 147
wonder, then, that Laertes accords her such high honour. But the equivalence in his valuation of 
Eurycleia and his own wife is surely marked – and perhaps even surprising.  We probably do 148
not expect a slave woman to be held in the same esteem as a wife whose relationship with her 
husband is portrayed as a good one. And, if both women are valued equally, there is some 
potential for amphimetric strife in the oikos should both women have sons by Laertes, as 
Odysseus’ lying tale shows.  The significance of Laertes’ decision not to sleep with Eurycleia 149
and avoid Anticleia’s anger, therefore, probably has less to do with sexual jealousy than with a 
desire to avoid the amphimetric conflict that could result. After all, Autolycus, Anticleia’s father, 
is portrayed as a man of some influence, and he shows a fairly marked interest in his descendant, 
Odysseus (Od. 19.392-412, 459-66). Another son from an unrelated mother could only serve to 
harm Laertes’ relationship with Autolycus. On the other hand, Laertes does take something of a 
 Ops and Peisenor are obscure, and Σ PY ad Od. 1.429 Pontani says that they are ad hoc inventions. But their 145
names are markedly aristocratic in any case: Mühlestein (1987, 40-2).
 Karydas (1998, 11 n. 14). See Austin (1975, 165-71) and Karydas (1998, 9-63) for the difference between 146
Eumaeus and Eurycleia on the one hand and the other slaves of Odysseus on the other.
 See Heubeck et al. (1990 ad Od. 1.431) on the enormous size of Eurycleia’s purchase price. Higbie (1995, 8) 147
compares the variation in status among slave-women in the Odyssey to that of charioteers in the Iliad.
 However, Hunt (2011, 27 n. 12) compares Il. 1.112-5, 3.409, 19.290-300. One might also include Od. 11.421-3.148
 Cf. also my examination in a later chapter of Phoenix’ story at Il. 9.447-57. Here and Od. 14.203 are the only two 149
uses of pallakis in Homer. Diller (1937, 73) takes Il. 9.447-57 and Od. 1.429-33 as “protests against concubinage.” I 
see calculations on the part of the characters and not moral condemnation from the narrative voice.
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risk in the end, because he only manages to sire one son, Odysseus, by Anticleia. And one son 
might easily die, as the Odyssey makes painfully evident.  But, by forgoing Eurycleia’s 150
potential as a mother to some of his children, Laertes reinforces the investment he makes in his 
son by Anticleia.  She becomes a nurse to Odysseus and eventually to Telemachus (1.434-5, 151
19.482-3), thereby ensuring her devotion to Anticleia’s descendants.  In other words, Laertes 152
faces a choice between, on the one hand, maximizing the number of his sons and risking 
amphimetric strife, and, on the other hand, focusing his investment on sons – or in this case, a 
son – from Anticleia. That he chooses to focus on Odysseus is likely meant to redound to his 
credit. 
 We find, then, that bastards occupy a recognizable if relatively inferior position in Homer.  
They are raised along with their legitimate siblings in a loving environment marred only by an 
amphimetric strife that is mild compared to that of later texts. However, this amphimetric strife 
can become more problematic in the case of murder or suicide. On the other hand, in extreme 
circumstances, bastards may even stand as their father’s heir. All of this seems stereotyped and 
fictitious, and it probably is. Whether we are talking about Bronze Age or Archaic Greece, there 
 See especially Goldhill (2010) on the meaning of mounos at Od. 16.117-20. He argues convincingly that mounos 150
always “expresses not merely the state of being alone or single, but also a sense of threat or danger” (122). Contrast 
Hes. Op. 376-8, who counsels the auditor to have a single son in order that his estate not be divided on his death. 
Leaving a single heir has other, later proponents (e.g. Pl. Lg. 740b-d, 923cd). One suspects, however, that the 
Hesiodic narrator is reflecting bitterly on his unfortunate experience with his own brother, Perses, and the 
distribution of their inheritance (Op. 27-41).
 Thalmann (1998a, 74-7) comes to a similar conclusion regarding the strategic advantage of having Eurycleia 151
nurse Odysseus. But he and Golden (2011, 148) seem to read Anticleia’s potential wrath only in terms of sexual 
jealousy. Vernant’s (1996, 64-5) interpretation is more in line with my own. Pomeroy (1975, 26-7) argues that, in 
order to breast-feed Odysseus (19.482-3), Eurycleia must have found a way to have a baby “without incurring her 
master’s displeasure.” I think Pomeroy may be demanding too much consistency from the poetry here. Certainly, 
given that Laertes never sleeps with Eurycleia, it may be difficult to see how she could have conceived a child 
without angering him. On the other hand, such inconsistencies, particularly thousands of lines apart, are not 
unknown or even necessarily noticeable in oral poetry.
 In this light, Karydas (1998, 16-17) compares Eurycleia’s attachment to Odysseus and Telemachus to Demeter’s 152
initial devotion to Demophoön in the H. Dem. Taking a different perspective, Murnaghan (2011, 28) suggests that 
“Eurycleia is, in many ways, a doublet for Odysseus’ mother, Anticleia.”
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is no reason to think that the lot of the bastard could not be considerably more complicated and 
unpleasant than it appears in Homer. As mentioned above, the bastards in Homer were in many 
cases considered to be the illustrious ancestors or even founders of the ruling families of Archaic 
Greece. We expect their portrayal to be idealized. But to observe the way in which they tend to 
be portrayed, as we have, will help us to analyze the figures of Teucer and Heracles in the 
following sections. 
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1.2: TEUCER 
 Teucer is the most prominent nothos in the Iliad, and he appears in his own section for a 
significant reason. He almost always appears with his legitimate half-brother, Telamonian Ajax, 
and this seems to highlight his notheia. Ajax generally overshadows Teucer, even to the extent 
that the two are frequently referred to as the two Ajaxes (Aiante). This asymmetrical relationship 
is also evident when the two fight together, with Ajax using a spear and shield, and Teucer a bow 
and arrow, a combination that many have proposed is a symbolic representation of Teucer’s 
notheia. Ajax fighting in the melee supposedly highlights his legitimate birth as compared to 
Teucer’s illegitimacy, with the nothos fighting from afar like a coward. However, as I will try to 
show, archers are not portrayed as cowards in the Iliad, nor does archery have any apparent link 
to notheia per se. However, that Teucer in particular is an archer is likely linked to his bastardy 
in an indirect manner. As I will show, Teucer is the only archer to fight for the Greeks in the 
Iliad. Other Greeks occasionally use a bow, but Teucer is the only archer. The Trojans, on the 
other hand, have several archers. Teucer’s archery, therefore, is likely derived from the fact that 
his mother, Hesione, is a Trojan. That he favours what is – in the Iliad, at least – a style of 
fighting associated with the maternal side of his family could either be taken to indicate a 
supreme loyalty to his patriline, since he uses the weapon of his maternal kin against them in 
defence of his paternal kin; or it could indicate a certain identification with his mother’s people. 
He is certainly suspected of having the latter attitude. We learn from later literature that Teucer’s 
maternal ancestry eventually damns him in his father’s eyes, and I contend that the Iliad alludes 
to this unfortunate event in Book 8. When Ajax commits suicide, Telamon apparently comes to 
the conclusion that Teucer betrayed his brother, and he exiles Teucer as a consequence. That 
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Teucer’s mother is Trojan appears to be the decisive factor in Telamon’s deliberation. It is not 
Teucer’s notheia that is problematic per se. It is rather the suspicion that he is loyal to his 
maternal family that results in his exile. 
 Teucer’s status as nothos is a matter of dispute, but it should not be. Edgeworth claims 
that the description of Teucer as Ajax’ κασίγνητος καὶ ὄπατρος (“brother and from the same 
father,” Il. 12.371) “implies that they were full brothers.”  However, Gainsford has since shown 153
conclusively that kasignētos can refer either to a full brother or a half brother.  Furthermore, 154
Agamemnon elsewhere addresses Teucer explicitly as nothos (8.284).  Given that Ajax and 155
Teucer are also treated as half brothers in post-Homeric literature, and that Teucer is always 
nothos (perhaps most notably in Sophocles’ Ajax and Euripides’ Helen), there does not seem to 
be any reason to doubt that Teucer is universally such.  In this respect, Teucer is significant 156
because he is by far the most prominent of all the figures in the Iliad to be referred to explicitly 
as a bastard. In this light, it is perhaps unsurprising that, while he is a significant character in his 
own right, Teucer is nonetheless overshadowed by his half brother, Telamonian Ajax. There are a 
number of ways in which Ajax overshadows Teucer, the most frequently discussed of which is 
the so-called ‘elliptical dual’, Aiante. Nagy defines an elliptical dual as one designating A + B, 
rather than a regular dual, which designates A + A.  In the Iliad, Aiante can be a regular dual 157
and denote Telamonian Ajax and Oïlean Ajax (probably 2.406, 4.519, etc.). Aiante can also, 
 Edgeworth (1985, 27 n. 4); similarly Higbie (1995, 30 n. 15); cf. Il. 8.330 and 15.436 = 466.153
 Lejeune (1960, 22) and Gates (1971, 14-16) had already demonstrated this fairly convincingly, but Gainsford 154
(2012, esp. 441 and 451-2) is decisive.
 Proponents of the idea that Teucer is gnēsios argue in favour of this line’s deletion. On this issue see below.155
 HE 3.848 s.v. “Teucer” for the figure generally. On his bastardy in Sophocles and Euripides specifically, see 156
Ebbott (2003, 50-65).
 Nagy (1997, 168), assigning a name to the pattern observed by Wackernagel (1877, 304-6) and picked up by von 157
der Mühll (1930, 30–4).
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although probably less frequently, be an elliptical dual and refer to Telamonian Ajax and 
Teucer.  But it is often difficult to tell with any certainty which pair the dual is designating on a 158
particular occasion. Regardless of the frequency of this usage in attested epic, however, it is clear 
that it was possible to read Aiante as denoting Telamonian Ajax and Teucer.  Teucer is 159
overshadowed here to such an extent that it is probably impossible to tell whether he is being 
referred to in some cases. The greatness of Ajax sometimes subsumes even the name of Teucer. 
 More difficult to get a handle on is the status of Teucer as archer versus that of Ajax, who 
is often seen as the prototypical melee combatant in the Iliad.  The usual view is that through 160
much of early Greek antiquity long-range combat was seen as socially inferior to melee combat. 
Farron characterizes the consensus more generally as “that the ancient Greeks and Romans 
regarded military archery as lower class, cowardly, immoral and ineffectual.”  While Farron 161
has proved at some length that archers are actually quite effective in the Iliad, the remaining 
three parts of the consensus require some reevaluation.  There is certainly a fair body of 162
 Page (1972, 236-8) argues forcefully for 4.272-85, 13.197 and 201, and there may well be other places; pace 158
Simon (2003, 6). Dué and Ebbott (2010, 260) support Page here and also discuss the plausibility of the variant 
reading Αἴαντε (which would be the elliptical usage) in place of Αἴαντα at 10.53. Edgeworth and Mayrhofer (1987, 
187) find support for the elliptical usage of Aiante in the Mahâbhârata, in which the dual “the two Krsnas” is 
frequently used to refer to Krsna and his mortal companion Arjuna. Mühlestein (1987, 12-23) explores the 
possibility of a Mycenaean origin for the Locrian and Telamonian Ajaxes, implying that Teucer was developed later 
than his half-brother.
 In fact, Page (1972, 235-8) follows Wackernagel (1877, 306) in arguing that this would have been the ordinary 159
usage and that Aiante applied to the lesser and greater Ajaxes would have been marked.
 On Ajax as the prototypical melée combatant, see for example von der Mühll (1930, passim) and Mühlestein 160
(1987, 22-3).
 Farron (2003, 169). Cf. van Wees (2004, 61-5) and Hornblower (2008, 40-2), both of whom are somewhat 161
skeptical about how pervasive this attitude was. H. Mackie (1996, 49-55) and Kelly (2007, 263-4) review the 
examples in the Iliad and Odyssey which are taken to prove the inferiority of the bow in Homer. Closest to the mark, 
in my opinion, is C. Mackie’s (2008, 91-152) demonstration that opinions about archery can be shown to vary to a 
considerable extent. For example, the archer is open to a considerable amount of antagonism in the Iliad. This is not 
so in the Odyssey (102-3 and 234 n. 52). Eur. Her. 140-235 is sometimes used to inform our understanding of the 
portrayal of archery in the Iliad, but I think that the social position of archery had altered too drastically by this time 
for this play to be of any use to us. See George (1994) and Papadopoulou (2005, 137-51) on the place of archery in 
the Heracles. 
 Farron (2003).162
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passages in the Iliad which have been cited to support the claim that archers are viewed in a less 
than complimentary light.  The most frequently quoted is Diomedes’ diatribe against Paris, 163
who has just hit him in the foot with an arrow: 
     τοξότα λωβητήρ, κέρᾳ ἀγλαὲ παρθενοπῖπα, 
     εἰ µὲν δὴ ἀντίβιον σὺν τεύχεσι πειρηθείης, 
     οὐκ ἄν τοι χραίσµησι βιὸς καὶ ταρφέες ἰοί. 
     νῦν δέ µ᾽ἐπιγράψας ταρσὸν ποδὸς εὔχεαι αὔτως. 
     αὐκ ἀλέγω, ὡς εἴ µε γυνὴ βάλοι ἢ πάϊς ἄφρων· 
     κωφὸν γὰρ βέλος ἀνδρὸς ἀνάλκιδος οὐτιδανοῖο. 
     ἦ τ᾽ἄλλως ὑπ᾽ ἐµεῖο, καὶ εἴ κ᾽ ὀλίγον περ ἐπαύρῃ, 
     ὀξὺ βέλος πέλεται, καὶ ἀκήριον αἶψα τίθησιν. !
     “Archer, slanderer, ogler of girls, famous for your hair, I wish that you’d make trial of me in  
     arms face-to-face. Then your bow and frequent arrows wouldn’t protect you. As it is, you’ve 
     scratched the flat of my foot and boast in vain. I don’t pay it any mind. It’s as if a woman or a 
     foolish child had shot me. For the arrow of the man who is weak and of no account is blunt. 
     Differently indeed does the sharp missile travel from my hand, even if it only grazes, and it 
     immediately renders a man lifeless” (11.385-92). !
Hainsworth’s characterization of this passage is typical: “Diomedes’ words are an eloquent 
expression of the aristocratic spearman’s contempt for those who fight at a distance (and often 
anonymously) with the bow.”  Indeed, the fact that Diomedes uses toxotēs pejoratively does 164
seem to indicate that the term “had enough contemptible connotations that it could be used to 
diminish the glory of the person or nation using it.”  But there are several mitigating factors 165
here. First, archers can also be addressed in complimentary terms. For example, in Book 15, 
 This is not the place for an exhaustive study of all the passages which have been suggested as portraying archers 163
negatively. Reasonably extensive analyses may be found in Farron (2003) and C. Mackie (2008, 93-154). However, 
in addition to what I examine, I note that Pandaros’ sneak attack on Menelaus (4.86-126) is not depicted as 
particularly cowardly because archery is involved, but rather because he is committing an immoral act; so van Erp 
Taalman Kip (2000, 390-2), pace Fenik (1974.196). Contrary to the common assumption (e.g. van der Valk (1952, 
271), H. Mackie (1996, 50-1)), sneak attacks do not seem in particular to be sources of disapproval in Homer per se: 
R. Parker (1983, 132-3, van Wees (1988, 5), Dué and Ebbott (2010, 54-5). On the other hand, it is not my intent to 
deny what Farron (2003, 183) calls “the superior glamour of fighting close to the enemy rather than at a distance.”
 Hainsworth (1993 ad loc.); similarly Erbse (196, 173-7), Fenik (1968, 21), and Ndoye (2010, 262-3).164
 Farron (2003, 181), who also rightly notes that “it is inconceivable that anyone would taunt an enemy as an 165
αἰχµητής [‘spearman’]” (182).
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Hector refers to the arrows of Teucer as ἀνδρὸς ἀριστῆος… βέλεµνα (“arrows of the best man,” 
15.489).  And, as Farron notes, Achilles draws an equivalence between dying at the hands of a 166
spearman and an archer (21.275-83).  Secondly, it is important to note that Diomedes’ address 167
to Paris here is part of a type-scene that frequently appears in Iliadic fighting. If a warrior is the 
target of a spear-cast or arrow-shot, and he is wounded but survives, he ordinarily taunts his 
assailant.  If Diomedes’ taunt is particularly vociferous here, it is because of the 168
inappropriateness of Paris’ boast. As Muellner has shown, the formula καὶ εὐχόµενος ἔπος ηὔδα 
(“and he spoke a word in boast,” 11.379 in the present context) is only used elsewhere of 
warriors boasting over the corpse of a slain foe. Diomedes is presumably offended because he 
has understood from Paris’ speech that he is claiming an honour he has not earned.  Diomedes, 169
in his response, goes too far in the other direction. His claim that Paris’ arrow has merely 
scratched him is shown to be false when he suffers intense pain from the removal of the arrow 
and has to be taken back to the camp on account of the wound (11.396-400). His abuse of Paris 
as an archer must be seen therefore as more in the nature of flyting, as opposed to an expression 
of contempt for archers as a group.  After all, Diomedes himself has recently gone on a night-170
raid with Odysseus, who was armed with a bow (10.260).  This is not to claim that we should 171
 I am uncertain what is meant by ‘best’ here. Cf. Nagy (1999, 26-41) on the epithet aristos in Homer in general. It 166
might refer to the fact that Teucer is the best of the Greeks at archery (12.350 = 363, 13.313-14). And the most 
pertinent passage in this regard is worth quoting: Τεῦκρός θ᾽, ὃς ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν / τοξοσύνῃ, ἀγαθὸς δὲ καὶ ἐν 
σταδίῃ ὑσµίνῃ (“Teucer, who was the best of the Achaeans at archery, and good too in close combat,” 13.313-14). 
The poet clearly does not portray the archer as incapable of holding his own in closer encounters.
 Farron (2003, 184), who provides several further examples throughout his article.167
 Fenik (1968, 31-2), who provides multiple examples. Of particular interest here is the similarity of the response 168
that Diomedes gives to Pandarus when the archer misses him with a spear-cast (5.280-9).
 Muellner (1976, 89-92), who also notes that the formula is only used elsewhere of Greeks. I am unclear on what 169
the significance of its use by a Trojan might be.
 On this passage as an instance of flyting, see Ready (2011, 120-6).170
 Dué and Ebbott (2010, 57-62) discuss the significance of this bow at some length.171
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disregard Diomedes’ expression of disdain for archery entirely. I am merely suggesting that 
archery, while it is clearly socially vulnerable to some extent, is not simply an object of 
contempt. 
 In Book Thirteen, the Locrians do not follow Oïlean Ajax into battle: 
     οὐ γάρ σφι σταδίῃ ὑσµίνῃ µίµνε φίλον κῆρ· 
     οὐ γὰρ ἔχον κόρυθας χαλκήρεας ἱπποδασείας, 
     οὐδ᾽ ἔχον ἀσπίδας εὐκύκλους καὶ µείλινα δοῦρα, 
     ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα τόξοισιν καὶ ἐϋστρεφεῖ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ 
     Ἴλιον εἰς ἄµ᾽ ἕποντο πεποιθότες, οἷσιν ἔπειτα 
     ταρφέα βάλλοντες Τρώων ῥήγνυντο φάλλαγγας. !
     “For their dear heart did not remain in firm battle. For they did not have brazen helms thick 
     with horsehair, nor did they have round shields and ashen spears. But they followed along to 
     Ilium, trusting in bows and well-twisted sheep wool, with which they fired in numbers and  
     broke the Trojan lines” (Il. 13.713-18).  172!
Schwartz claims that the narrator is indicating here that “Ajax’ bowmen… lack the courage for 
close combat.”  This reading may be correct as far as it goes, but it seems also to imply that the 173
bowmen lack courage at all. I would argue that they should only be read as lacking courage in 
the present context, and that the narrator’s statement should not be interpreted as an indictment 
of the Locrians’ character per se. In other words, the fact that they are bowmen and not melee 
combatants does not necessarily stem from a lack of moral fibre. I read the γάρ on 714 as causal, 
meaning that the Locrians do not have the heart to withstand hand-to-hand combat because they 
do not have bronze armour and spears.  Interestingly, Strabo (10.1.13) has οὔ σφιν σταδίης 174
ὑσµίνης ἔργα µέµηλεν, / ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα τόξοισιν καὶ ἐϋστρόφῳ οἰὸς ἀώτῳ / Ἴλιον εἰς ἅµ᾽ ἕποντο 
 It is uncertain what the ἄωτος is in this context, but, if Pausanias 1.23.4 does refer to this passage, as Lorimer 172
(1950, 301) suggests, it might be a sling (σφενδόνη).
 HE 1.80 s.v. “archery.” Janko (1992 ad 13.712-18) reads line 718 as redeeming the Locrians in a paradoxical 173
way, which requires us to understand lines 713-17 as condemnatory.
 Van der Valk (1952, 272 n. 7) suggests that the Locrians may be archers because they live in a mountainous 174
district.
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(“they did not care for the deeds of firm battle, but they followed along to Ilium with bows and 
well-twisted sheep wool”), apparently in place of 713-17. This variant would strengthen the case 
that the Locrians are cowards because it fails to explain their unwillingness to participate in 
hand-to-hand combat with their lack of appropriate gear, instead leaving the fact unexplained. On 
the other hand, two factors argue against our adoption of these lines. The T scholiast, tentatively 
suggested by Erbse as quoting Didymus here, favours ἔργα µέµηλεν on 713 because, according 
to him, the Locrians are described as following the Ajaxes (Αἰάντεσσι, 4.273), using the 
metaphorical phrase, νέφος εἵπετο πεζῶν (“a cloud of infantry followed,” 4.274). How, the 
scholiast asks, can the Locrians be described as ordinarily being ranged fighters when they are 
clearly described as foot-soldiers in Book Four?  The argument apparently implied by the 175
scholiast here is that the Locrians do not care for close combat in this particular case, and so they 
fight with missiles instead. However, it is important to note that the foot-soldiers of 4.274 are 
never explicitly called Locrians. It is merely assumed that some of them are because they are 
following the two Ajaxes, and the Oïlean Ajax is followed by Locrians, as at 13.712-18. But, as 
we have already mentioned in a footnote, Page has persuasively argued that the two Ajaxes 
named in 4.272-85 are in fact Telamonian Ajax and Teucer, thereby undermining the reasoning of 
the scholiast.  The second reason for preferring the vulgate reading to Strabo’s is that his 176
version requires the πεποιθότες on 717 to be read with the following relative clause, with οἷσιν as 
its dative complement. While this is certainly possible, the position of the relative pronoun would 
be awkward, and βαλλόντες works more smoothly with οἷσιν as its instrument, given the 
consequential force (ἔπειτα) of the clause and the fact that its point is that missile weapons are 
 Σ Τ ad 13.713 Erbse.175
 Page (1972, 236-7).176
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being put in motion, not relied upon. The best way to understand this passage is therefore that the 
Locrians do not engage in hand-to-hand combat because they do not have the appropriate 
equipment. Lack of means and not cowardice is the cause of the Locrians’ holding back. After 
all, Achilles himself, who is surely no coward, does not proceed into battle before he is supplied 
with appropriate arms. 
 A passage from Tyrtaeus is sometimes used as a parallel to the state of affairs for long-
range combatants in the Iliad: 
     ὑµεῖς δ᾽, ὦ γυµνῆτες, ὑπ᾽ ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος 
          πτώσσοντες µεγάλοις βάλλετε χερµαδίοις 
     δούρασί τε ξεστοῖσιν ἀκοντίζοντες ἐς αὐτούς, 
          τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἱστάµενοι. !
     “And you, light-armed men, throw great rocks, cowering under your shields in different  
     places and aiming at them with polished spears, taking a stand near the fully armed  
     men” (11.35-8 W).  177!
While ptōssein does unambiguously communicate cowardice, there are several informative 
reasons to distinguish this passage from earlier epic.  First of all, Tyrtaeus appears to be 178
incorporating this group of light-armed warriors into an early form of the phalanx which does not 
appear in early Greek hexameter.  Several interpretations have been suggested for what exactly 179
these gymnētes are doing in this passage. To my mind, the most convincing is Irwin’s, who 
proposes that they are cowering under their own shields (ὑπ᾽ ἀσπίδος) and not those of the 
 See Irwin (2005b, 38 n. 8 for a convenient summary of the link that has been proposed between this passage and 177
the kind of warfare described in the Iliad. Romney (2014), resurrecting Hartung’s conjecture, makes a compelling 
case for reading ξυστοῖσι τ᾽ (“and javelins”) in place of ξεστοῖσιν in line 37. While, as she notes, this would 
certainly allow us to make better sense of πτώσσοντες by construing it as adversative, I do not think that it affects 
my argument to read it either way.
 See Irwin (2005b, 38-9) and Romney (2014, 829-31) on ptōssein as communicating cowardice.178
 On Tyrtaeus 11 and the phalanx, see van Wees (2000, 71-2 and 2004, 173-4) and Irwin (2005a, 293-4). On the 179
phalanx’ absence from Archaic epic, see Wheeler (1991, 129-31), van Wees (1994a and 2004, 160-70), pace Latacz 
(1977). Van Wees (2000, 156 n. 1) outlines the history of the scholarship on the early development of hoplite 
warfare.
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panoploi addressed in the rest of the poem.  The gymnētes are, by virtue of their shields, 180
hoplites, and they can be distinguished from the panoploi based on the fact that, apart from these 
shields, they are very lightly armed.  It has been well-established that differences in level and 181
quality of military equipment were usually – and often deliberately – representative of 
differences in economic status.  In this light, the pejorative ptōssein probably reflects the 182
contempt of the aristocratic class for the lower classes, who, while they contribute to the battle, 
are not able to bear the brunt of the enemy’s attack to the same extent on account of their inferior 
equipment. As Irwin puts it, Tyrtaeus’ “agenda is to forge a link between those of a certain 
elevated economic status and the ideal of martial ἀρετή.”  We may therefore contrast the 183
gymnētes with Oïlean Ajax’ Locrians, for example, inasmuch as the gymnētes are portrayed as 
cowardly and presumably less effective than the panoploi, whereas the Locrians do not 
participate in combat at close quarters for the simple reason that they do not have the appropriate 
equipment. There is also a crucial distinction to be made in terms of their equipment. The 
gymnētes have shields, whereas the Locrians probably do not have them equipped because at 
least some of them are using bows (Il. 13.716-18). 
 In addition to the kind of equipment they wear, the gymnētes appear also to be separated 
from the panoploi by the fact that they use missile weapons.  This difference is linked to the 184
 Irwin (2005a, 291-6), who addresses and summarizes earlier interpretations.180
 Possession of a hoplite shield was the minimum requirement for being a hoplite: Hanson (2000, 58-60), van Wees 181
(2000, 132), Osborne (2009, 164-5). I avoid comparing the gymnētes to the psīloi of classical warfare for the reasons 
outlined by Irwin (2005a, 291-3). 
 Cartledge (1977, 22-4), van Wees (2004, 47-60).182
 Irwin (2005a, 294).183
 It is unclear to me whether the panoploi are to be understood as throwing spears in Tyrtaeus 11 W. However, even 184
thrown spears were clearly treated as a different class of weapon than other missiles, possibly because they doubled 
as melee and long-range weapons; cf. H. Mackie (1996, 49): “to avoid a spear cast is to evade a close encounter with 
an enemy.” It was not until the Classical Period that spears were used only for thrusting: van Wees (1994b, 145-7).
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variation in armour in the sense that it represents – at least in Tyrtaeus’ formulation – the removal 
of the gymnētes from the most dangerous area of battle. Tyrtaeus presumably prescribes the use 
of missile weapons with the understanding that the gymnētes are not in a position to be of more 
use otherwise. In this way as well, the world of epic is different. For example, like the gymnētes, 
Homeric warriors use stones (chermadia) on several occasions (4.517-20; 11.580-3; 12.154-6; 
16.772-5; 20.283-8). Included among this number are major aristocratic figures, like Diomedes 
(5.302-4), Hector (8.321-2), Agamemnon (11.264-6), and Ajax (14.409-13).  Similarly, the 185
Homeric poet regularly uses akontizein to describe the long-range fighting of upper class figures, 
such as Odysseus (4.496), Agamemnon (5.533), and Diomedes (8.118). The bottom line is that 
the army portrayed in Tyrtaeus primarily derives success from maintaining a unified front, 
whereas the kind of combat described in early epic does not, resulting in a slightly less stratified 
hierarchy of combatants and styles of combat.  186
 Although archery does not have a stigma attached to it, it is nonetheless undeniable that 
hand-to-hand combat is accorded more prominence and attention in the Iliad (and the rest of 
Greek literature besides) than archery and other forms of long-range combat. It is interesting to 
note in this light that Teucer is an archer and Ajax a melee fighter. In fact, they are the only 
archer-spearman pair in the Iliad, although very little either of them does with the other is unique 
in and of itself.  This close but differentiated pairing is often thought to reflect the fact that 187
Teucer is nothos and Telemonian Ajax is gnēsios.  Certainly, Teucer is not just any long-range 188
 Many of these instances (e.g. 5.302-4; 8.321-2; 20.283-8) are clearly iterations of the same type-scene: Fenik 185
(1968, 33-6). But this hardly detracts from the significance of who it is that hurls the stone in each case.
 On battle formations in Homer, see van Wees (1994b, 1-9 and 2004, 153-8); pace Latacz (1977).186
 Fenik (1968, 225-7).187
 This view is argued most extensively and recently by Ebbott (2003, 37-48).188
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fighter. He is the archer par excellence in the Iliad. He is the sixth-most effective killer, far more 
noteworthy than any other archer.  But, as Kelly shows, none of these kills is particularly 189
important.  As noted above, he is called the best of the Greeks at archery (ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν/ 190
τοξοσύνῃ, 13.313-14; cf. 15.489). And he is one of the two archers to whom Apollo gives a bow 
(15.441).  But he loses the archery contest to Meriones because he does not offer a hecatomb to 191
Apollo (23.859-83).  And Teucer is quite clearly overshadowed by Ajax, who is the best of the 192
Achaeans after Achilles (2.768, 17.279-80; Od. 11.469-70, 24.17-18; cf. Il. 13.321-5 and Ibyc. 
S151.31-4 PMGF).  This unfavourable comparison perhaps establishes Teucer in a particularly 193
weakened state in light of Ajax’s awkward position in the Iliad. Criticism involving Ajax has 
generally reached the conclusion that he comes off rather poorly in comparison with his explicit 
status as second-best Greek.  Finkelberg notes that Ajax and his cohort only receive 2 lines and 194
very little land in the Catalogue of Ships (2.557-8), which is especially stingy when we compare 
what he offers for Helen in the Catalogue of Women (Hes. fr. 204.44-51 M-W).  When we add 195
to this the fact that his role in combat in the Iliad is essentially defensive,  and we note his poor 196
 Armstrong (1969, 30).189
 Kelly (2007, 263-4).190
 Pandarus is the other: 2.827. There is no similarity between the lines, and so it is difficult to know if we are 191
dealing with formulae. Apollo still favours the Trojan Hector to the Achaean Teucer when Teucer takes a shot at 
Hector (8.311).
 This possibly foreshadows Teucer’s victory at Achilles’ funeral games (Apollod. Epitome 5.5.); so Kullman 192
(1960, 130-1).
 Vergados (2009, 154) is particularly explicit on this point: “although Ajax’s brother, Teucer, is also a noble 193
character, he certainly is not as great as Ajax.”
 In addition to the following summary, see van der Valk (1952) and Kirkwood (1965, 60-1), contra von der Mühll 194
(1930, 436-8).
 Finkelberg (1988); similarly Latacz (2003 ad Il. 2.557-8). Several theories have been advanced to explain the 195
difference between the two lists. Rutherford (2005, 115-17 and 2012, 160-1) suggests that the passage from the 
Catalogue is influenced by the growth in Athenian power. And Cingano (2005, 143-52) argues at some length that 
Ajax is really boasting that he can obtain these places for Helen and not that he has them to give at the time.
 Holt (1992, 330-1).196
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showing in the funeral games for Patroclus (Il. 23.733-7, 824f., 841-9), we get the sense that 
Ajax is being actively diminished. 
 To a certain degree, this diminution of Ajax stands to reason. After all, his end is marked 
by failure both in the epic tradition and beyond. Because Ajax’s loss to Odysseus in the contest 
over the arms is alluded to at Od. 11.543-60 in such a way that the audience’s familiarity with the 
story seems to be understood as given, we generally assume that this contest was a live tradition 
from early on.  While there is no explicit mention of his subsequent suicide, Odysseus’ 197
reference to his death (549) seems without point unless we understand that Ajax killed himself 
out of grief over his loss in the contest. And certainly Ajax’s madness and suicide is attested 
elsewhere in the epic tradition (Aethiopis fr. 5, Il. Parv. arg., Il. Pers. fr. 4.7-8 Bernabé).  So it 198
is probably safe to assume that Ajax’s loss in the contest, madness, and suicide are understood in 
the Iliad as his eventual fate. With this end in mind, it is not difficult to conceive of Teucer’s 
corresponding fate, which is featured in later sources, in the background to the Iliad. Telamon 
drives Teucer out of his oikos after Ajax’ death and the sack of Troy, and Teucer settles Cyprus as 
a new Salamis.  199
 In Sophocles’ Ajax, Teucer contemplates how Telamon will greet him when he returns 
home with news of Ajax’s death: 
 Kullman (1960, 79-81), Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 ad 11.541-67).197
 The argumentum to the Aethiopis ends merely with a quarrel arising between Odysseus and Ajax over the arms of 198
Achilles (καὶ περὶ τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλων Ὀδυσσεῖ καὶ Αἴαντι στάσις ἐµπίπτει), but Finglass (2011, 27 and n. 67) is 
convinced that it could not have ended there. Finglass’ (28) reading of Αἴας … τήν τε λείαν τῶν Ἀχαιῶν λυµαίνεται 
(“Ajax spoiled the plunder of the Achaeans”, Il. Parv. arg. 4) as referring to the destruction of the spoils of the 
Greeks as opposed to their livestock seems perverse in light of the popularity of the livestock story in later tradition. 
Ajax’s suicide also appears in art from the beginning of the 7th century BCE: Simon (2003, 8-10), Finglass (2011, 
28-9).
 Pi. N. 4.46-7, A. Pers. 896-7, Eur. Hel. 89-96, Hor. Carm. 1.7.21-9, and Vell. 1.1. Teucer goes to Spain in Str. 199
3.3.3 and Philostr. VA 5.5. Teucer’s inclusion in the beginning of the Helen has long been thought awkward. For an 
excellent explanation for his presence, see Karsai (1992).
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     οὗτος τί κρύψει; ποῖον οὐκ ἐρεῖ κακὸν 
     τὸν ἐκ δορὸς γεγῶτα πολεµίου νόθον, 
     τὸν δειλίᾳ προδόντα καὶ κακανδρίᾳ 
     σέ, φίλτατ᾽ Αἴας, ἢ δόλοισιν, ὡς τὰ σὰ 
     κράτη θανόντος καὶ δόµους νέµοιµι σούς. !
     “What will this man keep to himself? What sort of ill will he not speak of the bastard born  
     from an enemy’s spear, your betrayer, dearest Ajax, out of cowardice and weakness, or with  
     tricks, so that, with you dead, I might have possession of your power and your  
     halls?” (1012-16). !
Of course in Sophoclean drama such issues are never simple. Before he kills himself, Ajax 
charges the chorus to instruct Teucer to convey his son, Eurysaces, who is in every way like 
Teucer in the circumstances of his birth, home to Telamon to be incorporated into his household 
(565-70). But, as noted above, it seems generally to be the tradition that Teucer is to be driven 
out of Telamon’s house and to settle Cyprus as a new Salamis, whereas, as Ebbott argues, 
Eurysaces is to become an Athenian citizen.  The contrast between these two fates in fact 200
highlights the unfortunate and awkward position in which Teucer is placed by Ajax’s death,  201
and his concern in the Sophoclean passage over how Telamon might react to the news is both 
believable and serves to heighten tension. What is difficult to account for at first, however, is the 
specificity of Teucer’s concern. That Telamon might rail at Teucer for surviving when the 
favoured son, Ajax, has not certainly seems plausible. But why would he call him a coward and 
accuse him of betraying Ajax? The point is probably that Teucer’s absence during Ajax’ crisis 
puts him in a poor position. Indeed, in the few fragments we have from a Sophoclean Teucer, the 
plot of which was likely the return of Teucer to Salamis, his rejection by Telamon, and his 
 Ebbott (2003, 51), citing Plut. Sol. 10 and noting his probable connection to the Choes festival at Athens.200
 Easterling (1997, 26).201
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departure to Cyprus,  it is likely that Teucer is in fact put on trial and accused of treachery.  202 203
The charge of treachery seems to stem from the fact that Teucer is absent when Ajax commits 
suicide. But exactly what he is supposed to have done is difficult to determine. There is no way 
of knowing whether the Ajax and the Teucer were part of the same trilogy.  However, whether 204
the passage quoted above foreshadows the trial in the Teucer or refers to it independently, 
Sophocles clearly envisions Teucer’s relationship with his father as coloured by the fact that he is 
nothos. In the quoted passage, Teucer does not consider the possibility that he might serve as an 
heir to Telamon after the loss of Ajax. For him to do so might be hypothetically viable in view of 
lines 1015-16, but Teucer apparently correctly anticipates that he will be repudiated by Telamon 
partly on account of his notheia (1012-13). And, in fact, Teucer’s case may be particularly grim 
because, as discussed above, his mother, Hesione, is Trojan (1299-1303). In the Teucer, 
Odysseus, who acts as prosecutor, probably argues that Teucer is likely to be a traitor because of 
his Trojan ancestry on his mother’s side (fr. 579 Radt).  To sum up, the fact that Ajax dies, 205
Teucer’s absence at the time of this death, and Teucer’s inconvenient maternal ancestry all 
conspire to undo the unfortunate archer. It is vital to note, however, that the two former facts 
would presumably be considerably less incriminating should Teucer have been born a full 
brother of Ajax and therefore not Trojan, as Teucer’s foreboding in the quoted passage implies. 
 Much of the dynamic observed in Sophocles is under the surface in Agamemnon’s 
 Frs. 576-9 Radt. On the likely outline of the plot, see Pearson (1917, 214-15) and Heath and Okell (2007, 202
379-80).
 Fr. 579 Radt. Cf. Pacuvius Teucer fr. 342/343 Ribbeck = fr. 390 d’Anna = fr. 244 Schierl, probably spoken by 203
Telamon to Teucer: te repudio nec recipio: naturam abdico: i facesse! (“I reject you, and I do not receive you. I 
renounce your birth. Get out of here!”).
 Heath and Okell (2007, 379-80, with further bibliography in n. 48) are convinced that they are. Finglass (2011, 204
35-6) is (probably rightly) skeptical.
 Teucer’s counterargument that his father is Greek is apparently not sufficiently effective, given the final verdict.205
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address to Teucer in Iliad 8: 
     ‘Τεῦκρε, φίλη κεφαλή, Τελαµώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν, 
     βάλλ᾽ οὕτως, αἴ κέν τι φόως Δαναοῖσι γένηαι 
     πατρί τε σῷ Τελαµῶνι, ὅ σ᾽ ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα 
     καί σε νόθον περ ἐόντα κοµίσσατο ᾦ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ· 
     τὸν καὶ τηλόθ᾽ ἐόντα ἐϋκλείης ἐπίβησον. 
     σοὶ δ᾽ ἐγὼ ἐξερέω, ὡς καὶ τετελεσµένον ἔσται· 
     αἴ κέν µοι δώῃ Ζεύς τ᾽ αἰγίοχος καὶ Ἀθήνη 
     Ἰλίου ἐξαλαπάξαι ἐϋκτίµενον πτολίεθρον, 
     πρώτῳ τοι µετ᾽ ἐµὲ πρεσβήϊον ἐν χερὶ θήσω, 
     ἢ τρίποδ᾽ ἠὲ δύω ἵππους αὐτοῖσιν ὄχεσφιν 
     ἠὲ γυναῖχ᾽, ἥ κέν τοι ὁµὸν λέχος εἰσαναβαίνοι.’ !
     “Dearest Teucer, son of Telamon, leader of men, shoot like that, in the hope that you might in 
     some way become a light for the Danaans and to your father, Telamon, who reared you when  
     you were little and took care of you in his house, even though you are a bastard. Set his foot  
     upon good reputation, even though he is far away. And I’ll tell you, as it is indeed possible to    
     accomplish: if aegis-bearing Zeus and Athena should grant to me to sack the well-built citadel  
     of Ilium, in your hand first after mine will I place a gift of honour, either a tripod or two  
     horses, chariot and all, or a woman who will go up to bed with you” (8.281-91). !
Buchholz cites this passage as prime evidence that the rearing of nothoi in prominent positions in 
the Homeric household is exceptional and accordingly deserving of comment.  Interestingly, 206
Zenodotus deleted line 284, and Aristarchus and Aristophanes athetized it (Σχ Τ ad loc. Erbse), 
moves which would change the entire tone of the passage. And Wilamowitz agrees with the 
line’s removal on the grounds that Teucer is not nothos in the Iliad.  But the Hellenistic 207
commentators appear to have objected to line 284 not because they did not think Teucer nothos, 
but because the tone Agamemnon takes toward bastardy in this passage was not felt to be 
believable. They believe that people in olden times did not think of notheia as a source of 
reproach (ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ ὄνειδος ἦν ἡ νοθεία παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, Σχ bΤ ad loc. Erbse, who then 
 Buchholz (1881, 2.2.34-5); so Diller (1937, 79 n. 46) and Ogden (1996, 24).206
 Wilamowitz (1920, 49 n. 1); so Edgeworth (1985, 27 n. 4). See above for a defense of reading Teucer as nothos 207
in the Iliad.
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defends the line).  They were probably correct in this regard. As Ogden notes, “in the 208
construction of heroic ancestries bastardy played a useful role: it was both an easy device for 
deriving descent ultimately from a god, and also a convenient device for linking newly invented 
lines of descent onto heroes that already had established families.”  In addition, as we have 209
observed, nothoi in Homer are almost universally treated with a fair degree of respect. They are 
generally inferior in status to their legitimate brothers, but they are not contemned for their 
illegitimacy.  The quoted passage is therefore the outlier from this point of view, and it requires 210
explanation. 
 Martin analyzes Agamemnon’s speech to Teucer and comes to less than complimentary 
conclusions about the effectiveness of the son of Atreus’ persuasiveness. And he finds this to be 
typical of his oratorical deficiency throughout the poem.  Agamemnon attempts to encourage 211
Teucer not through the usual promise of kleos and material reward, but material reward alone.  212
And Kelly finds that this is the only Homeric example of an incentive offered to someone 
already performing the desired task.  Teucer himself addresses this problem when he responds, 213
 I cannot agree with the deletion of the line. In 283, ἔτρεφε τυτθὸν ἐόντα is, as Kelly (2007, 57) correctly argues, 208
“reserved for those with an irregularity in that process,” (see also 277-8; cf. Il. 6.222, 8.283, 11.223, 13.466, 22.480, 
23.85; Od. 1.435, 11.67, 15.381, 20.210, and 23.325); similarly Ebbott (2003, 39). Some explanation is therefore 
required as to why Agamemnon perceives Telamon’s rearing of Teucer to have been irregular. So, removing line 284 
simply defers the problem. Apthorp (1980, 25) discards the notion of deletion on MS grounds.
 Ogden (1996, 22); so L. Patterson (2010, 5-12).209
 C. Mackie (2008, 115) finds in Agamemnon’s mention of Teucer’s notheia an “oblique allusion to the story of the 210
first sack of Troy.” This may be so, but it still does not explain the implication that one would not ordinarily have 
expected Telamon to rear Teucer (νόθον περ ἐόντα).
 Martin (1989, 116); similarly Kelly (2007, 57) and C. Mackie (2009, 9); pace Alden (2000, 157).211
 Martin (1989, 116); ὡς/τὸ καὶ τετελεσµένον ἔσται always occurs in the context of an explicit promise or threat 212
(209-10); cf. Kelly (2007, 279): “a speaker who makes this type of prediction is confident in the eventuality itself, 
and the statement’s persuasive power.”
 Kelly (2007, 281), with sixteen Homeric examples of someone being encouraged to perform a new task. Cf. 213
Knudsen (2014, 55): “the exhortation to Teucer… is notable because the situation hardly seems to call for a 
persuasive speech.” That Agamemnon feels the need to encourage Teucer might also be considered odd in light of 
the fact that Teucer kills more Trojans than Agamemnon in the poem (Armstrong (1969, 30)), and Agamemnon 
claims the first reward for himself (µετ᾽ ἐµέ).
!64
Ἀτρεΐδη κύδιστε, τί µε σπεύδοντα καὶ αὐτὸν / ὀτρύνεις; (“most glorious son of Atreus, why do 
you encourage me when I am hastening as it is?”, Il. 8.293-4). And it is effectively to Telamon 
and not to Teucer that Agamemnon offers the kleos for Teucer’s own deeds. Agamemnon’s 
speech is couched in terms of threptra. But, unlike in the other cases where this inducement is 
used, Agamemnon implies that Teucer especially owes Telamon threptra because he reared him 
despite (περ) the fact that he is nothos. Martin understandably finds it difficult to tell what 
Agamemnon’s purpose is in making this argument as he does. Surely it would be more effective 
to encourage Teucer to think of his father and to offer suitable reward for conspicuous 
performance. The insult is counterproductive.  We find, therefore, that this passage is peculiar 214
in a number of respects. It is the only example of a hero being told to do something he is already 
doing, and for material reward alone at that. It also contains the only instance in Homeric poetry 
in which a hero’s notheia is the source of insult or portrayed in a negative light. Bastardy might 
be unfortunate for the nothos as compared to legitimacy, but it is not a cause for shame, as we 
have already established. Agamemnon’s rhetorical incompetence can certainly be stunning. But 
his speech is hardly the only passage to set Teucer apart in an awkward manner. Some further 
explanation will be required. 
 Agamemnon’s attempt to encourage Teucer by recalling his father is, as we have 
established, a fairly standard tactic. The surprising barb that comes with this usual motivational 
ploy is, however, potentially significant in light of the passage which immediately precedes 
Agamemnon’s speech: 
 Martin (1989, 116), who characterizes this insult as a disconcerting use of the neikos device, on which see 71-6. 214
Cf. Knudsen (2014, 55): “Agamemnon strikes a discordant note by reminding Teucer that he is a bastard… thus 
undermining his attempt to put Teucer in a favourable frame of mind.”
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     Τεῦκρος δ᾽ εἴνατος ἦλθε, παλίντονα τόξα τιταίνων, 
     στῆ δ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ὑπ᾽ Αἴαντος σάκεϊ Τελαµωνιάδαο. 
     ἔνθ᾽ Αἴας µὲν ὑπεξέφερεν σάκος· αὐτὰρ ὅ γ᾽ ἥρως 
     παπτήνας, ἐπεὶ ἄρ τιν᾽ ὀϊστεύσας ἐν ὁµίλῳ 
     βέβλήκοι, ὁ µὲν αὖθι πεσὼν ἀπὸ θυµὸν ὄλεσσεν, 
     αὺτὰρ ὁ αὖτις ἰὼν πάϊς ὣς ὑπὸ µητέρα δύσκεν 
     εἰς Αἴανθ᾽· ὁ δέ µιν σάκεϊ κρύπτασκε φαεινῷ. !
     “Teucer came ninth, bending his back-stretching bow, and he stood under the protection of the 
     shield of Ajax, son of Telamon. Then Ajax would lift his shield away, and the warrior, looking  
     about, when he had taken a shot and struck someone in the crowd, he, having fallen on the  
     spot, would lose his life. And he [Teucer], like a child entering his mother’s protection, took  
     shelter with Ajax. And he [Ajax] hid him with his shining shield” (Il. 8.266-72). !
We note immediately that Ajax is awarded a proper patronymic, Τελαµωνιάδης, whereas Teucer 
receives Τελαµώνιος (281).  And there are several other elements of this passage which signal 215
Teucer’s inferiority. He comes ninth (εἴνατος), a number which Kelly and others have shown to 
denote incompleteness and insufficiency in the Iliad and Odyssey.  In this case, Teucer will not 216
be able to turn back the Trojans and will be injured (320-34). The comparison of Teucer ducking 
behind Ajax’ shield to a child seeking refuge with his mother combines two common evocations 
of the child-and-parent simile. First, this type of simile is frequently used to convey a sense of 
gentleness and protectiveness on the part of the parent figure for the child figure (e.g. of various 
Greeks for Patroclus: 16.5-9, 17.1-5, 132-9).  Second, the comparison of a warrior to a child is 217
a common method the poet uses to communicate the unworthiness of the warrior (e.g. 2.289, 
11.389).  In the quoted passage, this type of simile communicates simultaneously Ajax’ love 218
 See Higbie (1995, 7) for the significance of this difference.215
 Kelly (2007, 57 and 261-3, with bibliography on 261 n. 1).216
 Moulton (1977, 101 and 141-5) provides further examples.217
 Further examples are collected by Kelly (2007, 265-7). On the attitude toward children more generally in the 218
Iliad, see Ingalls (1998).
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and protectiveness for Teucer and also that Teucer apparently requires his protection.  Like 219
Agamemnon, then, the narrator diminishes Teucer in a manner atypical of the poem’s general 
treatment of nothoi. 
 I would argue that 8.266-91 can be better understood if we hypothesize that the Iliadic 
tradition is aware of the eventual falling out between Telamon and Teucer attested later in 
antiquity. We have already established that the early epics seem to be aware of the madness and 
suicide of Ajax. Given the close relationship between Ajax and Teucer in the Iliad, Telamon’s 
anger at Teucer is not difficult to imagine after Ajax’ ignominious death, especially in light of 
Teucer’s admittedly obfuscated Trojan heritage. All else being equal, a gnēsios is preferable to a 
nothos, and suspicion can easily arise in such circumstances, as in fact it does in later traditions. 
By itself, the presence of a nothos in a patriarch’s oikos is not treated as problematic in the Iliad, 
at least as far as the patriarch himself is concerned. But when the story is known to end with the 
death of the gnēsios and the estrangement of the nothos from his paternal oikos, Agamemnon’s 
aggressive, rhetorical treatment of Telamon’s rearing of Teucer may be seen as allusive rather 
than inexplicable. 
 In fact, Teucer’s Trojan heritage, his imminently antagonistic relationship with his father, 
his identity as an archer, and his intimate association with Ajax are all closely linked. It is often 
remarked that the only Greek archers named in the Iliad are Teucer and Meriones.  We might 220
 Teucer also retreats to Ajax’ side when his bow-string breaks (15.482-3). Ebbott (2003, 39-40) suggests more 219
specifically that the nothos is often associated particularly with his mother, and that this simile should accordingly 
be taken as evoking Teucer’s illegitimacy. While this reading is not at odds with my own, I find that the frequency at 
which this type of simile is used of gnēsioi precludes such an interpretation. There is a fragment of a 6th-century 
Corinthian plaque (Berlin F 764), on which Teucer can be identified crouching behind a shield with his bow drawn; 
cf. Johansen (1967, 57-61) and Snodgrass (1998, 122-3).
 Thomas (1962, 300), Edgeworth (1985, 30), H. Mackie (1996, 52-3), and C. Mackie (2008, 94-134). All of these 220
scholars find Teucer and Meriones to be inconvenient exceptions to their general rule that the Trojans are archers 
and the Greeks are not. Hopefully my analysis will resolve this problem. Hall (1989, 44-5) finds no ethnic 
correlation in this respect. 
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also include Philoctetes (2.718) and Heracles (5.392-3). But Philoctetes’ Heraclean bow is an 
important motif in the Trojan War.  And Heracles’ use of a club instead of a bow does not seem 221
to have been envisaged by the time of the Iliad (Pisand. T1 Bernabé).  Both of these characters 222
are firmly established as archers, and this fact could presumably not easily have been ignored. 
On the other hand, Meriones cannot properly be called an archer at all. He kills five men with a 
spear (5.59-68, 13.527-33, 567-75, 16.342-3, 603-5), and there is a lengthy passage describing 
his search for a replacement (13.159-305). He is even given the epithet δουρικλυτὸς, “famed for 
his spear” (16.619). On the other hand, his link to archery is tenuous. In Book 10, he gives 
Odysseus a bow, a sword, and the famous boar-tusk helm (10.260-2).  As McLeod 223
demonstrates, the bow is a particularly effective weapon at night, and so it was often used on 
guard duty.  It does not seem especially noteworthy, therefore, that Meriones is equipped with 224
one here – although it is true that Thrasymedes does not provide Diomedes with a bow in the 
same scene (10.255-9). We note as well that Meriones competes against Teucer in the archery 
contest at the Funeral Games (23.859-83). Again, I do not find this to be terribly significant, 
since he also at least nominally competes in the spear-toss against Agamemnon (884-97) as well 
as in the chariot-race (351, 528-31, 614-15). If anything, Meriones is something of a hybrid, and 
it is in this light that we should take the one instance where he uses a bow in combat, shooting 
Harpalion dead (13.650-5). This latter passage is also problematic. As we have observed, earlier 
 So C. Mackie (2009, 4-11), who demonstrates that Philoctetes’ later arrival at Troy with Heracles’ bow would 221
have been familiar to the audiences of the Iliad.
 Partly based on visual evidence, Huxley (1969, 102) dates the advent of Heracles’ club to late in the 7th century.222
 Odysseus is prominent as a bowman in the Odyssey, but not in the Iliad. He fights throughout the poem with a 223
spear, and he does not take part in the archery contest (Il. 23.859). On archery in the Odyssey, see Crissy (1997) and 
Andersen (2012). 
 MacLeod (1988), pace Farron (1979-80, 60). Dué and Ebbott (2010, 57-8) discuss the association of the bow 224
with night in Homeric poetry, suggesting that “it may even underlie the compressed simile of Apollo coming ‘like 
night’” (Il. 1.47).
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in the same book a fairly lengthy passage is devoted to Meriones' quest for a spear, which he 
finds (159-305). And his slaying of Harpalion is the next time he is mentioned. It is safe to say, 
then, that Meriones may occasionally use a bow, but he is not an archer.  225
 Teucer, on the other hand, is very closely tied to his bow. When Zeus breaks his bow-
string, he does arm himself with a spear, helm, and shield (15.461-83). But we never hear of him 
killing anyone after this. And, in fact, as di Benedetto notes, this scene marks the end of Teucer’s 
contribution to combat in this poem.  He is effectively neutralized by the loss of the use of his 226
bow. Teucer, it appears, is the only proper archer to fight for the Greeks in the Iliad. In this light, 
it hardly seems coincidental that he is half-Trojan.  We have already discussed how the Iliad 227
does not advertise Teucer's Trojan ancestry. But his depiction as archer par excellence seems to 
link him to this past.  If Teucer’s weapon is in fact a key to his place in the tradition, it is 228
interesting to recall by way of comparison that Ajax’ shield is similarly a fundamental 
component of his character.  He is especially conspicuous in battle when he is protecting others 229
and during retreats.  Teucer, on the other hand, is, as we have established, characterized as an 230
effective killer. We can to some extent, therefore, view the bow and shield as metonyms for 
 So C. Mackie (2008, 118-21). One might say the same of Helenus on the Trojan side, since he only uses a bow 225
once at 13.582-7; so Farron (2003, 183).
 Di Benedetto (1994, 202-3), who also describes Teucer’s ‘arming scene’ (15.478-83) as rather brief, a brevity 226
which scholars have long found to be marked: Tsagarakis (1982, 95-6, with bibliography at 95 n. 3). Between this 
scene and the contest of the bow, the only mention of Teucer is a reminder of the wound he dealt to Glaucus 
(16.510-12, referring to 12.387-91). 
 In this light, it is no wonder that Apollo has sided with the Trojans. Cf. C. Mackie (2008, 91): "Troy in the Iliad 227
has a very significant connection with archer, one that helps to inform the identity of the city and its people as quite 
distinct from the Greeks.”
 Cf. Lorimer (1950, 183) and Kirk (1990 ad Il. 8.267-72) on Teucer’s tactics as ‘Oriental’.228
 Ajax is above all identified by his great size (e.g. Il. 3.225-9; von der Mühll (1930, 435-42)), a characteristic to 229
which the shield is connected in formulae used only of Ajax: Whallon (1966, 7-8), especially emphasizing Αἴας δ᾽ 
ἐγγύθεν ἦλθε φέρων σάκος ἠΰτε πύργον (“and Ajax came near, holding a shield like a tower”, Il. 7.219 = 11.485 = 
17.128).
 So Holt (1992, 330-1).230
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Teucer and Ajax respectively. And Iliad 8.266-72 (quoted above) links them closely in the roles 
of archer and protector. The half-brothers work in a kind of symbiotic relationship. In this light, 
Teucer’s archery does not signify his notheia per se. It does, however, function as an expression 
of his mother’s ancestry in his particular case. In other words, there is no apparent link between 
archery and notheia in the Iliad, but Teucer’s Trojan ancestry links him to archery in a manner 
that is relevant to his notheia. His effective application of this facet of his maternal inheritance to 
the service of the Greek side of the war and in concert with his superlatively Greek half-brother 
signifies his allegiance to his patriline. And Agamemnon’s vaguely pejorative reference to 
Teucer’s notheia is particularly egregious in its apparent unawareness of how completely he has 
sacrificed the undesirable half of his bloodline. Agamemnon’s reference to Telamon evokes the 
fact that Teucer’s father in turn will fail to apprehend where his loyalties lie. Teucer functionally 
integrates himself into his paternal oikos. But the very manner in which he most symbolically 
proves this integration, namely by using the weapon of his maternal people against them, 
similarly highlights the cause for his father’s suspicion in the end. 
!
!
!
!
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1.3: HERACLES 
 An interesting divine instance of amphimetric strife is the dysfunctional relationship 
between Hera and Heracles. The stability of the cosmos requires that the hieros gamos not 
produce male offspring capable of inheriting Olympus, with Hera, the goddess of marriage, 
consequently never able to give birth to such a child, the very thing which would ordinarily be 
the ultimate source of tīmē for a Greek woman or goddess. Zeus’ attempts to promote his 
children from outside of their marriage, then, are a constant source of animosity. And this is 
fairly well-established, at least in the better-attested traditions available to us, as the primary 
motivating factor behind Hera’s unrelenting opposition to Heracles during his mortal life. As we 
might expect based on the other examples of stepmother-bastard relationships we have, those 
between Hera and Zeus’ many extramarital children are especially discordant because Hera 
herself never has any worthy, legitimate, male offspring. What remains to be explained properly, 
I think, is why she comes to love Heracles in many traditions after his apotheosis. The usual 
explanation, that Heracles is welcomed onto Olympus as a reward for the successful completion 
of his labouring for Eurystheus, relies on very late testimony. And in any case it is unclear why 
Hera should come to love Heracles as a result of this achievement. The more likely cause of 
Hera’s change of heart, I will argue, is Heracles’ well-attested but under-examined, posthumous 
marriage to Hebe, the daughter of Zeus and Hera. By marrying his half-sister, Heracles ceases to 
be merely an unwelcome result of one of Zeus’ many infidelities. He becomes Hera’s son-in-law 
and ally. 
 Heracles is in some respects a challenging subject because, in the words of Karl Galinsky, 
“the variegated nature of Herakles’ traditional qualities prevented him from being frozen in a 
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schematized role.”  It is unsurprising, therefore, that, according to Aristotle (Po. 1451a16 = 231
Theseis T1 Bernabé), the epic accounts of Heracles were episodic and weak in terms of narrative 
trajectory.  In many respects, Heracles is more a set of mythemes and superlative 232
characteristics than a figure with a coherent and articulated biography. However, as scholars such 
as Dumézil and Loraux have shown by example, it can be profitable to view his myths as 
structured by recurring themes. Using heavily diachronic approaches which encompass a wide 
range of materials, they have found that, while the figure of Heracles is appropriated in a variety 
of ways throughout Greco-Roman antiquity and beyond, some of his characteristics remain 
consistent in nature and emphasis.  Following their lead to a certain extent, I assume that, while 233
the figure of Heracles did undergo some fairly important changes during the Archaic period, it 
nonetheless remained consistent enough to justify some analysis. Interestingly, Heracles’ 
bastardy is not infrequently asserted or denied without argument, and so I think the question 
merits some inquiry.  Having concluded that he is a bastard from a certain point of view, I will 234
then proceed to look at how this helps us to read his brief appearances in early epic in general, 
and his marriage to Hebe in particular, with more nuance. 
 As we expect based on how the word behaves, Heracles is never referred to as nothos in 
Archaic literature. He is, after all, the son of a god and a mortal. We have to look as late as 414 
 Galinsky (1972, 4). Two major exceptions are Galinsky (1972) and Loraux (1997, 116-39). Stafford (2012), 231
while valuable, is more of a general overview. See Gantz (1993, 374-466) and Fowler (2013,  260-333) for thorough 
reviews of the early evidence for Heracles.
 So Haubold (2005, 86) interprets the passage. But contrast Barker and Christensen (2014), who argue that both 232
the diegetic narrator and characters in the Iliad use a single, consistent Heraclean fabula.
 Dumézil (1979, 60-3) examines the large number of Heracles’ marriages. Loraux (1997, 116-39) focuses on the 233
frequent juxtaposition of super-masculine and feminine qualities. Another example is Csapo (2005, 301-15), who 
considers Archaic and Classical presentations of Heracles in terms of their various ideologies.
 Using Euripides’ Heracles, Ebbott (2003, 49) provides some fairly meagre argumentation in favour of viewing 234
Heracles as a bastard. Ormand (2014, 117) is adamant that he is not a bastard, while Laurens (1987, 71) contends 
that he is somewhere between bastardy and legitimacy.
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BCE with Aristophanes’ Birds to find such a reference. Let us begin there. In the pertinent scene, 
the protagonist, Peisetairos, convinces Heracles that, pace Poseidon, he stands to inherit nothing 
from Zeus in the humorous, hypothetical situation in which Zeus should die and his property be 
divided: 
     Πε. διαβάλλεταί σ᾽ ὁ θεῖος, ὦ πόνηρε σύ. 
            τῶν γὰρ πατρῴων οὐδ᾽ ἀκαρῆ µέτεστί σοι 
            κατὰ τοὺς νόµους· νόθος γὰρ εἶ κοὐ γνήσιος. 
     Ηρ. ἐγώ νόθος; τί λέγεις; 
     Πε.                                    σὺ µέντοι νὴ Δία 
            ὤν γ᾽ ἐκ ξένης γυναικός. ἢ πῶς ἄν ποτε 
            ἐπίκληρον εἶναι τὴν Ἀθηναίαν δοκεῖς, 
            οὖσαν θυγατέρ᾽, ὄντων ἀδελφῶν γνησίων; !
     Peisetairos: “The divine one [Poseidon] is misleading you, you poor man. There’s no way  
     you have a share in your father’s estate according to the laws; for you are a bastard and not  
     legitimate.” 
     Heracles: “I’m a bastard? What do you mean?” 
     Peisetairos: “By Zeus, you certainly are, since you’re born from a foreign woman. Or how 
     do you think Athena could ever be an heiress, she being a daughter, if you have legitimate  
     brothers?” (Ar. Av. 1648-1654). !
Peisetairos later refers to the law of Solon (τὸν Σόλωνος… νόµον, 1660), and Pericles’ 
citizenship legislation of 451/0, in which a child was probably defined as nothos if he was born 
to a citizen and a non-citizen, is also pertinent.  Dunbar is correct to point out that Aristophanes 235
is probably referring to Solon’s law on intestate succession, according to which it is unlikely that 
nothoi were granted the rights of kinship and therefore allowed to inherit. And the definition of 
Heracles as a bastard because his mother is a foreigner also makes sense in light of the Periclean 
legislation.  The joke is that Alcmene, Heracles’ mother, is considered a foreigner to Olympus 236
 Cf. Solon fr. 50a-b Ruschenbusch. See C. Patterson (1981, 17-19) on this legislation; followed by Kamen (2013, 235
62-3).
 Dunbar (1995 ad 1660); so Ogden (1996, 35-6). On the continuous threat to both categories of nothoi during the 236
fifth century and beyond in Athens, see Ogden (1996, 44 and 62-3).
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because she is a mortal. Therefore, by analogy with the relatively recent Periclean legislation, 
Heracles must be nothos.  237
 The precise significance of the description of Athena as epiklēros is unclear. Rogers has 
suggested to some approval that it is an otherwise unattested cult title.  Dunbar also puts 238
forward the possibility that she is being referred to here as the patron goddess of heiresses.  In 239
either case, Athena’s position as heiress to Zeus’ estate is both humorous in the present context 
and appropriate with respect to the children of Zeus in general and Heracles in particular. The 
continuing security of Zeus’ patriarchy is predicated upon the absence of any heir or other threat 
to his throne.  In the Theogony, for example, Zeus secures himself from succession by 240
monopolizing access to Metis (‘Cunning’), thereby obtaining control over Athena specifically 
(Hes. Th. 886-900).  In fact, as his closest ally and sharer of the aegis and his mētis, Athena 241
comes to represent the closest thing that Zeus has to an heir.  And her femininity is probably 242
decisive in keeping her from posing a threat. From this point of view, Athena as epiklēros can be 
taken to denote in a humorously quasi-legal way her non-threatening ‘heirdom’ to Zeus’ estate.  243
In this light, Heracles can be seen as a kind of nothos, as Peisetairos says. Zeus necessarily 
denies even his divinely born sons their true heirdom. Figures like Heracles can only emerge 
 Ogden (1996, 35-6) on the passage as extra-metrical, meaning that it may reflect an actual legal text.237
 Rogers (1906 ad loc.).238
 Dunbar (1995 ad 1653f.). See Demand (1994.3-4) for general information on the epiklēros in classical Greece.239
 See, for example, Redfield (1993, 36-7) and Bonnard (2004, 34-5). Σ ad Ar. Av. 1653b Holwerda objects that 240
Ares and Hephaestus are gnēsioi. This would depend upon the tradition, and, in any case, Aristophanes is a 
comedian, not a mythographer.
 See also Felson (2011) on how the Homeric Hymns to Apollo (h. Ap.) and Athena (h. Hom. 28) portray the two 241
gods as allies of Zeus who might have been his rivals.
 Wöhrle (1999, 99-106) and Yasumura (2011, 90-6) address in more detail the portrayal of Athena as a kind of 242
non-threatening heir or even quasi-son to Zeus.
 See also Stocking (forthcoming), who connects Athena as epiklēros in this passage to the Apatouria and 243
patriarchal legitimacy.
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even further distant from legitimacy. While it is only natural that Aristophanes should provoke 
laughter by framing Heracles’ lineage in contemporary legal terms, the point that Peisetairos 
makes nonetheless has broader traction. 
 Of course the jocular element of this passage must necessarily leave some doubt as to 
what extent it can be taken to reflect actual views. But Heracles was also quite closely associated 
with notheia at a Heracleion and gymnasium in Cynosarges, an Attic district lying on the bank of 
the Ilissos in what was a suburb southeast of Athens in antiquity.  This complex probably dates 244
back to 490 at least,  and it may always have had a stigma attached to it.  Plutarch even 245 246
describes Themistocles’ characteristically clever attempt to palliate his activity at this institution 
by convincing his highborn friends to exercise there with him (Plut. Them. 1.2). But it was 
possibly not until the Periclean reform of 451/0 that nothoi as a group became associated with 
it.  As has already been noted, Pericles’ law disenfranchised even upper-class children, unless 247
both of their parents were citizens. It was probably in reaction to their disenfranchisement that 
this new set of upper-class nothoi gathered at Cynosarges, associating themselves with the site at 
least partly because Heracles can be seen as nothos. C. Patterson plausibly suggests that, “as a 
well-known Athenian not born from two Athenian parents, Themistocles may have become 
associated with the cult… in later tradition.”  248
 Notheia also appears to be linked to Cynosarges in a fragment of Polemon:  
 See Billot (1992) and Eliopoulos (2010) for discussions of the locations of these buildings in Cynosarges. But 244
little can be concluded with any certainty.
 Humphreys (1974, 92) on Hdt. 6.116.245
 So Bremmer (1977, 372-3), especially based on the existence of the phrase es Kynosarges (‘go to Hell’); see 246
Bremmer (1977, 372 n. 17) for references.
 And Themistocles was, in any case, probably not a bastard: Humphreys (1974, 88), C. Patterson (1990, 63), 247
contra Lotze (1981, 171) and Ogden (1996, 55-7).
 C. Patterson (1990, 64).248
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     Ἐν Κυνόσαργει µὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ Ἡράκλείῳ στήλη τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ᾗ ψήφισµα µὲν Ἀλκιβιάδου, 
     γραµµατεὺς δὲ Στέφανος Θουκυδίδου· λέγεται δ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ περὶ τῆς προσηγορίας οὕτως· ‘τὰ  
     δὲ ἐπιµήνια θυέτω ὁ ἱερεὺς µετὰ τῶν παρασίτων. οἱ παράσιτοι ἔστων ἐκ τῶν νόθων καὶ τῶν 
     τούτων παίδων κατὰ τὰ πάτρια.’ !
   “So, in the Heracleion in Cynosarges there is a certain stele, on which there is a decree of 
     Alcibiades, and the secretary was Stephanos, son of Thucydides. And in it is said as follows 
     concerning the address [i.e. parasitos]: ‘Let the priest sacrifice the monthly offerings with the  
     parasitoi. Let the parasitoi be selected from among the bastards and their children according  
     to ancestral customs’” (Polem.Hist. fr. 78 Preller ap. Athen. 6.234e = fr. 174 Tresp). !
Athenaeus quotes this passage in order to show that the term parasitos could be a perfectly 
respectable one in former times (πάλαι, 6.234c), and most discussion of this passage has 
accordingly centred around this claim.  However, the passage also contains our best and 249
probably earliest evidence regarding nothoi and the Heracleion in Cynosarges, namely a decree 
in which a special ritual association with Heracles is reserved – and even required – for nothoi 
and their descendants.  Ogden may be correct to suggest that the inclusion of the sons of 250
nothoi, “who could not of course have been nothoi themselves in the eyes of the Athenian state,” 
indicates that the disenfranchised aristocratic nothoi had formed a kind of alternative community, 
which had, by the time of this decree, reached a stage where its replication was seen as a 
possibility.  Both the dating of this decree and the period of time in which this group of nothoi 251
rallied at Cynosarges are matters of some dispute. The broadest range of dates for the decree 
must be 440 to 415, and Humphreys argues that the nothoi only used Cynosarges during these 
 On the parasitos, see Naiden (2012, especially 75-81).249
 Cf. Phot. s.v. Κυνόσαργες [κ 1214 Theodoridis]· ἐπειδὴ οὖν καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ νόθος εἶναι, διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖ οἱ 250
νόθοι ἐτελοῦντο· οἱ µήτε πρὸς πατρὸς µήτε πρὸς µητρὸς πολῖται (“and yet Heracles seems to be a bastard too 
because the bastards used to be initiated there: citizens neither from their father or their mother”). And see the 
comparanda in Theodoridis. Also cf. IG 1³.134 re: Alcibiades and the Cynosarges. Antisthenes was another, later 
nothos associated with the gymnasium in Cynosarges (DL 6.1.6); cf. Billot (1993, especially 115-16).
 Ogden (1996, 201). See also R. Parker (2005, 9-49) on the importance of the oikos in Athenian sacrifice, and 251
Stocking (forthcoming) on the association between sacrifice and the patriline.
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years.  However, scholars more recently have generally agreed that the decree only represents 252
one stage in Cynosarges’ association with notheia, that it may in fact go back to 490 or even to 
Solon’s archonship in 594/3.  The terminus ante quem is found late in the 350s, when 253
Demosthenes claims that Charidemos is enrolled (συντελεῖ) among the nothoi in Oreos, “just like 
the nothoi used to be enrolled at Cynosarges here” (καθάπερ ποτ᾿ ἐνθάδ᾿ εἰς Κυνόσαργες οἱ 
νόθοι, Dem. 23.213-14). Billot plausibly argues that the phrase συντελεῖν εἰς followed by a 
particular community refers to an obligatory enrolment in that community.  The power to 254
conscript would seem to suggest a fairly developed and well-established institution. Presided 
over by the figure of Heracles, it faded away between the end of the 5th century and halfway 
through the 4th. Unfortunately, little further is currently known about the particulars of this cultic 
association. However, we may say in general that the fact that Heracles could fairly clearly be 
considered a nothos in the 5th century probably can be taken to indicate that the concept of his 
illegitimacy was already there to be appropriated. 
 Some further lexical evidence may be found in two Archaic words that could apply to the 
extramarital child of a god and a mortal. The first is skotios, which literally means “shadowy.” It 
is generally thought to refer to bastardy, but it is used rather obscurely:  255
     βῆ δὲ µετ᾽ Αἴσηπον καὶ Πήδασον οὓς ποτε νύµφη 
     νηΐς Ἀβαρβαρέη τέκ᾽ ἀµύµονι Βουκολίωνι. 
     Βουκολίων δ᾽ ἦν υἱὸς ἀγαυοῦ Λαοµέδοντος 
     πρεσβύτατος γενεῇ, σκότιον δέ ἑ γείνατο µήτηρ· 
     ποιµαίνων δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ὄεσσι µίγη φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ, 
 Humphreys (1974, 88-9), supported by Billot (1993, 79-80).252
 C. Patterson (1990, 63-4), Ogden (1996, 200-1), and Jameson (2005, 19.)253
 Billot (1993, 81).254
 C. Patterson (1990, 50) and Ogden (1996, 25-6). See Ebbott (2003, 20-9) for the term diachronically. Cf. LfgrE 255
s.v., which has the opposite of skotios as amphadios (‘public’); cf. Od. 6.288. See also Eur. Tr. 44, 252, Alc. 989, and 
especially Hsch. s.v. σκότιος [σ 1125 Hansen] and Poll. 3.21, which seem to be derived from Ar. Byz. fr. 233 Slater.
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     ἡ δ᾽ ὑποκυσαµένη διδυµάονε γείνατο παῖδε. !
     “And he went after Aesepus and Pedasus, to whom the river-nymph Abarbarea once gave  
     birth by blameless Boucolion. And Boucolion, eldest by birth, was the son of noble  
     Laomedon, but his mother bore him shadowy. While shepherding, he [i.e. Boucolion] lay  
     with her in love and bedding, and she [Abarbarea], made pregnant, bore twin  
     sons” (6.21-6).  256!
This passage is somewhat difficult to unravel at first because it is not always immediately clear 
what the subjects of the various verbs are. But it must be the case that Laomedon is the father of 
Boucolion with an unnamed female, and therefore that Boucolion is the skotios.  A scholion to 257
Euripides’ Alcestis is useful here, which discusses the possible shades of meaning of this usage. 
Citing the following definition, Ogden suggests that skotios could refer to Boucolion being of 
some sort of mixed ancestry: σκότιοι· οἱ µὴ γνήσιοι ὄντες τῶν θεῶν παῖδες ἀποθνῄσκουσιν, οἱ 
µὴ ὄντες ἐξ ἀµφοτέρων θεῶν (“illegitimate children of the gods die, since they are not from gods 
on both sides,” Σ AB ad Eur. Alc. 989 Schwartz).  I think the point here is that these 258
illegitimate children are ‘shadowy’ because they are mortal and must spend their afterlife in 
Hades.  On the other hand, the scholiast then refers explicitly to the present Iliadic passage 259
when discussing a different usage. He suggests that Boucolion is ‘shadowy’ because he is one of 
those “born from a marriage unlit by torches” (ἐξ ἀδᾳδουχήτων γάµων γενόµενοι, ibid.).  So, 260
according to the scholiast, the present use of skotios is roughly synonymous with nothos. 
 On folktale motif in this passage, see Stinton (1965, 48-50).256
 Apollodorus lists Boucolion as the son of Laomedon and the nymph Calybes (3.12.3). Boucolion may be an ad 257
hoc invention; cf. Nünlist (2009, 243-4) on scholia regarding speaking names, particularly when characters’ fathers 
are obscure.
 Ogden (1996, 25-6).258
 So L. Parker (2007 ad Eur. Alc. 988-90).259
 Eust. 622.43 has very similar wording. Cf. Eur. Ion 1473-6: Ion - ὤµοι· νόθον µε παρθένευµ᾽ ἔτικτε σόν; / Creusa 260
- οὐχ ὑπὸ λαµπάδων οὐδὲ χορευµάτων / ὑµέναιος ἐµός, / τέκνον, ἔτικτε σὸν κάρα (“alas, did you give birth to me as 
a bastard child of a maiden?” – “Child, not accompanied by torches or choral dances did my bridal song beget you.” 
Cf. also 860-1 and Tro. 44. On wedding torches in classical Greek poetry, see Ebbott (2003, 23-5), with 
bibliography.
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However, it is interesting to note that Boucolion does not appear in the list of Laomedon’s sons 
later in the poem (Il. 20.237-8). This absence may imply that C. Patterson is correct to assert that 
skotios “is suggestive of the circumstances of bastards without the social recognition of their 
fathers.”  But we must remain agnostic on this point for lack of comparanda of an appropriate 261
date. 
 The second possible term for the illegitimate son of a god and a mortal is parthenios 
(“child of a parthenos”), which is used of Eudorus, son of Polymele, who is raped by Hermes, 
conceives Eudorus, and then marries Echecles (16.179-192). Because of the assumption that 
parthenos must mean “virgin,” there has been some confusion expressed over this term in the 
present context. After all, Polymele cannot have been a virgin after she was raped by Hermes and 
gave birth to Eudorus. How, then, can Eudorus be the son of a virgin?  Lefkowitz claims that 262
Polymele is indirectly called a parthenos here because she is dancing in a chorus of girls for 
Artemis when Hermes conceives of his desire for her (181-3).  However, I am convinced by 263
Sissa’s argument that parthenos fundamentally means “unmarried, young woman” rather than 
“virgin.”  If we apply her definition here, we get good sense by reading Eudorus as the son of 264
an unmarried woman, a state of affairs which was true at the time of his birth. Taken this way, the 
 C. Patterson (1990, 50) and the lexicographers cited above.261
 Cf. Janko (1992 ad Il. 16.179-181), who translates parthenios as “born of a (supposed) virgin.” Also cf. Hsch. s.v. 262
παρθένιοι [π 923 Hansen] : οἱ κατὰ τὸν Μεσσηνιακὸν αὐτοῖς πόλεµον γενόµενοι ἐκ τῶν <παρ>θέ<ν>ων. καὶ οἱ ἐξ 
ἀνεκδότου λάθρα γεννώµενοι παῖδες, ἀπὸ τοῦ δοκεῖν ἔτι παρθένους εἶναι τὰς γεννησαµένας αὐτοὺς (“those born to 
them from the maidens [or the gods] during the Messenian War. Also children conceived in secret, outside of 
marriage, on account of which the women who have given birth to them still seem to be maidens”). And Σ bT ad Il. 
16.180 Erbse: ὁ ἐκ νοµιζοµένης παρθένου γεννηθείς; similarly Σ A ad loc. and Phot. s.v. παρθένιος [π 406 
Theodoridis].
 Lefkowitz (1993, 22); accepted by Ebbott (2003, 19).263
 Sissa (1990, 76-82). Contrast Poll. 3.21: παρθενίας δ᾽ ὅν τις ἐκ τῆς δοκούσης εἶναι παρθένου, [ʙοὐʙ] νόµῳ 264
συνοικήσας, ἐποιήσατο (“he is a parthenias whom someone fathered with a woman who seemed to be a maiden, 
having come to live with her by custom”). But this does not seem to fit the present context.
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term might even be thought to confer prestige. The poet names Polymele and provides the story 
of her rape. An Olympian god lusts after her, has sex with her, and gives her (πόρεν) a worthy 
son (181-6). Considering how infrequently bastards’ mothers are even named in the Iliad, the 
recital of her rape would seem to confer kleos upon her.  In addition, Hesychius (s.v. παρθένιοι) 265
may also include the river Parthenios (Il. 2.854) in the category of parthenioi.  If this is correct, 266
it is interesting to note that both Parthenios, who is presumably a river deity, and Eudorus have 
divine ancestry. And some support for the notion that parthenioi have divine parentage may be 
found in Poseidon loosening Tyro’s “maidenly girdle” (λῦσε δὲ παρθενίην ζώνην, Od. 11.245) in 
the Odyssean catalogue of women. The parthenios would appear therefore to be in a different 
category than the nothos because he has, at least as far as we can tell, one divine parent. 
 So, while Heracles could clearly be considered a nothos only slightly later in Greek 
antiquity, he might potentially have been described as parthenios or even as skotios, meaning 
more or less that he is a bastard from the divine point of view. Amphitryon and Alcmene seem 
technically to be married before Heracles is conceived, but the marriage has not been 
consummated:  
     ἦ µέν οἱ πατέρ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἀπέκτανε ἶφι δαµάσσας, 
     χωσάµενος περὶ βουσί· λιπὼν δ᾽ ὅ γε πατρίδα γαῖαν 
     ἐς Θήβας ἱκέτευσε φερεσσακέας Καδµείους. 
     ἔνθ᾽ ὅ γε δώµατ᾽ ἔναιε σὺν αἰδοίῃ παρακοίτι 
     νόσφιν ἄτερ φιλότητος ἐφιµέρου, οὐδέ οἱ ἦεν 
     πρὶν λεχέων ἐπιβῆναι ἐϋσφύρου Ἠλεκτρύωνης 
     πρίν γε φόνον τείσαιτο κασιγνήτων µεγαθύµων 
 Being raped is, as Lyons (1997, 56-59) shows, one of the only reasons a woman is ever mentioned in a hero’s 265
genealogy in Greek literature.
 καὶ ποταµὸς Παφλαγονίας Παρθένιος. It is difficult to tell whether the καὶ means that Hesychius is adding 266
another example of the usage we are discussing, or if he is simply listing an example of the word as a proper noun. 
Parthenios is a common name for Greek rivers, since they were frequently associated with virginity: N. Richardson 
(1974 ad H. Dem. 99).
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     ἧς ἀλόχου, µαλερῷ δὲ καταφλέξαι πυρὶ κώµας 
     ἀνδρῶν ἡρώων Ταφίων ἰδὲ Τηλεβοάων. 
     τὼς γάρ οἱ διέκειτο, θεοὶ δ᾽ ἐπὶ µάρτυροι ἦσαν· 
     τῶν ὅ γ᾽ ὀπίζετο µῆνιν, ἐπείγετο δ᾽ ὅττι τάχιστα 
     ἐκτελέσαι µέγα ἔργον, ὅ οἱ Διόθεν θέµις ἦεν. !
     “In fact, he [Amphitryon] had murdered her fine father, having overcome him with might,  
     angered over oxen. And he, having left his fatherland, supplicated the shield-bearing  
     Cadmeans in Thebes. There he inhabited halls with his respectable wife, but without desirable  
     love; and it was not possible for him to set foot on the bed of the well-ankled daughter of  
     Electryon before he had avenged the murder of the great-spirited brothers of his wife and  
     burned with destructive fire the villages of the Taphians and Teleboans, warrior men. For so it  
     was settled for him, and the gods were witnesses to it; for he regarded their wrath with awe,  
     and he strove to complete the great task as quickly as possible, the one which was established  
     for him by Zeus” (Hes. fr. 195.14-22 M-W).  267!
There is much about this passage which has troubled commentators. For example, various 
speculations have been offered, but the connection remains unclear between Amphitryon’s 
murder of Alcmene’s father and her insistence upon his vengeance for her brothers’ murder.  268
Whatever this connection may be, however, there is clearly something of a double determination 
– or at least motivation – at play here. Alcmene sets the price of her virginity as vengeance for 
her natal family, and Amphitryon is presumably interested in having a wife – especially such an 
excellent one (1-8) – who is willing to have his children. But the poet explicitly states that 
Amphitryon completes the task out of fear of the interested gods and especially Zeus. The groom 
therefore has powerful motives for completing his task. It is particularly interesting that Zeus is 
 Other, later versions of Heracles’ conception are in Pi. I. 7.6-7, Pherecyd. fr. 13bc Fowler, Eur. Her. 340-6, Diod. 267
4.9, Apollod. 2.4, Hyg. Fab. 29, Tz. ad Lyc. 33 and 932.
 I agree with Hirschberger (2004 ad 16-17) that it is Alcmene who delivers the imperative to Amphitryon (cf. 268
Pherecyd. fr. 13b Fowler). Fowler (2013, 262-3) suggests that the murder of Electryon provides the motivation for 
the move to Thebes, “Herakles’ undisputed birthplace.” But he simply describes the war against the Taphians and 
Teleboans as the price of Alcmene’s hand in marriage, making no connection between the two events. Gantz (1993, 
374) assumes that Alcmene requires Amphitryon to seek vengeance for her as penance for his transgression against 
her father. Ormand (2014, 158-9), using especially the scholion to AR 1.747 Wendel, argues somewhat ingeniously 
that the Taphians had stolen cattle from Electryon before his murder. Alcmene’s assignment for Amphitryon could 
then be read as the reacquisition of familial property in place of hedna, with Amphitryon paying penance for his 
murder of Electryon to boot. The Hesiodic version of Electryon’s murder by Amphitryon is uncommon in later 
traditions; cf. Gantz (1993, 374-5).
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described as the primary mover of Amphitryon’s task, since a few lines later he weaves (ὕφαινε) 
Heracles’ birth as a δόλος (‘cunning plan,’ 27-9). Presumably Zeus has sent Amphitryon away in 
order that he might have access to his bride while she is still a virgin. Exactly how all the pieces 
of this passage fit together is not obvious.  But it is clear that the poet has gone to a fair amount 269
of effort to ensure that Heracles should be born a parthenios. And particular emphasis seems to 
be required in the case of Alcmene’s virginity, since, as Steinrück has observed, all seven of the 
women who have twins in the Catalogue of Women are married. It is difficult to tell, given the 
extremely fragmentary nature of the remains of the poem, but Alcmene may be marked as a 
partial exception because she does not have intercourse with her husband until after she has been 
visited by Zeus.  The emphasis placed on Alcmene’s virginity stands to reason; the status 270
involved is a matter for boasting, at least as far as we can tell from our analysis above of the case 
of Eudorus. 
 But of course this boasting is from the mortal point of view. From the immortal 
perspective, the mortal offspring, the parthenioi, are not necessarily advantageous additions to 
the family, however peripheral they may be. When thinking of Heracles in this light, the 
ferocious antagonism of Hera must spring to mind. While the cause of Hera’s animosity towards 
Heracles is not made explicit in early poetry, a certain amount is implied. The Homeric and 
Hesiodic traditions differ over the purpose of Zeus’ fathering of Heracles. In the Iliad, Zeus 
intends Heracles to be a great ruler, but he is frustrated by Hera’s cunning mind 
 In addition to the above, other elements have caused confusion. Ormand (2014, 165) notes the incongruity of the 269
all-powerful father of gods and men needing to weave a clever plan, and Fowler (2013, 264) finds the lengths to 
which Zeus goes to execute his dolos to be unparalleled in other myths about him.
 Steinrück (1999, 396-8). Ordinarily, when gods have sex with mortal women, the women are virgins; cf. 270
Lefkowitz (1995, 33).
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(δολοφρονέουσα, 19.101-33). In the Catalogue of Women, as mentioned above, Zeus comes up 
with a cunning ploy (δόλος and µῆτις) to produce Heracles as a protector from ruin for gods and 
men (Hes. fr. 195.27-30). Either way, the birth of Heracles appears to be a piece in a high-stakes 
Olympian game. In the Theogony, Heracles plays a part in the cosmic victory of the masculine 
over the feminine when he slays monsters nursed by Hera (Hes. Th. 313-18, 326-32). There is, 
then, a kind of inverse symmetry between the dolos of Hera in Homer and the dolos of Zeus in 
Hesiod. Both deities use their cunning to attempt to gain their way with respect to Heracles and 
against the interests of the other. The difference is that, in Homer, Hera oppresses Heracles, 
whereas in Hesiod, Heracles overcomes Hera’s creatures. The mortal son of Zeus serves as a 
proxy for the Olympian couple to play out their cosmic struggle indirectly, avoiding the 
potentially cataclysmic consequences of more direct means. And what better proxy for such a 
struggle than the illegitimate son of Zeus? Zeus wishes to promote his son, and Hera to thwart 
him. Heracles may not be a nothos from the mortal point of view, but he certainly seems to play 
that role among the gods. 
 But we also note that Hera and Heracles are reconciled after his death and apotheosis. 
Potentially the earliest attestation of these events (Od. 11.602-4) is usually thought to be an 
interpolation from the sixth century or later.  Fortunately we may safely pass it over in favour 271
of two more detailed passages from the Hesiodic corpus: 
     Ἥβην δ᾽ Ἀλκµήνης καλλισφύρου ἄλκιµος υἱός,  950 
     ἲς Ἡρακλῆος, τελέσας στονόεντας ἀέθλους, 
     παῖδα Διὸς µεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου,      
     αἰδοίην θέτ᾽ ἄκοιτιν ἐν Οὐλύµπῳ νιφόεντι· 
     ὄλβιος, ὃς µέγα ἔργον ἐν ἀθανάτοισιν ἀνύσσας 
 See most recently Karanika (2011, 1-4) and Burton (2016, 12 n. 41) on this question. Lyons (1997, 9-10) offers a 271
rare argument in favour of the passage’s authenticity.
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     ναίει ἀπηµαντος καὶ ἀγήραος ἤµατα πάντα.  955 !
     “Αnd the stout son of fair-ankled Alcmene, the might of Heracles, made Hebe, the daughter of  
     mighty Zeus and golden-sandalled Hera, his respectable wife on snowy Olympus, once he had  
     completed the groan-worthy labours: happy man, who, having accomplished great work, lives  
     among the immortals, safe and ageless for all days” (Hes. Th. 950-5). !
     νῦν δ᾽ ἤδη θεός ἐστι, κακῶν δ᾽ ἐξήλυθε πάντων, 
     ζώει δ᾽ ἔνθα περ ἄλλοι Ὀλύµπια δώµατ᾽ ἔχοντες 
     ἀθάνατος καὶ ἄγηρος, ἔχων καλλ[ίσ]φυρον Ἥβην, 
     παῖδα Διὸς µεγάλοιο καὶ Ἥρης χρυσοπεδίλου· 
     τὸν πρὶν µέν ῥ᾽ ἤχθηρε θεὰ λευκώλενος Ἥρη  30 
     ἔκ τε θεῶν µακάρων ἔκ τε θνητῶν ἀνθρώ[πων, 
     νῦν δ᾽ ἤδη πεφίληκε, τίει δέ µιν ἔξοχον ἄλλ[ων 
     ἀθανάτων µετά γ᾽ αὐτὸν ἐρισθενέα Κρ[ο]νίωνα. !
     “Now he is a god, and he has escaped from all ills, and he lives in the very place where the 
     other dwellers of Olympian halls live, deathless and ageless, with beautiful-ankled Hebe for 
     his wife, the daughter of great Zeus and golden-sandalled Hera. Before, the white-armed 
     goddess, Hera, hated him more than she hated any other happy god or mortal man, but now  
     she has come to love him, and she shows him more respect than she does the other gods,  
     except the son of Cronos himself, whose might is broad” (Hes. fr. 25.26-33).   272!
Here, as elsewhere (h. Hom. 15.7-8, Pi. N. 1.69-72), Heracles’ arrival among the gods appears 
next to his marriage to Hebe.  The fact that Heracles marries Hebe, the personification of 273
youthful prime, is well attested. Hebe appears frequently on vase-paintings depicting Heracles’ 
introduction to Olympus.  The earliest of these is on an unpublished Samian krater dated to the 274
7th century, on which Heracles and Hebe ride on a chariot into heaven.  This same motif can be 275
 It is worth noting that these lines are obelized in P. Oxy. 2075. Fr. 229.8-13 is identical to fr. 25.28-33 if we 272
accept what Merkelbach and West supply. Hirschberger (2004 ad fr. 25.26-33) suggests that this duplication is the 
reason for the obelization of fr. 25.26-33.
 M. West (1966 ad Hes. Th. 881-1020 and 947-55) and Stafford (2010, 241 n. 35) argue that the Theogony 273
passage is a later interpolation, but they are in the minority. We have no mention of Heracles’ afterlife in the Iliad. 
But, given the general absence of a special afterlife for heroes in the Iliad (Redfield (1994, 180-1); cf. Il. 23.103-7), 
we probably have to assume based on 18.117-19 that Heracles is understood simply to be dead or in Hades: Holt 
(1989, 72).
 LIMC s.v. “Herakles” 3292-3343; cf. Simon (1979, 102-1 with plates 118/119). Pausanias (2.17.6) saw a relief in 274
the Heraeum in Corinth, on which the wedding of Heracles and Hebe is depicted as overseen by Hera. See Schefold 
(1992, 33-46) for an overview of Heracles’ apotheosis on late Archaic pottery.
 LIMC s.v. “Herakles” 3330.275
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found on a more complex scene on a Corinthian aryballos, which is dated to ca. 600. On this 
vase, inscriptions also identify the Muses, Calliope, Apollo, Athena, Aphrodite, the Charites, 
Zeus, Hermes, and Hera, all of whom appear to be attending the wedding of Heracles and 
Hebe.  After this, more than 125 Attic black-figures featuring the wedding of Heracles have 276
been catalogued.  On Attic pottery, Athena often appears both with and without Hebe as a kind 277
of bride (or bridegroom) of Heracles.  This likely represents an Attic appropriation of the 278
apotheosis and wedding of Heracles, an event that they claimed to have been the first to 
acknowledge.  Despite this wealth of data, the marriage of Heracles and Hebe has elicited very 279
little scholarly attention. Laurens says that Hebe represents Heracles’ dissociation from 
mortality, and Lyons and Kratzer describe the marriage as a commemoration of Heracles’ change 
in address.  This is as far as the analysis goes. I would argue, however, that Heracles’ marriage 280
to Hebe is a vital component of the structure of his story, a component without which the arc of 
his progress from toiling bastard son to Olympian god would be problematic.  
 LIMC s.v. “Herakles” 3331.276
 See Stafford (2010, 241 n. 36).277
 Laurens (1987, 62-70), Deacy (2005, 41-43). We ought also to bear in mind Laurens’ (1987, 71) salutary warning 278
that it is not always a straightforward matter to identify Hebe iconographically. There is also an Attic red-figure 
chous (Paris, Musée du Louvre M9 (N2408)), dated by D. Walsh (2009, 236) to ca. 410 BCE, on which there 
appears a burlesque version of Heracles’ apotheosis. Here, he is accompanied by Nike on a chariot drawn by 
Centaurs. While the scene certainly has a comic atmosphere, Taplin (1993, 9-10) does not believe that it would have 
been staged as we have it.
 On the Attic claim to have been the first to acknowledge his apotheosis, see Holt (1989, 71), who cites Diod. 4.39 279
and Paus. 1.15.3; Natoli (2004, 158) suggests that Isoc. 5.33 refers to the same tradition. Cf. Shapiro (1983, 12-17) 
on similar claims from outside of Attica to have been the first to acknowledge the divine Heracles. Moon (1983) 
discusses the political and social significance of vase-paintings of Heracles’ apotheosis in Attic art of this period, 
particularly with respect to the work of the Priam Painter. Heracles’ apotheosis is notably absent from Sophocles’ 
Trachiniae and Euripides’ Heracles, however. But these are probably cases of strategic silence on behalf of the 
playwrights rather than representations of alternative traditions: Holt (1989, 71-2). On the importance of Heracles in 
Attica in general, see Stafford (2012, 163-170 and 176-180).
 Laurens (1987, 71), Lyons (1997, 56-7), Kratzer (2013, 56-7).280
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 The reason for the lack of interest in Hebe, I think, is that Heracles’ acceptance among 
the gods is typically explained by his performance of the Labours, or at any rate some task or 
tasks.  Since, from this point of view, Hebe merely symbolizes Heracles’ apotheosis, it is no 281
wonder that she has largely been ignored. However, to my knowledge, the link between Heracles 
successfully labouring for Eurystheus and thereby obtaining immortality is only as early as 
Diodorus (4.10.7).  Indeed, if we view this explanation from Hera’s perspective, it is not 282
particularly convincing. As we have seen, Hera is an opponent of Heracles and is linked to many 
of his struggles.  Why would she admit him into the Olympian household because he has 283
overcome them? Presumably we should expect her to be angry and not conciliatory when she 
has been thwarted. Despite this, Gantz says of Hes. Th. 950-5 that “the implication must thus 
seem that the apotheosis [of Heracles] is a reward for his accomplishments.”  Let us look at 284
this passage more closely. Gantz’s suggestion requires us to take τελέσας on 951 and ἀνύσσας on 
954 as causal and not merely temporal. While this is hardly necessary, even if we accept this 
understanding, the result of Heracles’ deeds is strictly speaking his marriage to Hebe and not 
immortality. More importantly, if we look again at Hes. fr. 25.26-33, Heracles’ mortal 
accomplishments are nowhere to be seen. He has rather “escaped from all ills.” We note, 
 Galinsky (1972, 16), Stafford (2012, 172). Gantz (1993, 461) suggests the Gigantomachy, and Winiarczyk (2000) 281
a combination of factors, including the Gigantomachy and Heracles’ function as an euergetēs (‘benefactor’) and 
sōtēr (‘saviour’).
 See Huxley (1969, 101-2) on the fragments of Pisander, however. One might accept M. West’s (1966 ad Hes. Th. 282
954) contention that Hesiod explains Heracles’ immortalization as a reward for his participation in the 
Gigantomachy. And so does Pindar (N. 1.67-72), who also includes Hebe. But this would still fail to account for 
Hera’s change of heart, since she should probably be understood as having opposed Heracles in the Gigantomachy: 
Yasumura (2011, 39-57).
 On Hera as the cause of the Labours, see Deacy (2005, 38). But I do not claim that this tradition was by any 283
means universal; cf. Fowler (2013, 271-3). Even the opposition between Hera and the mortal Heracles may not have 
been uniform throughout the ancient Greek world. Giangiulio (1996) offers several cultic examples of Heracles and 
Hera apparently acting in concert. However, all of his evidence is very late, and it is unclear in most cases whether 
Heracles is to be considered a mortal or a god.
 Gantz (1993, 461); cf. M. West (1966 ad 954).284
!86
however, that the marriage to Hebe is mentioned again. In addition, Hebe’s parentage occupies 
an entire line, which is a strange detail to appear if she is merely a symbol of his immortality. I 
would argue that Hebe represents more than the personification of youthful prime in these 
passages – although it is certainly a nice touch that Heracles becomes immortal and marries such 
a deity. It is the oikos to which Hebe belongs that is of primary importance. Heracles does not 
just marry any goddess; he marries the daughter of Zeus and Hera, an extremely rare and 
presumably valuable product of the hieros gamos. In other words, Heracles does not just move to 
Olympus; he marries into the family. This arrangement helps to explain Heracles’ admission 
onto Olympus from Hera’s point of view. We see in the fragment from the Catalogue that, not 
only has she ceased to have a superlative hatred for him, but she has even come to have an 
exceptional love for him. Since marriage was a fundamental means of establishing alliances in 
antiquity, it is easy to see how Heracles’ arrangement could motivate Hera’s otherwise highly 
confusing change of heart. Heracles is no longer her husband’s bastard child. He is now her son-
in-law and ally. 
 That Heracles needs to be incorporated into this household after his death implies that he 
was not considered to be a full member of it during his lifetime. The divide for him, therefore, is 
predicated on his ontological status. Heracles’ apotheosis both demarcates his crossing of the 
boundary between bastardy and legitimacy and itself constitutes one of the prerequisites to his 
acceptance as legitimate. Both of these aspects of his apotheosis are linked to Hera and her 
initial opposition to Heracles’ recognition as son of Zeus. Hera does not accept Heracles as 
Zeus’ son, and, partly because he is mortal, her opposition proves decisive in determining his 
kinship identity – at least for the time being. Whether Hera is consulted about the marriage of 
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her daughter could easily have depended upon the storyteller. The bond created is consistent 
with the usual pattern of using kinship thinking to describe the cosmos. Heracles, the 
prototypical founder, outsider, and champion of humanity is brought into a lasting alliance with 
Hera, the most prominent goddess and therefore threat to humanity.  
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CHAPTER TWO: EUMAEUS  
 Like much of the second half of the Odyssey, Eumaeus used to be neglected by 
scholarship, at least relative to the rest of Homer. By contrast, the swineherd has fared much 
better over the last twenty-five years or so.  Of especial importance in this vein has been the 285
fact that Eumaeus is Odysseus’ slave. Recent interpretations of Eumaeus’ character have hinged 
on this fact. Most prominently, Thalmann has argued that Eumaeus functions as an expression of 
Archaic aristocratic ideals about the ‘good’ slave. In particular, Thalmann contends that the 
portrayal of Eumaeus as a member of Odysseus’ family corresponds fairly precisely to O. 
Patterson’s theory that the master appropriates the basic father-child relationship inherent to most 
cultures in order to justify the exploitation of his slaves.  This insight by Thalmann remains 286
fundamental to our understanding of Eumaeus’ character. I would go further and argue that this 
paternalistic, master-slave relationship also has a profound effect on the portrayal of Odysseus. 
Eumaeus is more than just Odysseus’ ‘son’ for convenience’s sake. On the one hand, there is no 
doubt that Odysseus is the primary character, and Eumaeus is the secondary. Eumaeus’ identity is 
predicated on the fact that his master exists, that he has certain, praiseworthy characteristics. All 
of this can be mapped onto a recognizable type of father-son relationship.  On the other hand, 287
as I will argue, Eumaeus in turn closely resembles Odysseus. He shares these desirable 
characteristics to an uncanny extent. In fact, Eumaeus comes to play Odysseus’ role on Ithaca in 
his absence. And, when the master returns, it is through the swineherd’s resemblance to him that 
 See, for example, Roisman (1990), Minchin (1992), Ahl and Roisman (1996, 167-88), Louden (1997), Thalmann 285
(1998a), Felson (2002b), Schmidt (2006), Newton (2015).
 Thalmann (1998a, 97-100), citing O. Patterson (1982).286
 So especially Schmidt (2006, 124-5).287
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he most poignantly experiences the gap between his mere presence on Ithaca and his final goal of 
resuming his role as head of his oikos. Eumaeus is not merely a slave. He is his master’s 
double.  288
 Several scholars have anticipated this argument. Scodel, for example, claims without 
elaborating that “Eumaeus serves as a sympathetic double of a more important character.”  And 289
this proposal is to some degree an extension of the recent consensus that Eumaeus understands 
Odysseus as no other mortal does.  It is also not unusual for a slave to be identified as a 290
doubling figure in the Odyssey. In fact, almost all of the doubles in the poem are slaves.  That 291
slaves should consistently be portrayed as secondary characters certainly stands to reason prima 
facie. But if we are to examine the correlation between the role of double and slave in the 
character of Eumaeus, then it is necessary first to clarify exactly what I mean by ‘slave’ and in 
what respects I am claiming that Eumaeus is Odysseus’ double. Following this, I examine how 
this doubling enhances the portrayal of Odysseus by highlighting how his absence can only 
partially be compensated for by Eumaeus. 
 First, let us consider whether we can say that Eumaeus is a slave, and what it means to 
 Most scholarly discussions of the double assume that the term is simply understood; see, however, Keppler’s 288
(1972, 1-13) insightful discussion. For the present purpose, I will define doubling as a relationship between a 
primary and secondary character in which the secondary resembles the primary to an uncanny extent. This 
uncanniness expresses a tension, in this case the tension caused by the fact that Odysseus has reached Ithaca but 
remains unable to be himself.
 Scodel (2002, 157). Cf. Farron (1979-80, 89), who says that Eumaeus can be seen as Odysseus’ alter ego; so to 289
some extent Bonnafé (1984). Segal (1994a, 164-5) and Louden (1997, 97-106) find a number of striking parallels 
between Eumaeus and Alcinous.
 E.g. J. Roisman (1990, 218-36), Montiglio (2005, 257).290
 Cf. Fenik (1974, 155-207).291
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say so. Because doul-stem words are so rare in Homeric poetry,  there is a long-standing debate 292
about whether figures like the dmōs (‘slave’), tamiē (‘housekeeper’), oikeus (‘house slave’), 
amphipolos (‘handmaiden’), etc. ought to be considered chattel slaves. More recent scholarship 
tends either to express agnosticism on the point or simply to assume that these figures are slaves 
without addressing the question.  Part of the issue is that do-e-ro/-ra, which is sometimes 293
controversially taken to refer to to the chattel slave, is attested in Linear B. Some of the do-e-ro/-
ra were clearly slaves, but probably not all of them.  It does seem tolerably clear, however, that 294
the doulē (‘slave woman’) is a chattel slave in Homeric poetry. But it has been suggested either 
that the dmōs, for example, is in a feudal relationship with his master, or that the term is 
something approaching a euphemism for doulos, namely the chattel slave.  Regarding the 295
debate surrounding the relationship between dmōs and doulos, the sentiment expressed by 
Eumaeus to the beggar is not easily misunderstood: 
     ‘δµῶες δ᾽, εὖτ᾽ ἂν µηκέτ᾽ ἐπικρατέωσιν ἄνακτες, 
     οὐκέτ᾽ ἔπειτ᾽ ἐθέλουσιν ἐναίσιµα ἐργάζεσθαι· 
 Doulē: Il. 3.409, Od. 4.12; doulosynē: Od. 22.423; doulion hēmar: Il. 6.463, Od. 14.340, 17.323; douleion eidos: 292
24.252; Beringer (1982, 25) includes Il. Parv. fr. 22 Bernabé in this list, but it is in Pausanias’ words (10.26.1). The 
two uses of doulē were seen to be grounds for athetization in antiquity. Σ ΜΟ ad Od. 4.12 Pontani reports that τινὲς 
τὸ δούλης κύριόν φασι διὰ τὸ µηδέποτε οὕτω λέγειν τὸν ποιητὴν τὸ “θεράπαινα{ν}”· διὸ καὶ τὸ “εἰσόκεν ἢ ἄλοχον 
ποιήσεται ἢ ὅγε δούλην” [= Il. 3.409] ἀθετοῦσιν (“some say that the proper term for doulē is therapaina because the 
poet never says doulē. Therefore they also athetize, ‘on the chance that he might make you his wife, or even his 
doulē’”). Note that all modern editions print εἰς ὅ κέ σ᾽ instead of εἰσόκεν. See also Eust. 1479.62 and Erbse’s 
remarks on the scholion ad Il. 3.395. Cf. Raaflaub (2004, 23-7) on eleutheros in the Archaic Period.
 For: Lencman (1966), Debord (1973), Gschnitzer (1976, 50-62), Finley (1978, 58-9, with significant caveats (55 293
and 71)), Ndoye (2010, 222-6); against: Beringer (1982), Wickert-Micknat (1983, 117), Raaflaub (1997, 639); more 
recent agnostics: Thalmann (1998b, 25), Hunt (2011, 26). Harris (2012) is the sole exception, concluding that 
Homeric and Hesiodic poetry portray historical slave societies. See Schmidt (2006, 118 n. 3) for a fuller description 
of this question in German scholarship. The ubiquitous habit of referring to figures such as Eumaeus and Eurycleia 
as ‘servants’ only confuses the issue further.
 Benveniste (1969, 358-9), Gschnitzer (1976, 3-8), Beringer 1982 (18-19), Garlan (1988, 25-9); see Raaflaub 294
(2004, 19-22) for a review of this question with ample bibliography.
 Feudal: Beringer (1982, 22-4); euphemism: Thalmann (1998a, 55-6). The analysis of the word would be greatly 295
simplified if there were agreement on its etymology. Raaflaub (2004, 291 n. 53, with further bibliography) and 
Beekes (2010 s.v.) assert that it comes from dōma, but damazein has also been suggested (e.g. Chantraine (1968, 
290)); cf. Ramming (1973, 3) for more possibilities.
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     ἥµισυ γάρ τ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἀποαίνυται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς 
     ἀνέρος, εὖτ᾽ ἄν µιν κατὰ δούλιον ἦµαρ ἔλῃσιν.’ 
      
     “Dmōes, when their masters cease to give them directions, then no longer are they willing to 
     do proper work. For broad-seeing Zeus deprives a man of half his excellence when his day of 
     slavery takes him” (Od. 17.320-323). !
Like Gschnitzer and Harris, I find it difficult to interpret this passage as indicating anything other 
than that each dmōs has met his doulion ēmar, meaning that a dmōs is a doulos, a slave.  We 296
cannot therefore make distinctions between the status of these two individuals based on 
terminological grounds. Beringer’s claim that the relationship between the dmōs and his master 
is essentially feudal is also disproved by the evidence of the Odyssey. As an example, he 
contends that “not without good reason are the δµωαί never anywhere in the epics portrayed as 
the concubines or mistresses of their lords, leave alone that the latter would have had a right over 
the bodies of their δµωαί as some scholars have mistakenly asserted.”  On the contrary, there 297
are any number of Odyssean examples of the master asserting his absolute right over the bodies 
of his slaves. The introduction of Eurycleia, quoted in the last chapter, in which Laertes is said to 
have kept his hands off her in order to avoid the anger (χόλος) of his wife (Od. 1.429-33), clearly 
implies that he could have slept with her. A more graphic example of the power of the master 
over the body of his slave is Telemachus’ overzealous and summary execution of the ‘bad’ 
 Gschnitzer (1976, 62), Harris (2012, 354-5). Santiago (1962) argues that eleutheron ēmar (Il. 6.455, 16.831, and 296
20.193) was constructed on the model of doulion ēmar (Il. 6.463; Od. 14.340, 17.323; cf. Thgn. 1213) and is 
therefore a later development in epic formulaic diction. Gschnitzer (1976, 3 n. 6) and Raaflaub (2004, 24) show that 
doulion ēmar and eleutheron ēmar are ordinarily used in constructions which refer to the same event, the onset of 
slavery. Ndoye (2010, 223-4) appears to assume the same. The only appearance of eleutheros outside of this formula 
is at Il. 6.528 with the “wine-bowl of freedom” (κρητὴρ ἐλεύθερος), which Raaflaub (2004, 26) thinks is constructed 
by analogy with eleutheron ēmar. Although dmōs is intended only as an illustrative example here, it does often seem 
to serve as the general term for the slave in Homeric poetry (e.g. Od. 17.422-3).
 Beringer (1982, 23 n. 33); so, for example, Debord (1973), Garlan (1988, 37), Ndoye (2010, 224 and 257), who 297
argue that specifically the pallakis and the doulē are concubines; contra Gschnitzer (1976, 58). Westermann (1955, 
2-5) and Harris (2012, 354-5) are rare holdouts against this trend, but even Westermann (2-3) claims that slavery in 
Homeric poetry is “so mild that it is difficult to distinguish it at times from patriarchal clientage or serfdom.” 
!92
handmaidens (22.457-77). This act has horrified many a modern reader of the poem, but no one 
suggests that Telemachus does not have the authority to kill them. The suitors’ kin gather at the 
end of the poem to avenge their deaths (24.415-71). No one complains about the handmaidens’ 
fate.  The most one might have expected to hear would have been that it is hardly parsimonious 298
to dispose of so much property in such a manner. In addition, like Schmidt, I cannot agree with 
Gschnitzer and others that “the brute fact of servitude” is avoided in the Odyssey.  Slaves are 299
sometimes brutally punished, as here, or promised rewards (e.g. at Od. 21.213-16), depending on 
their behaviour.  It is fairly evident, then, that in Homer the slave is a chattel slave and that his 300
or her fate is accordingly subject to the whim of the master. 
 When we consider the Homeric slave in light of current, universal definitions of chattel 
slavery, however, the issue becomes slightly more complex. Shaw, in his introduction to his 
revised edition of Finley’s Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, approbatively summarizes 
Finley’s definition of a chattel slave as  
     “a person who is systematically deracinated and kept in the status of an isolated being who  
     has no roots, no kin or family claims, and a person against whom such harsh abrogations of       
     personal empowerment and identity are enforced in perpetuity.”   301!
This corresponds quite closely to O. Patterson’s extremely influential and more extensive 
formulation in Slavery and Social Death. Patterson uses the term ‘social death’ to refer to 
 The harsh reality of slavery does not seem to be avoided. I also see no reason to follow Risch (1972), Gschnitzer 298
(1976, 12-13), Thalmann (1998a, 18), and Schmidt (2006, 125-8) in considering terms like dmōs, oikeus, etc. to be 
euphemistic simply because they are not doulos. And oikeus (also cf. oiketēs and oikiatas) in particular is quite well-
attested later in antiquity as being more or less synonymous with doulos: Benveniste (1969, 358) and Garlan (1988, 
21).
 Schmidt (2006, 128-30), citing Schlaifer (1936, 93) and arguing contra Gschnitzer (1976, 105) and Thalmann 299
(1998a, 18) especially.
 Schmidt (2006, 129 n. 66) compiles a number of examples on both sides.300
 Finley (1998, 12 and 145); similarly Garnsey (1996, 1). For a history of the scholarship on ancient slavery prior 301
to Finley, see Garlan (1988, 1-12).
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Finley’s definition, although he never acknowledges his debt explicitly.  I prefer Finley’s 302
descriptive definition to Garnsey’s prescriptive (and in my view essentialist) statement that an 
ancient “slave was property.”  Slavery was a distinct and changing institution, one which did 303
not always correspond semantically or legally to property – although slaves were often 
considered to be property – the definition of which also changed considerably over time.  The 304
ancient Greeks frequently tried to reduce the slave to a piece of property, but such attempts were 
never – and could never be – entirely successful.  A similar point needs to be made about 305
labour as well. The assumption that labour is a fundamental element of slavery is still prevalent 
in recent scholarship.  There is no doubt that labour is an extremely common purpose of 306
slavery, but it is by no means universal. While it has always been the case that the most common 
purpose of slavery is labour, the only solid criteria for slavery are deracination and social 
isolation.  307
 Considering Eumaeus’ story by way of comparison to Finley’s model, certain 
 O. Patterson (1982, 17-101), who does acknowledge a great debt to Finley’s work in general (xii). Patterson’s 302
definition of slavery is essentially composed of three elements: i) domination enforced by violence, ii) dishonour or 
the denial of honour, and iii) natal alienation. Ndoye (2010, 239-50) and Harris (2012, 356-8) find evidence for each 
of these elements in the treatment of slaves in the Homeric poems.
 Garnsey (1996, 1).303
 On the slave being considered property in antiquity, see in particular Vlassopoulos (2011) on [Arist.] Oec. 304
1344a23-26 and Pol. 1253b33. DuBois’ (2003, 6) definition of the chattel slave as a thing or object is more nuanced 
but ultimately fails due to the same objections. Both Garnsey’s and duBois’ theses had already been disproved by O. 
Patterson (1982, 17-27). Harris (2012, 352-3) attempts unconvincingly to show that Patterson’s definition is 
compatible with the concept of ownership. Honoré’s (1961) claim that ‘ownership’ and ‘property’ are universally 
consistent concepts across all civilizations is dubious inasmuch as he confines his study to relatively modern 
Western European and Russian/Soviet data. Cf. de Ste. Croix (1988, 21-2) on the definition of slavery at the League 
of Nations’ Slavery Convention of 1926 as “the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers 
attaching to the right of ownership are exercised.”
 So Vlassopoulos (2011). 305
 For example, cf. Schmidt’s (2006, 118 n. 2) definition: “sklave bezeichnet einen Menschen, der dauernder 306
Privatzbesitz eines anderen ist und für diesen arbeiten muß.” Schmidt is aware of O. Patterson’s “haarspalterisch” 
disproof of this formulation and confusingly responds, “aber in der Summe weiß doch jeder Sklave, ob und daß er 
Sklave ist” (ibid.).
 Cf. Rankine (2011, 34-5) on the Homeric slave and labour.307
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resemblances can be found. He was originally the son of a basileus (‘chief’) from the island of 
Syria somewhere in the East, an idyllic location untouched by hunger or disease (14.403-14). 
Indeed, the difference between Syria and the ‘real world’ of Ithaca is perhaps reminiscent of the 
contrast between Goat Island and the mundane world familiar to the poem’s audience (9.116-39), 
making Eumaeus’ subsequent removal from his ancestral home to a life of toil all the more 
painful.  Eumaeus was kidnapped by his nurse and sold by Phoenicians to Laertes (15.415-84). 308
Such a removal and sale corresponds quite straightforwardly to Finley’s ‘deracination’ or O. 
Patterson’s ‘natal alienation’. Eumaeus is denied access to his natal kin and transferred to a 
strange land. We can assume that Eurycleia went through a similar experience when she is 
reported as having been sold to Laertes (1.429-30). We are not explicitly told that she was 
kidnapped, but one assumes that she must have been, since she is also given an aristocratic 
lineage; and we would not expect upper-class parents ordinarily to be understood as wont to sell 
their daughters into slavery.  Again, in the Hymn to Demeter, Demeter qua Doso concocts a 309
tale in which she is kidnapped by pirates (ληϊστῆρες) and intended for slavery (122-32).  These 310
are the only examples in early epic of slaves developed enough to have a backstory and who are 
not born into slavery. We are therefore forced to conclude that, at least with respect to natal 
alienation, Homeric slaves are portrayed as chattel slaves. 
 So far, so good. But the question appears more complicated when we consider the other 
 Cook (1992, 266) and Louden (1997, 106) find associations between Eumaeus’ Syria and paradise.308
 Plut. Sol. 23.2 (= fr. 31a Ruschenbusch; cf. T8) says that Solon created a law according to which a man was 309
permitted to sell (πωλεῖν) his daughter or sister if she was no longer a maiden (παρθένον). But this should probably 
be taken to refer to prostitution (Glazebrook (2005, with bibliography) and Kamen (2013, 93); pace Ruschenbusch 
(1968, 42) and Leão and Rhodes (2015, 49)), and, in any case, it applies only to Athens in a later period.
 This portion of the H.Dem. is dealt with in some detail below. On Doso as opposed to Dos as Demeter’s 310
pseudonym, see N. Richardson (1974 ad H.Dem. 122). Odysseus invents another story of this type (Od. 14.287-98). 
The Tyrrhenians in h.Hom. 7.6-12 may be slavers, but perhaps they should be understood as intending to hold 
Dionysus for ransom.
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components of Finley’s definition, namely the denial of kinship and empowerment or identity. 
Eumaeus, for example, rather vehemently expresses feelings of relatedness to members of 
Odysseus’ oikos (most explicitly at Od. 15.363-70).  He also claims that Odysseus, had he 311
survived, would have rewarded his good service with a wife, property, and possibly freedom 
(14.61-7). And Odysseus does eventually promise these things and to make Eumaeus and his 
doublet Philoetius “companions of Telemachus and brothers” (Τηλεµάχου ἑτάρω τε κασιγνήτω 
τε), should they all succeed in overcoming the suitors (21.214-16).  It is crucial to note that 312
Odysseus offers these rewards as just that: rewards. The possession of property, acknowledged 
kinship, and even a wife are contingent in this passage upon the approval of and cooperation 
with the master.  From this point of view, Odysseus is perfectly prepared to play cynically into 313
Eumaeus’ sentimentality in order to advance his own cause. He could be seen to work on 
Eurycleia in a similar fashion when she discovers that he is the beggar and turns to inform 
Penelope: 
                 αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς 
     χείρ᾽ ἐπιµασσάµενος φάρυγος λάβε δεξιτερῆφι,        480 
     τῇ δ᾽ ἑτέρῃ ἕθεν ἆσσον ἐρύσσατο φώνησέν τε· 
     ‘µαῖα, τίη µ᾽ ἐθέλεις ὀλέσαι; σύ δέ µ᾽ ἔτρεφες αὐτὴ  
     τῷ σῷ ἐπὶ µαζῷ· νῦν δ᾽ ἄλγεα πολλὰ µογήσας 
     ἤλυθον εἰκοστῷ ἔτεϊ ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν.’ !
     “And Odysseus sought out her throat with his right hand and took hold of it, and with the  
     other he dragged her closer, and he addressed her: ‘Mama, why do you wish to destroy me?  
     You nursed me yourself at your breast. And now, having suffered many toils, I have come to  
     my fatherland in the twentieth year’” (Od. 19.479-484).  314
 Eumaeus’ expressions of kinship will be dealt with in detail below.311
 For Philoetius as a doublet of Eumaeus, see Fenik (1974, 172-3) and G. Rose (1980, 294). Contrast Nagler (1974, 312
108-9), who more or less dismisses Philoetius as nothing more than a fulfillment of the requirement that Odysseus 
be attended by two henchmen.
 So Harris (2012, 357).313
 See below on how polla mogein is peculiar to Odysseus and Eumaeus.314
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Line 480 appears to pick up on the description of Eurycleia’s discovery of Odysseus’ scar: τὴν 
γρηῢς χείρεσσι καταπρηνέσσι λαβοῦσα / γνῶ ῥ᾽ ἐπιµασσαµένη, πόδα δὲ προέηκε φέρεσθαι (“the 
old woman, when she had taken it [the scar] in her down-turned hands and felt it, recognized it 
and let his foot fall,” 467-8). The repetition of cheir, lambanein, and epimaiesthai within close 
proximity suggests that Odysseus’ actions are to be understood in light of Eurycleia’s. Each feels 
and grabs the other with his or her hand(s). Eurycleia uses her touch to identify her master. She 
does not know him until she touches him (474-5). But the parallelism of action is not matched by 
a similarity of intent. Eurycleia is overjoyed to discover her master and cannot wait to share the 
good news with Penelope (476-8). Odysseus’ enthusiasm does not equal Eurycleia’s. He feels for 
her throat and takes hold of it in order to threaten her. And the line-beginning χείρ᾽ 
ἐπιµασσάµενος is only attested elsewhere of Odysseus contemplating finding the place where 
Polyphemus’ midriff holds his liver so that he can stab him to death with his sword (9.299-302). I 
would suggest that, given the infrequency with which we see this line-beginning formula, what 
we have in the present scene might be a pointed allusion to Odysseus’ struggle with the 
Cyclops.  But this is not fundamental to my interpretation. The point is that such brutality is to 315
be expected between an epic hero and a bloodthirsty monster like Polyphemus. But it is 
potentially shocking in a domestic setting, especially between a man and his old nurse, who 
appears only to have his best interests at heart. But he promises to kill her, even though she used 
to be his nursemaid (τροφοῦ οὔσης σεῦ, 489), if she reveals his identity to anyone else 
(19.485-90). And, what is more, he refuses her help in ferreting out the disobedient handmaidens 
(500-2) – although, as Karydas notes, he does accept her assistance in this regard in the end 
 Cf. the furthest point on Bakker’s (2013, 167-9) scale of interformularity, as outlined in the introduction above.315
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(22.437-45).  Again, one could argue that Odysseus’ brutality in this scene exposes the threat of 316
violence underlying any system of slavery. And indeed Odysseus’ manipulative address to 
Eurycleia, quoted above, is chilling, to say the least. The use of the affectionate maia, for 
example, serves as a reminder of the long-standing bond between them.  And Odysseus’ 317
description of the length of time he has been away from their home presumably implies that his 
old nurse, of all people, should not be the one to destroy him after he has survived twenty years 
of battle and shipwreck. His further reference to his feeding at Eurycleia’s breast is sensually 
evocative and harsh, especially in light of the fact that he is recalling such a bond while grasping 
her throat, a similarly sensual but violent act.  Odysseus’ treatment of his nursemaid in this 318
passage features the threat of violence and the manipulative use of kinship (or perhaps better 
‘relatedness’ here) to get his end, two hallmarks of chattel slavery. In other words, in this case, 
kinship relations are only of advantage to the master, and the threat of violence is used, as it 
often is, to enforce obedience and deny empowerment to the slave. 
 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that many scholars have found fault with the Odyssey on 
the grounds that: 
     The Odyssey parades other people of the island, but largely as stage props or stock types: 
     Eumaeus the swineherd, the old nurse Eurycleia, Phemius the bard, the nameless ‘carvers of  
     the meat’, the sailors and housemaids and miscellaneous retainers. The poet’s meaning is 
     clear: on the field of battle, as in the power struggle which is the Ithacan theme, only the  
     aristocrats had roles.  319
 Karydas (1998, 37-42). Olson (1992, 225-6) argues that Odysseus preserves his authority by performing the 316
suggested act at a time of his own choosing.
 Cf. Telemachus’ use of atta (‘papa’) when threatening Eumaeus (21.369-75).317
 Cook (2012, 82 and 91), citing the parallel of Metaneira’s reaction to Demeter’s treatment of Demophoön at H. 318
Dem. 242-9, suggests that accusing the nurse of attempting to kill her charge is a motif in the theoxony and epiphany 
theme. Even if this is the case, it hardly detracts from Odysseus’ manipulation of Eurycleia.
 Finley (1978, 53); cf. Kirk (1962, 366-9), who complains that the portrayal of the servile figures in the Odyssey is 319
too flat.
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Finley more or less denies here that non-aristocratic figures are represented for their own sake in 
Homeric poetry. They are merely props in the background of heroic tales. Or, as McConnell 
characterizes his argument, “the role of underlings in the Odyssey is faithfully to underpin 
aristocratic society, rather than to have individual identities each in their own right.”  The 320
assumption here is that the role and portrayal of subordinates in the Odyssey are solely 
determined by the ideology of the oral tradition which produced them. In other words, one 
should not be surprised by the dismissive attitude shown toward the lower classes in the Odyssey 
because the poem is the product of an aristocratic perspective. But what about Eumaeus, for 
example, who is a slave and developed in some detail? Donlan and G. Rose contradict Finley and 
contend that figures like Eumaeus and Philoetius represent an anti-aristocratic pluralization of 
aretē, an attitude which approaches the more recently formulated  ‘middling ideology.’  But 321
Finley’s argument has subsequently been provided with a more thorough and nuanced expansion 
by Thalmann, whose reading has probably become the most influential. He says that scholars 
like Donlan and G. Rose should not be fooled. While Eumaeus is quite developed, having a 
history, emotions, and affections, his character is nothing more than an expression of an 
aristocratic perspective “in the service of the poem’s controlled ideological outlook.” Any 
attempt to read Eumaeus otherwise is necessarily to ignore or “explain away” certain passages of 
the Odyssey.  In fact, the portrayal of Eumaeus can be reduced to two themes: (1) Eumaeus 322
loves his kind (ēpios) master and wants to preserve his property;  (2) the master-slave 323
 McConnell (2011, 391).320
 Donlan (1973), P. Rose (1992, 92-140). On middling ideology, see Morris (2000, 113-54).321
 Thalmann (1998a, 85), referring to such passages as 4.62-4 and 15.324.322
 On ēpios in Homer, see below.323
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relationship between Odysseus and Eumaeus is assimilated to family relations. Both of these 
themes are connected to Eumaeus’ status as a slave and serve to soften the hard fact of his 
slavery in a manner that serves the ideological outlook of the poem.  Thalmann’s treatment of 324
the Odyssey is an important corrective to a long tradition of scholarship which uncritically 
accepted the poem’s presentation of the harmonious relationship between the ‘gentle’ master and 
the ‘good’ slave.  An important source of Thalmann’s theoretical basis for this analysis is O. 325
Patterson’s aforementioned work on social death.  Eumaeus, since he is a slave, is socially 326
marginalized. And one common ploy, whether it is applied consciously or unconsciously, is to 
express the dominance of the master over the slave in terms of ‘pseudo-kinship.’ The master 
cares for the slave as a father cares for his son, and the slave owes the master loyalty and 
frequently labour in return. After all, if the master is like the slave’s father, then the slave should 
no more resent the master’s dominance than a son should resent the authority of his father.  327
This constitutes symbolic domination. The master and slave misrecognize the power the master 
has over the slave by rationalizing it as a kinship relationship.  And, as we have already seen, 328
there is justification for reading Eumaeus’ relationship with Odysseus in such a way. Eumaeus 
perceives Odysseus and his oikos in familial terms, and Odysseus appears to exploit this 
perception by offering promotion in his oikos in exchange for help in fighting the suitors. My 
intention here is to expand on this reading by showing ways in which Odysseus and Eumaeus are 
 Thalmann (1998a, 86-100). Garlan (1988, 40-1) and Ndoye (2010, 239-40) contrast the kind master in Homer 324
with the typically harsh one in the literature of Classical Greece.
 Cf. Ndoye’s (2010, 239-42) review of earlier scholarship.325
 See especially Thalmann (1998a, 87-8).326
 See especially O. Patterson (1982, 19 and 62-5). For examples of this method apparently being utilized in 327
antiquity, see Golden (2011, 134-40).
 So Thalmann (1998a, 91). On symbolic domination and misrecognition, see Bourdieu (1977, 171-97). 328
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able to interact with one another within these constraints. Eumaeus’ social position is marginal, 
and even nearly non-existent in some settings. But he has a profound effect upon Odysseus 
nonetheless. 
 To begin with, it is necessary to look at this concept of social death more closely. Treating 
the relationship between Odysseus and Eumaeus as one of symbolic domination is useful 
inasmuch as it helps us to identify the means by which the dominance of the master over the 
slave is rationalized. But to characterize the appropriation of a kinship model to express the 
relationship between Odysseus and Eumaeus as pseudo-kinship is unnecessarily limiting. As was 
discussed in the introduction, the category of pseudo-kinship is no longer preferred. Rather than 
prescribe what constitutes ‘legitimate’ kinship, it is now generally accepted that kinship is better 
defined from the subject’s point of view. When Eumaeus' relationship with Odysseus or 
Telemachus is expressed in terms of kinship, therefore, it is inappropriate for us to dismiss this 
claim as ‘pseudo-kinship,’ implying that his relatedness is somehow illegitimate or imaginary. 
The fact that this relationship is characterized by an extreme level of domination does not 
prevent it from being a kinship relationship. After all, that one’s kin can be dominating and even 
abusive is hardly a revelation. The advantage of taking a more flexible approach to the portrayal 
of slavery here is that it potentially allows us to obtain a more temporally and culturally 
appropriate view of the poem. As Miller has recently lamented,  
     the prevailing concept of institutionalized slavery in fact primarily represents abolitionist  
     depictions of the U.S. antebellum South, with the enslaved as one-dimensional victims of  
     similarly one-dimensional brutal masters. The whip is the dominating symbol.  329!
To O. Patterson, the social reality of slavery may be expressed in what Miller calls the master-
 Miller (2012, 2).329
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slave dyad. The master dominates, and the slave is dominated.  While a relationship of 330
domination no doubt characterizes most, if not all, instances of slavery, this does not always 
prevent a complex and nuanced relationship from forming. And it follows that the Odyssey is not 
necessarily guilty of serving a propagandist function in the interest of slave-owners. Of course, 
the Homeric poems are told from the point of view of an aristocracy that has a vested interest in 
maintaining the status quo with respect to slavery. But this does not necessarily mean that the 
only accurate portrayal of a slave must present one who is disgruntled with his situation and 
possibly even opposes slavery on principle. While many people in the modern world quite 
reasonably view slavery as a violent and dehumanizing violation of human rights, this quite 
simply was not the assessment of the ancient world. We have no evidence of abolitionism in the 
ancient Greek world. On the contrary, while slaves were no doubt dissatisfied by their own 
slavery, we have evidence of Greek slaves and freedmen who themselves owned slaves.  In 331
fact, it seems to have been the case that the Greeks could not imagine a society without slaves.  332
Slavery was a fact of life, like the tide or the fickleness of the gods.  In fact, Miller argues, to 333
view the slave as a dominated victim and the slave-master as the dominating monster does a 
disservice to the slave. The slave is necessarily more than a victim. He is a “vibrantly alive 
individual.” His master might attempt to dehumanize him, but he must always fail.  The slaves 334
in Homeric poetry are not historical persons. But it does follow that the depiction of a slave who 
 Ibid. 20-2 and 31-3.330
 Meyer (2010, 73 n. 210), Kamen (2013, 28).331
 Vlassopoulos (2011, 116). None of this of course is to say that slaves did not ordinarily want to be free, as H. 332
Strasburger (1976, 27-9) comes close to claiming.
 Cf. Segal (1994a, 169). Also cf. Thalmann (1998a, 75): “Eurykleia is an aristocrat by birth who just happens now 333
to be a slave.”
 Miller (2012, 21).334
!102
is more than a victim can be seriously considered as something other than aristocratic 
propaganda. The less palatable corollary to the latter assertion is that it is also not merely 
aristocratic propaganda that the relationship between Odysseus and Telemachus and at least 
some of their slaves is more nuanced than the master-slave dyad allows.  335
 The ability to take the character of Eumaeus seriously is of central importance to this 
chapter because I wish to consider in some detail his identification with Odysseus’ oikos and 
especially Odysseus himself in terms of kinship and more broadly identity. And such an 
endeavour is of little value if the portrayal of Eumaeus is nothing more than an aristocratic view 
of the ideal slave. I submit, however, that, in addition to the theoretical considerations outlined 
above, Eumaeus cannot be such a figure entirely. The reason for this is that he is too closely 
associated with Odysseus, the poem’s centre of gravity, to be categorically devalued. 
 Having established that Eumaeus is a chattel slave, that he has been deracinated, let us 
now consider the doubling figure and what it means that Eumaeus is a double. The social 
framework of Odysseus’ oikos is complex as it is depicted in the Odyssey. It is difficult for the 
audience to apprehend all of the relationships among the various members of the household. Part 
of the reason for this is the frequency with which different characters mirror one another in 
various ways in the second half of the poem. And this practice is alluded to in Fenik’s suggestive 
chapter on character doublets in the Odyssey.  While character doubles are only one type of 336
repetition in Homeric epic, Fenik argues that there are a large number of them in the latter half of 
 It is not my intention to dispute, for example, Thalmann’s (1998a, 76) argument that “it is no accident that 335
whereas the ‘bad’ Melantho and her brother were born of slaves, the loyal Eurykleia and, more conspicuously, 
Eumaios, are of noble birth”; similarly Minchin (1992, 261 n. 9). There is no denying the aristocratic bias in these 
poems.
 Fenik (1974, 172-232).336
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the Odyssey, and that they are organized around their opposition to or support for Odysseus.  337
This claim must be correct broadly speaking. But it is surprising that Fenik’s work in this vein, 
while it has widely been cited with approbation, has gone undeveloped as far as I am aware.  338
Fenik provides us with considerable assistance, but I would suggest that there are important 
questions to be asked. For example, there are undoubtedly a number of character doublets in the 
Odyssey, and this fact is consistent with the formulaic nature of Homeric poetry. But does one 
character’s categorization as a double of another preclude the possibility that his or her actions 
have any peculiar meaning, or is he or she merely a reduplication of the more important, 
developed character?  339
 The usual notion is that, before the advent of Romanticism – and more particularly 
late-18th-century German Romanticism – the character double is little more than a plot device. 
Two characters, often twins, are identical in such a way as to drive the story. Throughout the 
history of comedy, for example, the confusion caused by identical twins who are unaware of 
each other’s proximity has frequently been used as a plot’s directing force. Starting with 
Romantic literature, on the other hand, the double has come to have “psychological depth,” often 
representing alternative possibilities or hidden realities with respect to the self.  So, to cite just 340
one example, William Wilson, in Poe’s short story of the same name, has a double who serves as 
 Ibid. passim, but summarized on 231-2.337
 Particular instances of the character doublet receive mention in de Jong (2001). But the theme is never treated at 338
length per se, since the book is a commentary. Marks (2003, 212-13) provides a very compelling case for Aetolian 
Thoas as Odysseus’ double in Archaic epic in general; cf. Visser (1997, 599). See also Russo et al. (1992 ad Od. 
19.248) and Louden (2006, 125-7) on the similarities between Eurybates and Odysseus.
 This question is not unlike the debate outlined in the introduction regarding whether we should consider epithets 339
to be meaningful in a particular context.
 So Labriola (2002, 70), Vardoulakis (2006, 101-5), Marcus (2011/12, 364-6). Rank (1971, 69-82), on the other 340
hand, finds several ancient examples, focusing especially on Narcissus and his reflection.
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an unwelcome conscience, one which he rejects.  Of particular importance is the use of the 341
double to evoke the horrific or ‘uncanny’.  William Wilson’s double is effective as such 342
precisely because he is so similar to William that it is uncanny. I would dispute the evolutionary 
model, however. As I will argue below, there is a similarity between Eumaeus and Odysseus. 
And, while it may not be horrific, it is certainly uncanny. Of use to us at present, however, is the 
critical treatment of the double as a manifestation or at least a representation of tension or 
anxiety.  To take one illustrative example from the Odyssey, let us consider the figure of 343
Eurynome as a doublet of Eurycleia. Eurycleia may work under the supervision of Penelope 
during Odysseus’ absence – and she presumably also does before his departure – but she is very 
much the master’s creature. As Fenik shows, “she does nothing in the entire poem that is not 
directly ordered by or connected with Odysseus or Telemachus.”  Eurynome is correspondingly 344
associated with Penelope, only appearing in connection with her mistress and never exchanging a 
word with Odysseus or Telemachus.  Of particular interest, as Fenik points out, is Eurynome’s 345
association with dressing beds. She is called θαλαµήπολος (‘chambermaid’) at Od. 23.293, and 
she usually fulfils this description, being either found in Penelope’s bedroom (17.492-7, 
18.158-86), or called upon to fix a bed for the disguised Odysseus (20.4) or for Odysseus and 
 Rank (1971, 8-33) provides a wealth of further examples.341
 Freud (1955, 226-36) discusses the literary use of the double in the late 19th and early 20th centuries to produce 342
the horrific or ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich).
 Webber (1996, 123-47) and Vardoulakis (2006) in particular emphasize this aspect of Freud’s discussion of the 343
double as especially central to its import. To my mind, this formulation satisfactorily takes into account Rank’s 
(1971, 76) earlier objections to similar claims.
 Fenik (1974, 190), with a thorough review of Eurycleia’s appearances in the poem and their connection to 344
Odysseus and Telemachus. Karydas (1998, 18-20) comes to much the same conclusion as Fenik, apparently without 
much awareness of his work. Much of Fenik’s analysis of Eurycleia and Euronyme as described in the following 
section is indebted to W. Scott (1918), as he himself acknowledges (1974, 189 n. 94). Cf. also Ramming (1973, 
103-4), of which Fenik was probably not yet aware.
 So Fenik (1974, 190-1) and Steiner (2010 ad Od. 18.164).345
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Penelope together (23.293-5).  And Eurynome’s close association with the thalamos and 346
Penelope is consistent with the metonymic import which the bed serves with respect to the 
relationship between Odysseus and Penelope, and in particular to Penelope’s sexual loyalty to 
Odysseus.  A touching symbolic resolution to the tension between Odysseus and Penelope is 347
found when Eurycleia, Odysseus’ trophos, and Eurynome, Penelope’s thalamēpolos, make the 
marital bed (23.288-9) on which the couple are about to be reunited.  
 Emblematic of the contrasting loyalties of Eurycleia and Eurynome is the very different 
advice they each give to Penelope. Eurynome more or less advises Penelope to consider 
remarriage (18.170-6) in a speech which Pedrick aptly compares to the bad advice often given by 
nurses or sisters to heroines in Greek tragedy.  We have in Eurycleia’s speech, on the other 348
hand, a rare example of a mortal woman giving good advice in Greek poetry. Eurycleia dissuades 
Penelope from calling for Laertes to drive the suitors out of her house. In addition, she more or 
less instructs Penelope to go upstairs to her room and act like a woman should (4.744-57), a 
gentler version of the speech Telemachus gave his mother earlier on (1.346-59). In other words, 
Eurynome comes close to suggesting that Penelope betray Odysseus, whereas Eurycleia fulfills 
the role which Telemachus – and Odysseus – would play were he present. So, Eurynome serves 
as a double for Eurycleia, playing the same role for Penelope as Eurycleia plays for Odysseus. 
And the mirroring of their respective roles represents the tension caused by the separation of 
 So Fenik (1974, 189-90). While Eurycleia is the only character in the Odyssey to be referred to as a trophos 346
(‘nurse,’ 2.361, 4.742, 17.31, 19.15, 21, 21.380, 22.301, 394, 419, 480, 485, 492, 23.25, 39, 69, 289), Ramming 
(1973, 103) does note that Eurymedousa, the only other thalamēpolos apart from Eurynome, is said to have reared 
(τρέφε) Nausicaa (7.12).
 For a thoroughgoing analysis of this metonym, see Zeitlin (1996, 20-7); cf. also Thalmann (1998a, 81-2).347
 Pedrick (1994, 98-103), citing in particular the nurse’s conversation with Phaedra at Eur. Hipp. 433-524, and, as a 348
later development, Anna’s successful attempt to persuade Dido to explore her passion for Aeneas at Verg. A. 4.1-53. 
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Odysseus and Penelope, just as it comes to represent the resolution caused by their reunion.  349
This is not to say that Eurycleia is nothing more than one half of a binary which shadows the 
marital relationship of Odysseus and Penelope. Various studies of Eurycleia have shown her to 
be a complex and interesting figure.  But the above analysis does show that she and Euynome 350
are mobilized along one of the lines that separate Odysseus from his oikos, and this separation is 
the main source of tension in the second half of the poem. 
 We encounter a much more complicated case when we look at Eumaeus as a doubling 
figure. Fenik does not include him in his list of doubles, although, as we have already observed, 
this possibility has been anticipated elsewhere. The reason for his lack of inclusion in Fenik, I 
believe, is that the manner in which Eumaeus plays the double is much more complex and 
nuanced than in the examples which he puts forward. Nonetheless, there are formal reasons for 
linking this pair closely.  First, Eumaeus is the only character in the Odyssey to receive 351
apostrophes from the narrator (14.55, 165, 360, 442, 507, 15.325, 16.60, 135, 464, 17.272, 311, 
380, 512, 579, 22.194). This unique situation has been the subject of much discussion. Eustathius 
suggests that the narrator treats Eumaeus in this fashion out of affection for the slave (φιλῶν τῆς 
εὐνοίας τὸν δούλον, 2.60.26), a view which has largely met with agreement in modern 
 The tension that doubles represent in Romantic literature and afterward is not typically resolved in such a 349
pleasant manner.
 Olson (1992), Karydas (1998, 8-63), Thalmann (1998a, 74-83).350
 Bonnafé (1984) thinks it is significant that dīos (‘godlike’) is used of both Odysseus and Eumaeus, and the 351
epithet’s distribution in the Odyssey is suggestive. Nominative, line-ending δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς is ubiquitous, and the 
only other character to be described in the same way on a regular basis is Eumaeus (δῖος ὑφορβός, 14.48, 401, 413, 
15.301, 16.1, 20, 333, 452, 17.183, 260, 589, 21.359, 22.162). The only other, infrequent recipients of this 
combination are Orestes (3.306, 11.461) and Echephron (3.439). I prefer J.-M. Foley’s (1999, 213-16) assessment 
that dīos refers to a type of character and nothing more specific. Cf. Scodel (2002, 156-60) on Eumaeus’ epithets as 
stressing “simultaneously his humble status and his nobility” (158), with the result that the audience cannot predict 
how his story will turn out.
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criticism.  It is also interesting to observe with Block that the two mortal characters to receive 352
relatively frequent narrative apostrophe in the Iliad, namely Patroclus (16.20, 584, 692-3, 744, 
754, 787, 812, 843) and Menelaus (4.127, 146, 7.104, 13.603, 17.679, 702, 23.600), share certain 
characteristics with the swineherd.  All three:  353
     exhibit characteristic traits of vulnerability, loyalty, and vague but poetically essential  
     weakness. All three furthermore define, negatively or positively, by possessing these traits,  
     the protective qualities of the main characters to whom they are complementary –  
     Agamemnon, Achilles, or Odysseus.  354!
While Block convincingly shows that this pattern holds with Patroclus and Menelaus, she 
essentially ignores Eumaeus.  And, in fact, while Patroclus and Menelaus can be seen to be 355
gentler doubles of Achilles and Agamemnon respectively, this is somewhat less clear in the case 
of Eumaeus. It is, after all, somewhat difficult to find a basis for comparison. Patroclus and 
Menelaus are shown to be gentle based on their actions in war, whereas Eumaeus’ martial 
activity is confined to a single, straightforward skirmish in his master’s oikos (22.265-80). 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that we first encounter Eumaeus driving his dogs away from the 
beggar Odysseus: 
     ἐξαπίνης δ᾽ Ὀδυσῆα ἴδον κύνες ὑλακόµωροι. 
     οἳ µὲν κεκλήγοντες ἐπέδραµον· αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς 30 
     ἔζετο κερδοσύνῃ, σκῆπτρον δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός. 
 Cf. Σ bT ad Il. 16.787 Erbse. So Block (1982, 15-16), Kahane (1994, 111-13), Louden (1997, 108), with further 352
bibliography, and Scodel (2002, 157). Contrast A. Parry (1972, 20-1), A. Edwards (1987, 37), and Reece (1993, 
151-2), who characterize these apostrophes as fossilized formulae. Stanford (1959 ad 14.55) argues that euphony 
was the motivating factor behind the use of the vocative in these cases, but A. Parry (1972, 21) shows this to be 
unlikely, pointing to 14.121 and 401, two third-person alternatives to the formula used at 14.55 and elsewhere. A. 
Bowie (2013 ad 14.55) is agnostic. Cf. J. Griffin (1986, 47) on the praise of Eumaeus at 15.556-7: “that openly 
laudatory comment departs widely from the normal reticence of the epic narrator.” And Kahane (1994, 111) notes 
that only the narrator and Odysseus’ immediate family refer to Eumaeus by name, creating “an affinity between the 
narrator and those characters sympathetic to Eumaios.”
 Melanippus is also addressed once at 15.582, and Achilles at 20.2.353
 Block (1982, 16).354
 See also A. Parry (1972, 17-21) on Menelaus, and Beck (2005, 81-2 and 2012, 172-4) on Patroclus.355
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     ἔνθα κεν ᾧ παρὰ σταθµῷ ἀεικέλιον πάθεν ἄλγος· 
     ἀλλὰ συβώτης ὦκα ποσὶ κραιπνοῖσι µετασπὼν 
     ἔσσυτ᾽ ἀνὰ πρόθυρον, σκῦτος δέ οἱ ἔκπεσε χειρός. 
     τοὺς µὲν ὁµοκλήσας σεῦεν κύνας ἄλλυδις ἄλλον  35 
     πυκνῇσιν λιθάδεσσιν. !
     “Suddenly, barking dogs saw Odysseus. They made a shrill sound and rushed at him. But 
     Odysseus craftily sat down, and his staff fell from his hand. Then he would have suffered 
     unseemly grief by his own farmhouse, but the swineherd followed them swiftly on swift feet 
     and rushed through the gate, and the leather fell from his hand. He shouted at the dogs and 
     chased them every which way with a hail of stones” (14.29-36). !
Critics have found a problematic disjunction between line 31 and what follows. The beggar sits 
down and drops his staff, a time-honoured technique for pacifying aggressive dogs.  But then 356
the narrator seemingly forgets that the beggar has used this technique and describes how 
Eumaeus is required to save him.  I would argue that this is an example of a kind of duplication 357
of the actions of Odysseus and Eumaeus, one which we will see again. This duplication is useful 
in the present context for several reasons. Both Odysseus and Eumaeus display their central 
characteristics side-by-side with respect to the same event. Odysseus once again shows his 
craftiness by applying a technique utilized by the cognoscenti, and the narrator ensures our 
awareness of this with the relatively rare word kerdosynē (cunning).  Eumaeus, on the other 358
hand, betrays a sort of gentleness in this passage that is typical of the doublet. He does attribute 
his defence of the beggar to a fear of his blame (κέν… ἐλεγχείην, 14.38), but his reaction says 
 Hainsworth (1961) and Lilja (1976, 19-20), who cite Arist. Rhet. 1380a24, Plin. Nat. 8.146, Plut. Mor. 970e, Σ 356
QV and B ad loc. Dindorf, and several more modern examples for this technique. Cook (1999, 129-30) and King 
(1999, 89-90), on the other hand, argue that Odysseus feigns helplessness here because this would be consistent with 
the helpless character they claim Odysseus is portraying in the beggar.
 Hainsworth (1961); so Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 ad 14.30-2).357
 Roisman (1990, 219) points out that the only other use of this word in this poem occurs at 4.251 when Helen 358
detects Odysseus despite his kerdosynē. She suggests that we should assume based on this parallel that Eumaeus 
quickly sees through Odysseus’ disguise (she also finds several other examples of kerd- words used in scenes in 
which Odysseus “is unmasked” (220)). It is worth noting, however, that  kerdosynē is also used at Il. 22.247 of 
Athena’s successful deception of Hector.
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otherwise. His haste in investigating the commotion and, more importantly, his dropping of the 
piece of leather suggest a genuine concern for the well-being of the vagrant, foolhardy though 
the trespasser’s lack of foresight may seem. The close similarity between the description of the 
beggar’s dropping of his staff and the swineherd’s dropping of the leather also suggests a 
sympathy between the two characters. There is an especially admirable effect from a poetic 
standpoint when we consider that two rather different actions are being described. As we have 
established, the beggar rids himself of his staff in a deliberate attempt to pacify the dogs. The 
swineherd seemingly drops the piece of leather out of shock.  These two very different actions, 359
which are described almost identically, in some sense foreshadow the relationship that will 
develop – or be reestablished.  It is interesting to note that, while encountering one or more 360
dogs is a common motif in type-scenes involving the reception of a xeinos (‘stranger’ or ‘guest-
friend’) into a household (Od. 7.91-4, 10.212-19, 14.21-2, 29-32, 16.4-10, 162-3, 17.291-327), 
these dogs are not aggressive elsewhere. The function of this aggression here may be to provide 
an opportunity for this evocative foreshadowing. In any case, Odysseus will exert his 
considerable manipulative abilities in an attempt to recruit Eumaeus to his cause. And Eumaeus, 
like Patroclus with Achilles, will respond in a sympathetic and even gentle manner, but also more 
importantly in a manner that is reminiscent of his master.  
 Cf. A. Bowie (2013 ad 14.34): “the use of similar expressions for Od. and Eum. constitutes the symbolic linking 359
of master and servant;” so Roisman (1990, 218-19). It is also noteworthy that Eumaeus was using the piece of 
leather he drops to make sandals (14.23-4). And he built and maintained a fine pigsty (5-17), another example of 
skillful craftsmanship, which is characteristic of Odysseus; cf. Austin (1975.166-8) on Eumaeus’ farm as a reflection 
of his character.
 Some variation of ekpese cheiros appears seven other times in Homeric poetry. But its meaning is more bland 360
than one might expect. It is used elsewhere to describe the inability of a warrior to hold onto his weapon because of 
death or injury in battle (Il. 3.363, 4.493, 8.329, 15.421, 465; Od. 22.17, where the cup falling from Antinous’ hand 
is perhaps indicative of his unheroic behaviour and the unmanly manner of his death; cf. Russo et al. (1992 ad 22.10 
and 17)). At Od. 16.13, the present scene is recapitulated when Eumaeus drops wine vessels (ἐκ δ᾽ ἄρα οἱ χειρῶν 
πέσεν ἄγγεα) at the sight of Telemachus having returned home from abroad. We will look more closely at this 
passage below.
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 Eumaeus' sympathy for the beggar Odysseus also increases, reflecting his gradual 
realization that the beggar closely resembles not only his missing master but also Eumaeus 
himself. Perhaps the clearest indication of this increasing sympathy is the alteration the 
swineherd makes to the hospitality he offers to the beggar as the first day progresses. When 
Eumaeus first welcomes the beggar, he receives the usual wish that his host should enjoy good 
fortune (14.53-4).  Eumaeus responds quite emphatically that such hospitality as the beggar 361
receives is only to be expected: 
     Ξεῖν᾽, οὔ µοι θέµις ἔστ᾽, οὐδ᾽ εἰ κακίων σέθεν ἔλθοι, 
     ξεῖνον ἀτιµῆσαι· πρὸς γὰρ Διός εἰσιν ἃπαντες 
     ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε. δόσις δ᾽ ὀλίγη τε φίλη τε 
     γίνεται ἡµετέρη· ἣ γὰρ δµώων δίκη ἐστίν, 
     αἰεὶ δειδιότων, ὅτ᾽ ἐπικρατέωσιν ἄνακτες          60 
     οἱ νέοι. !
     “Stranger, it is not right [or “it is contrary to divine law”] for me to dishonour a stranger, not  
     even if one much worse than you should come. For all strangers and beggars are from Zeus.  
     And our gift is small and dear. For this is the practice of slaves, always fearful when masters – 
     young ones – have the power” (14.56-60). !
The triple repetition of xeinos (‘guest-friend’) in the initial position seems to add a particular 
rhetorical emphasis to the fact that the beggar is a guest and therefore due the reception which he 
receives. And certainly the obligation to receive a guest hospitably is a frequent point of 
emphasis in the poem. One of the distinctions made between Eumaeus and the suitors, for 
example, is that Eumaeus passes the tests (πειρητίζων) of hospitality that Odysseus gives him 
(14.459-61, 15.303-6), whereas the suitors are anything but hospitable, despite the fact that they 
are aware of their duty to be so (17.483-7). As one of the acceptable hosts in the poem, then, 
 Reece (1993, 29-30) finds eight examples of this type of wish in early Greek hexameter: Od. 3.55-9, 7.148-50, 361
353-5, 14.51-4, 439-41,15.340-42, 17.353-5, H.Dem. 135-7, 224-5. He also contrasts the curse Odysseus places 
upon Antinous in response to his inhospitable behaviour (17.475-6). Grossardt’s (1998, 67) claim that Zeus Xenios 
is mentioned for the first time in the poem at 14.53 fails to take account of 9.271-2.
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Eumaeus is merely meeting social and religious expectation. But a beggar is hardly the typical 
guest; nor is a swineherd the typical Homeric host, at least in the sense that he no longer plays 
the role of an aristocrat. In addition, as Reece points out, relationships of xenia (‘guest-
friendship’) usually took place between social equals both in literary and historical Greece.  On 362
the other hand, neither the swineherd nor the beggar were born into the roles they are playing at 
this point in the poem. As we have seen, Eumaeus is the son of a basileus (‘chief’, 15.413-14). 
And Odysseus, not unusually for a Homeric hero, is ordinarily descended from Hermes and 
therefore ultimately Zeus himself on his mother’s side.  So, while the swineherd and the beggar 363
are not currently social equals, their fortunes have changed. It is precisely the dissonance 
between former and current fortunes that creates much of the tension in the latter half of the 
Odyssey. We do not just have a swineherd hosting a beggar. We have a swineherd who used to be 
a basileus unknowingly hosting a beggar who also used to be a basileus.  This shared 364
dissonance slowly creates a sympathy between the two characters as they come to realize how 
uncannily similar they are. In addition, as we will develop in more detail, Eumaeus’ past and 
 Reece (1993, 146).362
 Technically the prominent tradition according to which Sisyphus rapes Odysseus’ mother Anticleia (see Gantz 363
(1993, 175-6)) does not involve a breaking of this line. See the genealogical chart in Stocking (forthcoming).
 Cf. Segal (1994a, 173): “the loyal swineherd is equally a royal victim of chance and misfortune.” It has often 364
been noted that Odysseus is not Odysseus until he is acknowledged as such by all: Segal (1994a,95-8), Biles (2003), 
Murnaghan (2011, 1-4). The Homeric notion that one is little more than one’s reputation (kleos) is brilliantly 
expressed by Redfield (1994, 34). On kleos in the Homeric world more generally, see Olson (1995, 1-23). 
     Ahl and Roisman (1996, 167-88), developing a thesis first proposed by Roisman (1990), argue that Eumaeus 
“covertly” recognizes Odysseus in Book 14. This idea has gained little traction (Grossardt’s (1998, 69-70) rebuttal is 
particularly stinging; cf. also Olson (1995, 122-3) and Levaniouk (2011, 11)). There is no good evidence for this 
covert recognition, and in fact the lack of recognition on Eumaeus’ part “generates all the familiar ironies” (Fenik 
(1975, 29, with these ironies being explored at length from 5-61)); so Hölscher (1939.70) and King (1999, 80 n. 23), 
some of which we have already touched on. On the other hand, I would suggest that Ahl and Roisman are right to 
find fault with descriptions of Eumaeus’ “naïvety” (e.g. by Grossardt (1998, 66-74) and King (1999)). I see no 
reason to insist that Eumaeus is somehow deficient because he does not possess the perspicacity to see through a 
disguise fashioned by Athena herself (cf. especially ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε σ᾽ ἄγνωστον τεύξω πάντεσσι βροτοῖσι (“but come, I 
will make you unknown to all mortals”), 13.397). The inability of mortals to perceive the gods against their will is a 
theme in the Odyssey (cf. Jörgensen (1904) on the Apologoi, Pucci (1987, 85-9), and also Marks (2008, 41), with 
further bibliography; cf. H.Dem. 111)), one which is easily extended here, especially in light of Odysseus’ portrayal 
in the role of a god in the second half of the poem: Bierl (2004, with further bibliography at 44 n. 6).
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potential future highlights the tension in Odysseus’ current situation. 
 Returning to the quoted passage, we find that, as peculiar to the present situation as it 
sometimes seems, most of the content reflects a viewpoint general to the poem. A parallel to 
Eumaeus’ statement that it is not themis to dishonour a xeinos appears in Book 23, when 
Eurycleia informs Penelope that Odysseus is the xeinos whom all the suitors were dishonouring 
(Ὀδυσεὺς… ὁ ξεῖνος, τὸν πάντες ἀτίµων ἐν µεγάροισι; 23.27-8). We note that in both passages 
there is apprehension expressed over the dishonouring (atīmān) of a xeinos. And, in the present 
passage, themis, as Eumaeus implies, refers to divine law.  As will be dealt with in more detail 365
below, Odysseus’ return to Ithaca and vengeance on the suitors can be read as a theoxeny, divine 
punishment for their failure to observe the themis of xenia. Eurycleia seems to allude to this 
theme in Book 23, and Eumaeus in turn is doing little more in the present passage than deflecting 
praise by noting that he more or less has to receive the beggar hospitably, lest Zeus punish 
him.  In addition, the phrase δόσις δ᾽ ὀλίγη τε φίλη τε has frequently been taken as a kind of 366
apology by Eumaeus for the meagreness of the hospitality the beggar is about to receive.  But 367
in fact the latter half of line 57 and all of 58 are also spoken by Nausicaa at 6.207-8, and she is 
hardly in straitened circumstances. In this light, it is more likely that we should understand the 
δόσις phrase to mean that giving is a minor thing but dear to the receiver, rather than that this 
particular gift is meagre. The other partial parallel to this phrase from the Iliad is much the same, 
albeit in a very different context. Achilles complains to Agamemnon that his geras (‘extra 
 LfgrE s.v. θέµις BI: “von den Göttern garantierte bzw. gewünschte Lebensordnung.”365
 Cf. especially A. Bowie (2013 ad 14.57). One might also compare Hes. Op. 717-18 and Thgn. 155-6 West², 366
where the audience is advised not to contemn poverty.
 A. Bowie (2013 ad 14.59-60), Newton (2015, 257). The phrase turns out to be rather difficult, unlike similar 367
constructions with more concrete nouns (e.g. τίπτε, Θέτι τανύπεπλε, ἱκάνεις ἡµετέρον δῶ/ αἰδοίη τε φίλη τε (“why in 
the world, long-robed, revered, and dear Thetis, have you come to our house?”, Il. 18.385-6 = 424-5).
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apportionment connoting honour’) is unjustifiably inferior to Agamemnon’s: σοὶ τὸ γέρας πολὺ 
µεῖζον, ἐγὼ δ᾽ ὀλίγον τε φίλον τε/ ἔρχοµ᾽ ἔχων ἐπὶ νῆας, ἐπεί κε κάµω πολεµίζων (“your geras is 
far greater, and I go to my ships with something small and dear when I’m worn out from 
fighting”, Il. 1.167-8). Agamemnon has just threatened to deprive a major leader of his geras in 
order to replace his own (1.137-9). Achilles’ rejoinder is that, even though his geras is lesser than 
Agamemnon’s, he has worn himself out earning it. In other words, as with the two passages from 
the Odyssey, Achilles’ gift is a minor thing, but dear to him, the receiver.  Based on the two 368
other uses of the phrase, then, it seems that Eumaeus is saying that the hospitality he is offering 
is not a hardship for him, but it is undoubtedly dear to the beggar. At this stage, Eumaeus is polite 
and welcoming, but measured in his reception of the beggar. 
 It is only in the last lines of the passage (14.58-60) that Eumaeus adds to this relatively 
standard hospitable greeting by implicitly apologizing for what will, at least at first, be a 
formally appropriate but nonetheless meagre welcome.  Eumaeus is ostensibly constrained by 369
the harshness of the young master. The enjambment of οἱ νέοι is particularly interesting.  370
Obviously Eumaeus does not take issue with all masters, since he loves Odysseus. But his 
 Hammer (1997, 347) interprets the Iliadic passage as Achilles presenting himself as a beggar. Other passages also 368
lend the unsurprising impression that giving gifts – and especially gifts of hospitality – is an activity that takes place 
between philoi (οἷα φίλοι ξεῖνοι ξείνοισι διδοῦσι (“such things as dear guest-friends give to guest-friends”, Od. 
1.313); ποµπὴ καὶ φίλα δῶρα, τὰ οἱ δίδοµεν φιλέοντες (“conduct and friendly gifts, which we give him out of 
friendship”, 8.545)), or that philoi themselves are worthy of a gift of ransom (καὶ νῦν φίλον υἱὸν ἐλύσαο, πολλὰ δ᾽ 
ἔδωκας (“even now you have ransomed your dear son, and you have given much”, Il. 24.686)). So the φίλη in the 
present passage might also carry a sense of the conferral of philia by the act of giving.
 This statement is typical in a theoxeny: Kearns (1982, 6).369
 As A. Bowie (2013 ad 14.61) astutely notes, it “is added almost as a corrective.” I think this is absolutely correct 370
and in fact that it provides local motivation for the following tangent by Eumaeus about Odysseus (on local 
motivation in Homer, see Scodel (1999, 33-47)). In lines 59 and 60, Eumaeus could be taken to be iterating a fairly 
common slaves’ view of the master. He quickly corrects himself, however, and then explains the correction. He 
claims not to fear Odysseus, the man he takes to be his actual master (see below on the theme of the gentle master in 
the Odyssey). Regarding the deeper motivation for the tangent, Grossardt (1998, 67) hits the nail on the head when 
he says that “für Eumaios Gastfreundschaft… und Treue zur Herrschaft nur zwei äussere Erscheinungsbilder 
derselben ethischen Gesinnung sind und daher untrennbar zusammengehören.”
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specification of young masters could be taken to refer not only to the suitors but also – and 
perhaps more surprisingly – to Telemachus.  While his love of Odysseus’ patriline does quite 371
obviously extend to Telemachus (16.11-29), however, he perhaps not unreasonably fears the son 
(17.188-9). And Telemachus does threaten him at one point, although he is for the benefit of the 
suitors (21.369-75). Perhaps out of fear, then, Eumaeus is moderate with his hospitality. As 
Newton notes, even though he is the favoured servant (14.62-4) of an extremely wealthy man 
(96-8), the hospitality which Eumaeus offers is almost comic in its meagreness and rusticity.  372
But he does fulfill all of the ordinary criteria within his means.  He welcomes the beggar into 373
his hut and offers him a seat (48-51). Then he prepares a meal (72-81), drinks wine with the 
beggar (109-13), and exchanges news (112-84). Only after they have finished the meal does he 
ask the beggar who he is (185-90). Once their lengthy conversation is over, he provides a bed 
(518-24). Then, in the morning, he gives the beggar a gift in the form of a staff and himself 
serves as his escort to the oikos of Odysseus (182-203). We find, then, that Eumaeus’ reception 
of the beggar is measured but appropriate, as one might expect of a perfect stranger. 
 We note one important additional detail, however. After Odysseus gives his bogus 
autobiography (192-359), Eumaeus offers him a second, much more generous meal. And it is 
only at this time that he offers and shares sacrifice (407-56). Both of these actions draw our 
attention to the fact that something has changed for Eumaeus. He treats the beggar with 
considerably more sympathy once he has heard his story. The reason for this change, I argue, is 
 Pace Olson (1995, 125).371
 Newton (2015, 269). Reece (1993, 146-8) breaks down the meagreness of Eumaeus’ initial hospitality in 372
comparison to the other scenes of hospitality in great detail. The characterization of this scene by Williams (1986, 
396) and Reece (1993, 154) as parodic is perhaps excessive.
 Reece (1993, 17-39) provides an excellent list and analysis of all of the conventional expectations of the Homeric 373
host.
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that the suffering narrated in Odysseus’ lying tale causes him to realize that he and the beggar 
Odysseus are united by common experience, and most importantly the threat of slavery.  In 374
order to bring this out, it will be necessary to examine the lying tale in some detail. There are 
essentially two strands of scholarship on this lying tale. The first searches for ways in which 
Odysseus can be seen to be manipulating Eumaeus by inventing autobiographical details with 
which he might be expected to sympathize.  The second sees the lying tale as containing 375
allusions to alternative Odysseys, with the present example being the most extensive and 
therefore most examined one in the poem.  Of course these two strands are not incompatible. 376
Odysseus can simultaneously be alluding to alternative Odysseys and manipulating details in 
order to ingratiate himself with the swineherd. It is of fundamental importance, however, that 
both of these concepts be borne in mind when reading this passage. One can frequently interpret 
a particular detail of Odysseus’ lying tale as motivated by either or both of these factors, and 
ignoring one or the other possibility can lead to an unbalanced conclusion. The same holds true 
for the speech as a whole. It is well established that Odysseus’ tale has such an impact on 
Eumaeus because the swineherd has experience in common with the character Odysseus creates. 
But it is central to my interpretation of this passage below that Odysseus is not simply inventing 
 As will become clear, I think Cook (2012 n. 42) is absolutely correct in his decision to use quotation marks 374
around ‘lying’ and ‘false’ when referring to this kind of tale: “they are only ‘false’ in the sense that they do not agree 
with the primary narrative. They are, however, used to communicate important ‘truths’ about the characters who 
relate them and are perfectly authentic ‘myths’ in their own way.” Cf. Arthur (1977, 19): “the falsity is only 
superficial, for the message of the tale is true.” So Walcot (1977, 12).
 This strand is immense. The most important examples for our purposes are Austin (1975, 224-53), Finley (1978, 375
174-5), G. Rose (1980), Hölscher (1990, 212), Minchin (1992, with further bibliography in Minchin (2001, 210 n. 
19)), Louden (1997, 100-12), Grossardt (1998, 66-74), and Newton (2015, 269-70). Segal (1994a, 177-8) treats the 
lying tale as ironic because it is close to the truth.
 The idea seems first to have been suggested by Woodhouse (1930, 126-36), although he is primarily interested in 376
finding traces of the ‘true’ Odyssey. It was revived by Reece (1994). Most recently see Tsagalis (2012) and his ample 
bibliography; cf. also S. West (2012, 125).
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this story. He is including allusive details, the extent of which it is impossible to determine.  377
Implied by this, however, is the possibility that he actually could have experienced what he is 
narrating. From this point of view, the similarities between the character of his lying tale and 
Eumaeus are not entirely points of cynical manipulation. The similarities cast Eumaeus as a kind 
of counterfactual Odysseus. The auditors of the poem are not necessarily aware of these 
similarities until Eumaeus tells his own story (15.390-484). But when he does, I will argue, the 
effect produced is uncanny. 
 There is both internal and external evidence in favour of a so-called Cretan Odyssey. The 
most obvious internal evidence is Odysseus’ systematic claim to be from Crete in his lying tales 
(13.256-7, 14.199-200, 19.172-87).  This is particularly significant when we consider how the 378
proem to the Odyssey (1.1-10) does not seem to describe the poem which follows particularly 
well.  Of especial relevance for our present purpose is the phrase πολλῶν δ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν 379
ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω (“and he saw the cities of many men and knew their mind,” 1.3). It is a 
commonplace of Homeric scholarship to observe that Odysseus does not see many cities in our 
Odyssey. In fact, after Troy, the only location Odysseus reaches that could be called a city is the 
settlement of the Phaeacians (ἀπὸ πτόλιος, 6.294, 11.156; πόλινδ᾽, 7.14; πόλιν, 7.18). And this 
remote island hardly appears to fulfil the proem’s promise on its own.  On the other hand, as 380
Reece has observed, it is during Odysseus’ Cretan lies that the lines most similar to 1.3 occur 
 Cf. Levaniouk (2011, 93-108), who argues that the conversation between Odysseus and Penelope at Od. 377
19.104-360 is similarly suffused with Cretan themes and associations. See also Cook (2012, 55-7), with further 
bibliography.
 What follows is a very brief overview of the major points so that we can have some context for a discussion of 378
Odysseus’ conversation with Eumaeus. An excellent and more thorough treatment of both the internal and external 
evidence in favour of one or more Cretan Odysseys is Tsagalis (2012). Danek (1998, 285-6) remains agnostic.
 Scodel (1999, 79 n. 155).379
 The settlements of the Cicones (9.41) and the Cimmerians (11.14) are both referred to as cities. But these are 380
extremely fleeting references, and Odysseus could hardly be considered to have gotten to know them.
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(πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε᾽ ἀλώµενος (“wandering through many cities of men”, 15.492 = 
19.170)).  And Eumaeus remarks to Telemachus that the (Cretan) beggar φησὶ δὲ πολλὰ 381
βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστεα δινηθῆναι/ πλαζόµενος (“says that he has roamed to many cities of men in his 
wandering,” 16.63-4). In fact, according to the beggar, even Crete by itself has many and 
countless men and ninety cities (Κρήτη… / ἐν δ᾽ ἄνθρωποι / πολλοὶ ἀπειρέσιοι, καὶ ἐννήκοντα 
πόληες, 19.172-4).  It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the poem shows more familiarity with 382
the topography of Crete than with the Peloponnese, which Telemachus visits in Books 3 and 4.  383
Eumaeus also reports that an Aetolian falsely claimed that Odysseus had stayed in the house of 
Idomeneus on Crete while repairing his ships (14.378-89). And Marks argues that this report 
“alludes to themes that were central to some versions of Odysseus’ return, but were antithetical 
to the Odyssey itself.” This technique involving the deauthorization of competitive epics has 
been identified elsewhere in the Odyssey.  384
 While the external evidence is rather late, it nonetheless remains suggestive. Zenodotus 
seems to have had some access to a tradition in which Telemachus went to Crete rather than 
Sparta, in addition to his visit to Pylos. He, and possibly others, read ἐς Κρήτην (“to Crete”) in 
place of ἐς Σπάρτην (“to Sparta”) at 1.93, and ἐς Κρήτην τε παρ᾽ Ἰδοµενῆα ἄνακτα (“and to 
Crete to the house of the lord Idomeneus”), instead of Σπάρτηνδε παρὰ ξανθὸν Μενέλαον (“to 
 Reece (1994, 159). Segal (1994a, 183) also compares ἐπὶ πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀλήθην (“I wandered through many places”, 381
14.120), ὅσα δὴ πάθες ἠδ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἀλήθης (“how many things you suffered and how many places you wandered”, 
14.362), and ἐπὶ γαῖαν ἀληθείς (“having wandered over the earth”, 14.380) without making the same connections. 
On the proem and its relation to the rest of the poem in general, see S. West (1981), Nagler (1990), and Tsagalis 
(2012, 318-19), with bibliography.
 Cf. 19.178-80.382
 See Burkert (2001, 127-37) and M. West (2014, 87).383
 Marks (2003, 220-3). On the other hand, A. Bowie (2013 ad Od. 14.360-89) suggests that Eumaeus invents the 384
story of the Aetolian “carefully crafted to administer an inherent rebuke to Od.”
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Sparta to the house of blond Menelaus”) at 1.285.  S. West argues that these two variants 385
confirm one another and so cannot be the result of scribal error. She also insists that they could 
not simply have been conjectures by Zenodotus because they are so obviously out of place in our 
Odyssey. Her claim that these variants must have been strongly attested in his time seems 
decisive, therefore.  Much later, we have it narrated by Dictys Cretensis that Odysseus, either 386
instead of or in addition to travelling to the supernatural areas described in Od. 9-12, ends up 
with Idomeneus on Crete (6.5).  Few would suggest that we should take this narration as a 387
wholesale summary of a now lost alternative Odyssey. But, in light of the other evidence, it is 
possible that what we have is a learned treatment of such an Odyssey for the amusement of the 
contemporary literati.  Finally, it is worth noting Malkin’s observation that Odysseus was an 388
extremely popular heroic ancestor in regional genealogies because of his wanderings, meaning 
that a Cretan Odyssey is not an improbable possibility.  389
 It seems fairly clear, then, that an audience relatively contemporary to our Odyssey would 
have understood that Odysseus’ lying tales contain references to alternative, and possibly non-
 Σ ΗΜ ad 3.313 Pontani, apparently referring to 1.93 and 1.284-6. Reece (1994, 167 n. 15) reads Zenodotus as he 385
will, but the fact remains that Zenodotus did hold such an interpretation. See also Σ ΜΟ ad 1.93 Pontani, where it is 
unclear to whom τινές refers. But it may simply be Zenodotus alone, since τινές can refer to a single scholar: Nünlist 
(2009, 12), who cites Σ A ad Il. 3.11 Erbse, where it refers only to Zenodotus. Some scholia explicitly deny this 
alternative tradition (e.g. HM ad 2.359 Pontani). It is also noteworthy that some MSS confusingly record the line 
κεῖθεν δ᾽ ἐς Κρήτην τε παρ᾽ Ἰδοµενῆα ἄνακτα (“and from there to Crete and to the house of the lord Idomeneus”) 
after the vulgate’s 1.93 (see the app. crit. in Heubeck et al.).
 S. West (1981, 173-4), pace M. West (2014, 107-8). Zenodotus frequently comes under fire in Homeric textual 386
criticism, but see M. West (2001, 33-45) for a more balanced view.
 There is an Attic red-figure stamnos (LIMC s.v. “Idomeneus” I) from ca. 480 BCE, on which Idomeneus 387
(ΙΔΑΜΕΝΕΥΣ) is depicted hanging under a ram’s belly and escaping from Polyphemus’ cave with Odysseus (cf. 
Od. 9.424-66).
 So Reece (1994, 168-9) and Levaniouk (2012, 374). 388
 Malkin (1998, 121-6); so Marks (2003, 220-2).389
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canonical, Odysseys in which Odysseus was blown to Crete and visited Idomeneus.  Regarding 390
this possibility, Levaniouk makes the fundamentally important point that, contrary to much 
neoanalytical reconstruction, we are dealing with a branch of the poetic tradition of the Odyssey, 
and not a single poem.  And we have virtually no solid information regarding what this 391
tradition would have looked like in precise, narrative terms. Given the likely plurality of 
iterations of the Cretan tradition, however, it is probably more profitable to think in terms of 
themes. And in the present context, where we have an allusion – one of many in our Odyssey – to 
a recognizable, alternative tradition, it is safe to say that this Cretan lie which Odysseus 
constantly tells itself constitutes a theme. In other words, when Odysseus tells an interlocutor one 
of his Cretan tales, he evokes what I will call a Cretan ‘mode’ of the Odyssey, referring to the 
traditional referentiality of this type of tale.  The auditor is then given to understand that 392
Odysseus is, at least in the wandering portion of his story, providing a metapoetic version of the 
Cretan tradition, one which can be made to cater to his audience, just as actual bards presumably 
catered their stories to their audiences.  And, in fact, while Odysseus does not appear entirely to 393
be lying when he relates his journey to the Phaeacians in Books 9 to 12, there are good reasons to 
believe that he is at least not telling the whole truth.  To return to the question of Odysseus’ 394
 Reece (1994, 157-73) offers one possible version of such a poem. On the distinction between canonical and non-390
canonical early Greek hexameter, see Nagy (1990, 70 and 1999.7-8), bearing in mind the reservations of Andersen 
and Haug (2012, 6-7), for example.
 Levaniouk (2012, 374-5).391
 On traditional referentiality, see J.-M. Foley (1991, 38-60).392
 So Cook (2012, 94). In this sense, we should distinguish Odysseus’ Cretan lies from Demeter’s Cretan lie in the 393
Homeric Hymn to Demeter (119-33), at least inasmuch as we are not aware of a similar tradition regarding Demeter. 
But cf. Levaniouk (2011, 101-3), who argues that Odysseus’ and Demeter’s Cretan lies both “connote return, 
renewal, and epiphany” (103). A more detailed comparison of Odysseus’ meeting with Eumaeus and Demeter’s 
conversation with the daughters of Celeus is below.
 On the general veracity of Books 9 to 12, see H. Parry (1994), C. Brown (1996, 2 n. 1), S. Richardson (1996), 394
and de Jong (2001.221-3). For one example of Odysseus presenting his story in a manner advantageous to himself, 
cf. Karanika (2011, 11-17) on his description of his meeting with Heracles in Hades.
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longest lying tale and its relationship to Eumaeus, then, the fact that it is a Cretan tale does not 
simply signal that Odysseus is lying. It indicates metapoetically that he is, at least in the 
wandering portion, narrating a story that could have happened to him. And, again, if we think in 
terms of allomorphic motifs, much of what happens to the beggar in this lying tale does happen 
to Odysseus, as we will see. It is more sensible, then, as Cook argues, not to dismiss the 
resemblance between Eumaeus’ story and Odysseus’ lying tale “as a simple intratextual echo, 
since Homer could have given Eumaios a different biography to which ‘Odysseus’ could have 
then adjusted his story.”  The compilation of themes in the beggar’s lying tale is significant, 395
and Eumaeus’ in turn is at least partially modelled upon the same cluster.  In this reading, 396
Odysseus remains the primary character, and Eumaeus the doublet. The shared themes link them 
without always being peculiar to the two of them. We may expect as much from epic poetry, 
which is to some extent always about the human condition. 
 Thinking in these terms, the thematic model which primarily governs Odysseus’ stay with 
Eumaeus, and indeed all of Books 13 to 22, is that of his eventual epiphany. This has been well 
established.  To introduce the basic elements of this theme, Odysseus plays the role of a god 397
who disguises himself in order to test mortal xenia. In order to receive appropriate hospitality, he 
tells a lying tale meant to provoke the pity of his host. Then, when he has discovered who is 
naughty and who is nice, he reveals his true identity and punishes those who have not met his 
 Pace Danek (1998, 285).395
 Cook (2012, 84).396
 See Kearns (1982), whose treatment is considerably developed by Sowa (1984, especially 236-72), although her 397
definition of “epiphany” is much broader than the one outlined here; see also Montiglio (2005, 91-2), Louden (2011, 
30-56), Murnaghan (2011, 7-10), and Cook (2012, with further bibliography at 57 n. 13). Cf. Clay (1983, 213-39) on 
the more general concept of theodicy in the Odyssey.
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criteria.  The most important examples of this in early Greek epic are the present one in the 398
Odyssey and in the Hymn to Demeter (105-304).  Both of these instances, however, are also 399
parts of a series of complex themes and feature only partial epiphanies.  The advantage of this 400
comparison for our purposes is that the scene in the Hymn to Demeter which is parallel to our 
meeting between Odysseus and Eumaeus, namely the discovery of the disguised Demeter by the 
daughters of Celeus (105-68), contains many of the same motifs, not the least of which revolve 
around their Cretan lies (119-33).  The most obvious parallel is that both Demeter and 401
Odysseus appear in disguise, first to the daughters of Celeus and Eumaeus respectively (H. Dem. 
101-4, Od. 13.429-38), thus enabling them to perform tests.  The use of the disguise in each 402
case is rather different, however. We have already noted that Odysseus uses his beggar’s disguise 
to test the relevant denizens of Ithaca. Demeter’s disguise, on the other hand, is in some sense 
 Sowa (1984, 238 and 243-50) contends that all of the major Homeric Hymns contain epiphanies. It is worth 398
noting that the theoxeny only becomes nearly explicit in the Odyssey as late as 17.362-3: ὡς ἂν…/ γνοίη θ᾽ οἵ τινὲς 
εἰσιν ἐναίσινµοι οἵ τ᾽ ἀθέµιστοι (“to learn who was just and who lawless”). Nagy’s (1999, 116) doctrine that the 
central heroes of Homeric “epic tradition cannot have an overtly religious dimension in the narrative” just holds true 
in this case. Odysseus sensibly avoids portraying himself in such a manner: τούσδε δὲ µοῖρ᾽ ἐδάµασσε θεῶν καὶ 
σχέτλια ἔργα (“fate from the gods and their cruel deeds overcame these men here,” 22.413).
 We might also compare the much later examples of Jason in AR 1.8-11, 3.66-75, and Baucis and Philemon in Ov. 399
Met. 8.621-96. The passages in the Argonautica are heavily indebted to the Odyssey: Lennox (1980), Hunter (1989 
ad AR 3.66-75), Knight (1995, 133-8), Clare (2002, 20-32). A. Griffin (1991, 68-72) suggests that, while there is no 
good classical parallel, the Baucis and Philemon story probably has its origin in the Near East; cf. Kenney (2011 ad 
Ov. Met. 8.611-724) for further bibliography.
 Grossardt (1998, 231-40) provides a fine analysis of the similarity between the two scenes, although his 400
description of the relationship between the two poems as “die Rezeption der Odyssee in des Demeter-Hymnos” (231) 
perhaps underestimates the antiquity of the tradition of the Hymn. The usual dating of the Hymn to the late 7th 
century or early 6th century (cf. 227 n. 21) does not preclude the possibility that at least strands of the tradition could 
be much more ancient. Cook (2012) is an excellent and detailed examination of how the epiphany motif interacts 
with other themes in each of these two poems. See also Bierl (2004, 47-8).
 See the chart Sowa (1984, 251) provides comparing the relevant motifs in these two scenes. I would, however, 401
dispute her comparison between the daughters of Celeus (159) and Metaneira (213-15) recognizing Demeter as 
superior despite her disguise and Telemachus’ wondering at his father (16.178-85). Odysseus is not in disguise at 
this point, after all.
 See ibid. for these themes in the Phaeacian episode as well. One wonders if Helen’s description of her meeting 402
with Odysseus (Od. 4.235-64) is not a comparable example.
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not really a disguise, having more to do with mourning the ‘death’ of Persephone.  As Redfield 403
says of the slain Patroclus in the Iliad, “the dead man must go on a journey, and the impulse of 
the mourners is to go with him.” One symptom of this impulse is self-deprivation, such as 
Achilles’ abstinence from food, sleep, washing, and sex (24.129-31).  On Odysseus’ 404
disappearance, Laertes similarly removes himself from society and submits himself to a harsh 
regimen (Od. 11.187-96). As Murnaghan observes, “this conception involves the same kind of 
ambiguity inherent in literal disguises.”  The mourner becomes nearly indistinguishable from 405
an older person of a much lower class. So Demeter in her mourning naturally appears as if in 
disguise to the daughters of Celeus. This is probably an allomorph of the theoxeny theme, and the 
result is the same inasmuch as mortals are tested.  Eumaeus simultaneously passes Odysseus’ 406
first test by treating him hospitably despite his rude appearance and attire, and he provides him 
with a means into the oikos. If we compare the structures of the two passages, then, the daughters 
of Celeus emerge as the Hymn to Demeter’s parallel to Eumaeus. They encounter Demeter sitting 
by the road (98-111), invite her in (153-68), ask after her history (113-17), are given a Cretan lie 
(119-33), and introduce her into their household (184-9).  So Eumaeus and the daughters of 407
Celeus are both the internal audiences of a Cretan lie, and in parallel circumstances.  
 On Demeter’s reaction to Persephone’s abduction as one of mourning, see DeBloois (1997, 253-4) and Nickel 403
(2003, 77).
 Redfield (1994, 181).404
 Murnaghan (2011, 19 n. 12).405
 So Pratt (2000, 44) and Suter (2002, 139-40), pace Clay (1989, 227-8).406
 The parallel examples from Od. 14 have already been examined. Note, however, that, while Eumaeus’ first 407
encounter with Odysseus at 14.29-36 parallels the first encounter at H. Dem. 98-111, the ‘Maiden at the Well’ motif 
has already appeared with Odysseus’ meeting with Athena at 13.102-12 and 221-7. On this motif, see Reece (1993, 
12-13).
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 The broad similarities between the two passages more or less end there, however. But, 
because of the thematic parallels, it will be informative to provide a comparison of the two lies. 
The Hymn to Demeter is obviously much shorter than the Odyssey, and so much of the parallel 
material is correspondingly abbreviated. This goes for the daughters of Celeus as well. Their role 
can essentially be described as functional. They fulfill the basic requirements of the scene and 
then more or less disappear.  One result of this abbreviation is that Demeter’s lying tale 408
apparently only resonates with the goddess herself. Unlike Eumaeus, the daughters of Celeus are 
not sufficiently developed for such a purpose. On a more schematic level, however, there are 
some obvious similarities. The first and the most discussed is the fact that both Demeter and 
Odysseus claim to come from Crete. As I have already claimed, Odysseus’ reference to Crete is 
at least on one level an evocation of an alternative tradition of the Odyssey. Demeter’s claim may 
also refer to some alternative tradition.  But this can only remain a hypothesis. Demeter and 409
Odysseus also both begin their tales with professions of honesty (Od. 14.192, H. Dem. 119-21). 
And Eumaeus interestingly repeats the beggar’s profession (not verbatim) when introducing him 
 N. Richardson (2011, 46) observes that their “youthful innocence and grace resembles that of Persephone and her 408
companions.” According to Pausanias (1.38.3), they are supposed to have played some part in performing rites for 
Demeter and Persephone (τὰ δὲ ἱερὰ τοῖν θεοῖν… δρῶσιν), presumably at the institution of the Eleusinian mysteries.
 So Suter (2002, 147-8), although I cannot follow her in her further proposal that “the Hymn’s poet has perhaps 409
kept the basic story of this myth but dubbed it a lie because he wants to condemn the tradition as false” (148). We 
simply do not know enough about this possible alternative tradition to make any specific claims. Tantalizing, 
however, is Σ ad Hes. Th. 914 di Gregorio = Bacch. fr. 47 Maehler: ἡρπάσθαι δὲ τὴν Περσεφόνην φασὶν οἱ µὲν ἐκ 
Σικελίας, Β[ακχυλίδης] δὲ ἐκ Κρήτης (“some say that Persephone was kidnapped in Sicily. But B[acchylides] says 
in Crete”). Cf. also M. West’s (1966) note on Κρήτης at Hes. Th. 971 (ad loc.). N. Richardson (1974 ad H.Dem. 
123) thinks that Κρήτηθεν simply indicates that Demeter is lying. In the same note, he also summarizes the 
arguments in favour of the theory that the Eleusinian Mysteries had a Minoan origin, and a more detailed and up-to-
date treatment of this question may be found in Suter (2002, 169-207). But there can be no definitive answer either 
way. Levaniouk (2011, 101-3) hypothesizes that Demeter signals her coming epiphany by referring to Crete, much 
in the manner that Odysseus is thought to in his tale to Eumaeus.
!124
to Telemachus (Od. 16.61).  Tsagalis is surely correct in his observation that there is a certain 410
amount of irony here as well in their claims of veracity.  As mentioned above, what they are 411
about to say is not ‘true’, but they nonetheless report stories that are authentic in their own way. 
In a sense, then, Odysseus and Demeter hide the literal truth while exposing a deeper one. The 
truth explored in each of their cases is rather different, however, as is appropriate to each story. 
Demeter further reveals how much she is suffering on account of the loss of her daughter. And, I 
will argue, Odysseus alludes to important similarities between Eumaeus and himself, namely 
their shared suffering. 
 Part of the reason for the difference between the tales of Odysseus and Demeter is the 
status of their internal audiences. The daughters of Celeus belong to the aristocracy, whereas 
Eumaeus is a slave who used to be an aristocrat. For this reason, the idea of compulsion 
(anankē), so central to both tales, resonates and contrasts with Eumaeus’ experiences as it cannot 
with those of the daughters of Celeus, who have not yet experienced life’s vicissitudes. Demeter 
claims that: 
     ‘νῦν αὖτε Κρήτηθεν ἐπ᾽ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης  
     ἤλυθον οὐκ ἐθέλουσα, βίῃ δ᾽ ἀέκουσαν ἀνάγκῃ 
     ἄνδρες ληϊστῆρες ἀπήγαγον. οἳ µὲν ἔπειτα  125 
     νηΐ θοῇ Θορικὸν δὲ κατέσχεθον, ἔνθα γυναῖκες 
     ἠπείρου ἐπέβησαν ἀολλέες ἠδὲ καὶ αὐτοί 
     δεῖπνον ἐπηρτύνοντο παρὰ πρυµνήσια νηός· 
     ἀλλ᾽ ἐµοὶ οὐ δόρποιο µελίφρονος ἤρατο θυµὸς, 
     λάθρῃ δ᾽ ὁρµηθεῖσα δι᾽ ἠπείροιο µελαίνης  130 
     φεῦγον ὑπερφιάλους σηµάντορας, ὄφρα κε µή µε 
 Richardson (1974 ad H.Dem. 120-1) notes in addition that Persephone makes a similar claim to her mother at 410
406. And so does Hermes to his own father, Zeus (H.Herm. 368-9). The variation in the wording of these phrases, 
which seem relatively formulaic in their meaning, is most perplexing. Vergados (2013 ad H. Herm. 368) claims that 
such statements are generally followed by the actual truth. He is apparently thinking of Od. 16.226, 17.108, and 
22.420, which seem to me to be formulaic phrases of rather a different sort.
 Tsagalis (2012, 319 n. 41). Cf. Od. 19.203 and Hes. Th. 26-8, on which see Scodel (2001, 115-21).411
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     ἀπριάτην περάσαντες ἐµῆς ἀποναίατο τιµῆς.’ !
     “Now I have come against my will over the broad back of the sea, and by force, against my  
     will, by necessity did pirate men lead me away. Then they put in at Thoricos in their swift  
     ship, where the women set foot on land in a group, and the men themselves began to prepare  
     dinner by the ship’s stern cables. But my heart had no desire for dinner, which is sweet to the  
     heart. But I rushed out in secret through the dark land and escaped my insolent masters, so  
     that they wouldn’t sell me un-bought and have the enjoyment of my value” (H. Dem  
     123-32 Richardson).  412!
It has long been appreciated that, “in the Cretan tale, mother and daughter become closely 
assimilated in the mother’s imagination.”  Demeter places an extraordinary amount of 413
emphasis on her unwillingness to be driven off, taking up almost a full line of hexameter to say 
so (124).  Demeter perceives her daughter’s marriage to Hades as rape,  and her lying tale is 414 415
accordingly preoccupied with volition. Of particular interest is the line-ending ἀνάγκῃ in the 
dative case.  The lying tales of Demeter and Odysseus are both centrally concerned with the 416
weight of necessity. They both yield to it begrudgingly. Eumaeus, on the other hand, is happy 
with his lot, and he does not portray himself as having been constrained by necessity. The dative 
of anankē is used four times in the Hymn, once also with ἀέκουσαν in Demeter’s address to 
 Ἀπριάτην jumps out at us because of its rarity. Prior to Pindar (ἀπριάτας, fr. 169a.8 Maehler), it occurs only here, 412
at Il. 1.99, and in Odysseus’ lying tale (Od. 14.317). It appears to be used adjectivally here (N. Richardson (1974 ad 
loc.)) and at Il. 1.99 (so Hainsworth (1993 ad loc.) and LfgrE s.v., contra Σ A ad loc. Erbse, Cunliffe (1963 s.v.), and 
Wickert-Micknat (1983, 224)). But it must be adverbial at Od. 14.317. One is tempted to posit some significance to 
the appearance of such a rare word in both of these lying tales, but I am not convinced that there is any.
 H. Foley (1994, 125); cf. Clay (1989, 228).413
 For a less marked example of the capture of an unwilling party, cf. the description of Achilles’ abduction of 414
Lycaon, τόν ῥά ποτ᾽ αὐτὸς / ἦγε λαβὼν ἐκ πατρὸς ἀλωῆς οὐκ ἐθέλοντα (“whom he himself once took and brought 
away from his father’s orchard against his will,” Il. 21.35-6). This passage is examined in some detail below.
 Cf. DeBloois’ (1997, 246) insightful reading of the juxtaposition of ἥρπαξεν and δῶκεν at the beginning of the 415
Hymn: θύγατρα… ἣν Ἀϊδωνεὺς / ἥρπαξεν, δῶκεν δὲ… Ζεύς (“daughter… whom Hades snatched up, and Zeus gave 
her,” 2-3); so Clay (1989, 209); cf. Hes. Th. 913-14.
 In early Greek hexameter, the dative of anankē always appears at the end of the line, except at Il. 9.429 and 416
9.692, which appear to be variants of the same formula. In general, I find Schreckenberg’s (1964) thesis that anankē 
is fundamentally defined by the idea of binding to be convincing as far as early Greek hexameter goes. LfgrE s.v. 
ἀνάγκη seems to be more or less agnostic. But I am mindful that this idea does not necessarily underpin its use in 
later literature: Wooley (1967), Green (2012, 172-3). 
     This usage of the dative appears essentially to be instrumental: cf. Kühner (1904, §425.11), Chantraine (1953, 
§105), Schwyzer (1959, 167), all citing Il. 11.150 (φευγόντας ἀνάγκῃ).
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Helios, in which she says that she heard her daughter being taken away unwillingly (72). Later in 
the poem, a formula appears twice that is rather ironic in the context of the Hymn. Demeter is 
told that, although they grieve, people endure the gifts of the gods by necessity (θεῶν µὲν δῶρα 
καὶ ἀχνύµενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ/ τέτλαµεν ἄνθρωποι, 147-8 = 216-17). Interestingly, the latter two 
uses of the dative of anankē seem to resemble the Iliadic passages, while the former are 
reminiscent of the Odyssey.  The dative of anankē also appears within close proximity of some 417
form of ἀχνύµενοί περ (“although they grieved”) four times in the Iliad (ἀχνύµενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ, 
12.78; ἀχνύµενός περ ἀνάγκῃ, 15.133; ἀχνύµενοί περ… ἀνάγκῃ, 18.112-13 = 19.65-6), and this 
never happens in the Odyssey.  The line-ending dative of anankē does not appear in the other 418
Homeric Hymns or in Hesiod.  And in the Iliad, the agent imposing necessity is distant and 419
often impersonal. So, for example, Diomedes says to the uninjured Greeks in Book 14, δεῦτ᾽ 
ἴοµεν πόλεµόνδε καὶ οὐτάµενοί περ ἀνάγκῃ (“Come, even though we are wounded, out of 
necessity let us go to battle,” 14.128). One can surmise that the Greeks are compelled by 
necessity into battle because the Trojans are on the offensive. But this is nowhere to be seen in 
the speech. More of a borderline case is the withdrawal of the Greeks from the foremost ships in 
the face of the Trojan assault (τοὶ δ᾽ ἐπέχυντο. / Ἀργεῖοι δὲ νεῶν µὲν ἐχώρησαν καὶ ἀνάγκῃ / τῶν 
πρωτέων (“But they [the Trojans] poured in. And the Argives gave way from the foremost ships 
even by necessity”, 15.654-6)). The necessity is clearly caused by the advance of the Trojans 
 Schreckenberg (1964, 1-16) and LfgrE s.v. ἀνάγκη B3a implicitly make this same distinction without noting the 417
difference between the two poems in this respect.
 This is not to say that the sentiment that humans must endure what the gods give is foreign to the Odyssey (for 418
example, see Od. 4.236-7 and 6.187-90). I am only claiming that this phraseology resembles that of the Iliad.
 Anankaiē appears in the dative in the longer Hymn to Apollo (543), but not at the end of a line. Cf. Munson 419
(2001, 30-1), who cites an unpublished presentation by K. Cheshire at the 1998 APA conference claiming that, in 
Homer, “ἀνάγκη refers to more general or abstract compulsion, while ἀναγκαίη denotes particular instances of it.” If 
this guideline is correct, I am not convinced that it extends to the Homeric Hymns.
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(τοί), but the source of the necessity is still not linked syntactically to ἀνάγκῃ, nor does it even 
appear in the same sentence.  In the Odyssey, on the other hand, the source of compulsion tends 420
to be linked closely to the dative of anankē. So, for example, Calypso is described three times as 
ἣ µιν ἀνάγκῃ / ἴσχει (“the one who constrains him [Odysseus] with compulsion,” 4.557-8 = 
5.14-15 = 17.143-4). Similarly, Eumaeus, under compulsion, sends a man to drive a boar to the 
city for the insolent suitors (τὸν δὲ … ἀποπροέηκε πόλινδε / σῦν ἀγέµεν µνηστῆρσιν 
ὑπερφιάλοισιν ἀνάγκῃ, 14.26-7). The link between the anankē and the suitors is not absolutely 
explicit in this passage. But they appear side by side, and that the suitors are the source of the 
compulsion is clear.  In addition, lines which feature a redundant emphasis on unwillingness 421
and coercion similar – in kind, if not in extent – to that of H.Dem. 124 are not uncommon in the 
Odyssey (e.g. οὐκ ἐθέλουσ’, ὑπ’ ἀνάγκης, 2.110 = 19.156 = 24.146; πόλλ᾽ ἀεκαζοµένους, οὐδ᾽ 
ἤθελον, 13.277; ἀνάγκῃ… οὐκ ἐθέλων, 5.154-5). As far as I am aware, only one such example 
appears in the Iliad (πόλλ᾽ ἀεκαζοµένη, κρατερὴ δ᾽ ἐπικείσετ᾽ ἀνάγκη (“much against your will, 
and powerful necessity will lie upon you”, 6.458)).  Compulsion is an important idea in the 422
Odyssey. Much emphasis is placed on the fact that Odysseus and his allies must do the best they 
can despite the various constraints placed on them by hostile gods and malevolent mortals. The 
heavy weight of necessity frequently evokes sympathy and binds characters together. 
 So Il. 11.148-50, 12.178-9, 15.132-4, 197-9, and 343-5, 18.112-13, 19.65-6.420
 The other, similar uses in the Odyssey of line-ending anankē in the dative appear at 1.154, 5.154, 7.217, 9.98, 421
12.330, 14.27, 14.272 and 298, 17.441, 18.76, 22.331, 353, and 451. This closer connection between anankē and its 
cause is not universal in the poem. The three exceptions are at 10.434, 13.307, 15.311. The phrase hyp’  anankēs 
(“perforce”), which is virtually identical in meaning to the dative of anankē, and is used only in the formulaic phrase 
describing Penelope having to finish Laertes’ burial shroud (2.110, 19.156, and 24.146; cf. Cyp. fr. 9.3 and Panyas. 
fr. 3.4 Bernabé), similarly does not emphasize the cause of the compulsion. When Odysseus is himself the one 
constraining others (Od. 9.98), anankē lacks negative connotations.
 I do not consider phrases like τήν ῥα βίῃ ἀέκοντος ἀπηύρων (“whom they were taking by force from him against 422
his will,” Il. 1.430; cf. 7.197, 13.572, 15.186, Od. 1.403, 4.646) to be redundant or even necessarily emphatic. 
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 Line-ending anankē in the dative appears twice in the lying tale in Book 14. And these 
instances help us to appreciate how Odysseus subtly highlights his striking similarity to 
Eumaeus. The beggar reports that, during a raid in Egypt, his men were foolish, and they were 
routed (14.258-70): ἔνθ᾽ ἡµέων πολλοὺς µὲν ἀπέκτανον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ, / τοὺς δ᾽ ἄναγον ζωούς, 
σφίσιν ἐργάζεσθαι ἀνάγκῃ (“then they killed many of us with sharp bronze, and others they took 
alive inland to work for them under compulsion,” 14.271-2).  One assumes that working under 423
compulsion refers to slavery here.  We can only speculate about what kind of treatment is to be 424
understood in detail, but presumably forced labour in a foreign land involves the kind of 
systematic deracination outlined above. The tale Demeter tells in the extended quotation above 
also quite evidently describes the process of enslavement. She is taken very much against her 
will to a foreign land and is to be sold ‘un-bought’ (ἀπριάτην). The beggar and Doso are also 
both exceptions within the larger groups of which they are a part. Demeter says that, while many 
women set foot on land – presumably to be sold as well – she escaped at dinnertime. Oddly, 
Odysseus’ beggar escapes slavery because Zeus saves him by putting it into his head to 
supplicate the Egyptian basileus (‘chief’, 14.273-83), who spares him out of reverence for the 
wrath of Zeus Xenios (Διὸς δ᾽ ὠπίζετο µῆνιν / ξεινίου, 283-4). This is probably a reference to the 
suitors, whom Eumaeus has just accused at length of not heeding opis (‘the watchful eye of the 
gods’; especially 14.81-8).  And so does his double, Philoetius (20.214-16).  When we 425 426
 This extended passage (14.258-72) is repeated verbatim at 17.427-41, with the exception of στῆναι at 17.439 for 423
µεῖναι at 14.270.
 So A. Bowie (2013 ad loc.).424
 On this word’s sometimes fraught usage, see Burkert (2001, 95-104).425
 Elsewhere the roar of the hooves of Hector’s horses is compared to the tempest Zeus rains down during harvest 426
time when men are unjust (16.384-93), not heeding the watchful eye of the gods (θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες, 388 = 
Hes. Op. 251); cf. Heracles at Od. 21.24-33; also cf. Hes. Op. 187 and 706.
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consider that these passages are centrally concerned with the gods’ punishment of unjust 
behaviour, it is no wonder Grossardt finds it ironic that Eumaeus should respond so well to the 
beggar’s report that the Egyptian basileus should have thought of Zeus Xenios in a situation 
where an enemy combatant grabbed him by the knees and made supplication. In such a scenario, 
xenia does not ordinarily apply.  Why the Egyptian basileus should have such a thought is not 427
entirely clear, but it is noteworthy that Zeus puts the idea into the beggar’s head. Divine 
inspiration is hardly unknown in early Greek hexameter.  Here it apparently saves the beggar 428
from slavery. In these two passages, the contrast between the beggar and Doso is informative. 
They alone out of their respective groups escape. The beggar escapes because he is apparently 
uniquely favoured by Zeus, whereas Doso escapes because she is not hungry at dinnertime. As 
we noted above, abstaining from food is one of the forms of self-deprivation that is symptomatic 
of mourning in Greek literature.  Again, Demeter alludes to her daughter’s rape in her lying 429
tale. In other words, Doso refuses to accept the anankē which oppresses her, just as Demeter 
refuses to accept the anankē which she perceives as oppressing her daughter. Demeter has this 
luxury because she is a goddess. As we will see, however, the beggar, just like Odysseus, can 
only rely on the mercy of the gods to free him from anankē.  
 As is to be expected from different iterations of the same type-scene, we have observed 
that the two lying tales in question share a large number of characteristics. Both storytellers 
portray themselves as victims of necessity, although whether this is the necessity of fate or of the 
 Grossardt (1998, 67).427
 Cf. especially 3.26-7: Τηλέµαχ᾽, ἄλλα µὲν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ φρεσὶ σῇσι νοήσεις, / ἄλλα δὲ καὶ δαίµων ὑποθήσεται 428
(“Telemachus, some things you yourself will devise in your heart. Others a god will suggest.”).
 Cf. the later description of Demeter as ἀγέλαστος ἄπαστος ἐδητύος ἠδὲ ποτῆτος (“without laughter, not tasting 429
food or drink,” H.Dem. 220). Penelope submits herself to a similar regimen when Telemachus disappears early in 
the Odyssey (4.787-90). N. Richardson (1974 ad H.Dem. 220) provides a number of further parallels.
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harsh realities of human life is not always clear. One indication of this necessity is the similar, 
emphatic use of the dative of anankē. Odysseus and Demeter also narrate situations in which 
they alone of their respective groups escape slavery. As we will see, in all three of these respects 
Eumaeus’ autobiography can be distinguished from the lying tales of the former two. Eumaeus, 
although he has experienced the kind of suffering Demeter and Odysseus relate, does not portray 
himself as a victim of necessity, and so it follows that he does not tend to colour his narrative 
with words of constraint and unwillingness – although we are surely to understand that he was 
deceived into leaving his parents’ oikos. And finally Eumaeus is not part of a group of saleable 
victims. He is the victim of opportunism. The reason Eumaeus does not portray himself as a 
victim of necessity, I will suggest, is that he is depicted as happy with his lot as Odysseus’ slave, 
and so it would be nonsensical for him ultimately to regret his kidnapping. 
 The second appearance of line-ending anankē in the dative in the lying tale of Book 14 is 
just a few lines after the first, and it brings us squarely back to the threat of slavery. The beggar 
stays with the Egyptian basileus for seven years, but he is eventually persuaded by a dastardly 
Phoenician to travel with him to Phoenicia and Libya (14.285-95). The Phoenician persuades 
him to go to Libya, 
     ‘ψεύδεα βουλεύσας, ἵνα οἱ σὺν φόρτον ἄγοιµι, 
     κεῖθι δέ µ᾽ ὡς περάσῃσι καὶ ἄσπετον ὦνον ἕλοιτο. 
     τῷ ἑπόµην ἐπὶ νηός, ὀϊόµενός περ, ἀνάγκῃ.’ !
     “with the misleading advice that I should convey cargo with him, but really intending to take  
     me for sale and collect a huge payment there. I followed him onboard ship by necessity, even  
     though I was suspicious” (14.296-8). !
There are several aspects of this passage that are noteworthy for us. Given that a belated nostos 
(‘homecoming’) is the subject of the Odyssey, it is perhaps unsurprising that we see anankē so 
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frequently associated with the control of movement.  Here again we have the threat of slavery. 430
Similarly, in the final two lines of the quotation from the Hymn to Demeter above, Demeter 
escapes so that the pirates will not sell her (περάσαντες) and enjoy the profit from such a sale. 
Peraan (‘to cross to the other side,’ or ‘to sell’) frequently combines the ideas of crossing the sea 
and the sale of a person, especially in the Odyssey.  So deracination is at stake again. Ōnos 431
(‘profit’, or ‘price’), as opposed to the tīmē of the H.Dem., seems to be an important word in this 
portion of the Odyssey, being attested six times in Books 14 and 15, and only rarely elsewhere in 
early Greek epic.  In the Iliad, ōnos is used only of the purchase of Lycaon (21.41 and 23.746). 432
In the Odyssey, as we will see, it refers to the purchase-price for a slave four times (14.297, 
15.388, 429, and 452) and twice to that of merchants’ wares (15.445 and 463).  Wickert-433
Micknat argues that “ὦνος, in der Ilias der ‘Tausch-Wert’ eines Menschen, ist in der Odyssee 
‘Kauf-Wert’, und zwar von jeglicher Ware, nicht nur von Menschen.”  However, if we examine 434
the Iliadic examples, we find that the word is used no differently there than in the Odyssey. The 
poet has just described the abduction of Lycaon by Achilles from his father’s orchard (Il. 
21.34-39):  
     καὶ τότε µέν µιν Λῆµνον ἐϋκτιµένην ἐπέρασσεν 
     νηυσὶν ἄγων, ἀτὰρ υἱὸς Ἰήσονος ὦνον ἔδωκεν· 
     κεῖθεν δὲ ξεῖνός µιν ἐλύσατο, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἔδωκεν, 
     Ἰµβριος Ἠετίων, πέµψεν δ᾽ ἐς δῖαν Ἀρίσβην. 
 So Rankine (2011, 41) with respect to 4.557-8 = 5.14-15 = 17.143-4. On the Odyssey as a belated homecoming, 430
see Burgess (2012b).
 Wickert-Micknat (1983.138-9); cf. N. Richardson (1993 ad Il. 21.40-1), who translates the term as “export for 431
sale.” Grossardt (1998, 238 n. 57) finds it striking that, when the word is used in this way (citing especially Od. 
14.297, 15.453, and H. Dem. 132), it often begins in the same metrical position.
 On tīmē in the H. Dem. and in the Homeric Hymns more generally, see Nickel (2003).432
 I suspect that either ὦνον or βίοτον is implied at Od. 20.383 as well.433
 Wickert-Micknat (1983, 140). The word is often translated as “ransom” in the Iliad, such as in the revised Loeb 434
at Il. 23.746.
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     “And at that time he took him across the sea to well-built Lemnos, bringing him by ship, and 
     the son of Jason paid his price. And from there a guest-friend, Imbrian Aëtion, ransomed him,  
     and he gave much and sent him to godlike Arisbe” (21.40-3). !
Lexica tend to distinguish between peraan as “to get to the other side” and “to sell.”  The 435
LfgrE places the present use in the latter category, but I find this unlikely. Using the combination 
of the two meanings as described above, better sense can be gleaned from this passage if the 
word indicates Achilles bringing Lycaon across the sea in order to sell him.  Otherwise the 436
present tense of ἄγων is awkward, since it would be strange for Achilles to sell Lycaon on 
Lemnos at the same time as he was in the process of transporting him there.  Once on Lemnos, 437
he finds a buyer to provide an agreed upon price (ὦνον). In other words, he sells Lycaon into 
slavery.  Only then does Aëtion ransom him and return him to his family. The other appearance 438
of ōnos in the Iliad refers to the same transaction as in line 41 of the present passage. We learn 
there that the price paid for Lycaon was a mixing bowl (23.740-7). We see, then, that ōnos is 
always used of the purchase price of some commodity, and usually of a slave in the attested 
literature. Whereas tīmē in its commercial senses can variously mean “value” or “compensation,” 
ōnos is more specifically used of a proposed or agreed-upon price in an exchange of goods, 
 So Cunliffe (1963 s.v. περάω¹ and περάω²), and LfgrE s.v. περάω I and II. It is possible that περάω¹ and περάω² 435
have two different etymologies, one connected with perēn (‘beyond’) and pernēmi (‘to export for sale’); cf. Ebeling 
(1871-85 s.v. περάω).
 Similarly at 21.58. Cf. Willcock (1984 ad 21.40).436
 Cf. Od. 15.428.437
 So LfgrE s.v. ὦνος 2a, Wilson (1984, 190 n. 49), and Seaford (2004, 35). Cf. Il. 22.44-5, where Hecuba laments 438
that Achilles has sold (περνάς) many of her sons on remote islands (νήσων ἔπι τηλεδαπάων); cf. also 21.453-4 and 
24.751-2.
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roughly corresponding to a common usage of tīmē in later Greek.  It seems, then, that, in the 439
present passage, the beggar Odysseus is referring to the threat of being sold into slavery. 
 Also pertinent to our consideration of Books 14 and 15 of the Odyssey is Achilles’ 
mockery of Lycaon for his capture and sale (Il. 21.54-63). He sarcastically suggests that the 
Trojans he has already killed must be about to come back to life, just as Lycaon ἦλθε φυγὼν ὕπο 
νηλεὲς ἦµαρ (“has come, having escaped his harsh day,” 21.57). As N. Richardson observes, this 
phraseology “would normally refer to death, but can be taken also of Lukaon’s westward voyage 
into slavery.”  Unsurprisingly, then, it would seem that being used to obtain an ōnos for one’s 440
captor can at least be presented rhetorically as a form of social death and consequently extreme 
dishonour. The formulation of Demeter is highly revealing in this context. She runs away so that 
her captors will not have enjoyment of her tīmē. The implication seems to be that, if they had 
obtained an ōnos in exchange for her, she would have suffered a corresponding diminution in her 
tīmē in addition to what she underwent in being captured in the first place. So, to return to 
Odysseus’ lying tale, while it is important to observe that the beggar is twice in danger of being 
enslaved or sold into slavery, this never actually happens. In the first case, as we have already 
noted, he manages to become a xeinos of the Egyptian basileus through divine inspiration. In the 
 On tīmē, see N. Richardson (1974 ad H. Dem. 132) and LfgrE s.v. τιµή 1a. On ōnos, cf. Hsch. s.v. ὦνος [ω 247 439
Cunningham]: ὠνή, τιµὴ ἡ καταβαλλοµένη ἀντὶ τινος (“purchase, value laid down in exchange for something”). See 
also Hes. fr. 43a.41-2 M.-W., which is a lacunose and hotly disputed passage. But ōnos seems in essence to stand in 
for the bride-price (hedna) for Mestra (on hedna in the Catalogue of Women, see Ormand (2014, 51-84)). Hedna is 
used of her bride-price per se at 21, with the following lines probably listing what Sisyphus promised (ὑπέσ]χετ[ο], 
21; cf. ὦνον ὑπισχόµεναι (Od. 15.462)). Ōnos then appears to be used on lines 41-2 as the general term used for an 
agreed upon purchase-price. While there must remain some doubt because of the fragmentary nature of the passage, 
Athena is probably following the common judicial practice of making a general statement about all purchases with 
respect to this particular one, whose price takes the form of hedna. See Hirschberger (2004 ad Hes. fr. 37.41-3 = 
43a.41-3 M.-W.) for a summary of prior interpretations of this passage, adding Steinrück (1994, 294-7), and 
subsequently Irwin (2005b, 67-77) and Ormand (2014, 242-4). The other major ancient sources for Mestra’s peculiar 
series of marriages are Ov. Met. 8.738-878 and Σ ad Lyc. 1393 Leone = Hes. fr. 43b M-W. She notoriously goes 
unmentioned in Call. Cer.
 N. Richardson (1993 ad Il. 21.53-63); so Wickert-Micknat (1983, 225-6). Cf. above on doulion ēmar and 440
eleutheron ēmar. Ndoye (2010, 226-36) looks at the slavery of prisoners of war in Homer in general.
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second case, he is not overpowered but tricked by a Phoenician into a situation in which there is 
some danger of his being sold into slavery. But Zeus saves him again, this time by destroying 
their ship and everyone else on board (14.300-13). So, we have Odysseus claiming that he twice 
escaped slavery narrowly and only by the grace of Zeus in a story which nods to a tradition of 
alternative Odysseys. It can hardly be accidental that he addresses this tale to a man who has 
himself been forced into slavery. Odysseus is not merely lying. He is rather referring to a version 
of this story that emphasizes his similarity to Eumaeus. 
 In the following book, Odysseus presses this point further by asking Eumaeus for his own 
story and specifically having him frame it in terms of how he came to be a slave. He tells him to 
relate whether his city was sacked and he was captured, or ἄνδρες δυσµενέες νηυσὶν λάβον ἠδὲ 
ἐπέρασσαν / τοῦδ᾽ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς δώµαθ᾽, ὃ δ᾽ ἄξιον ὦνον ἔδωκε (“hostile men took you by ship 
and brought you over the sea for sale to the halls of the man here, who paid a worthy price,” 
15.388-9). We note the competitive distinction between the potentially boundless (ἄσπετον, 
14.297) ōnos the beggar speculates for himself, and the worthy (ἄξιον) ōnos he assigns to 
Eumaeus, which indicates nothing more than that the offer would be equivalent to Eumaeus’ 
perceived value. And Eumaeus plays with this word ōnos in his autobiography. After describing 
his homeland and his heritage, Eumaeus describes how a Phoenician trader seduced a Phoenician 
woman (γυνή, 15.417 and 439), who was working as a slave in his father’s household (415-23). 
Eumaeus reports how this unnamed woman described her own fate:  
              ‘µ᾽ ἀνήρπαξαν Τάφιοι ληΐστορες ἄνδρες 
     ἀγρόθεν ἐρχοµένην, πέρασαν δέ µε δεῦρ᾽ ἀγαγόντες 
     τοῦδ᾽ ἀνδρὸς πρὸς δώµαθ᾽, ὃ δ᾽ ἄξιον ὦνον ἔδωκε.’ !
     “Taphian pirate men kidnapped me as I was coming in from the country. And, having brought  
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     me here to the house of this man, they sold me. And he paid a worthy price (427-9).” !
The kidnapping, conveyance across the sea, and sale to a foreigner – a pattern familiar to us by 
now – would seem to resemble Odysseus’ speculations as well as the actual story to follow. But 
Eumaeus avoids this parallel. After all, Eumaeus is just a child when he is kidnapped, and the 
unnamed woman takes advantage of her position as his nurse (ἀτιτάλλω, 450) to obtain him as a 
commodity for her lover: τὸν κεν ἄγοιµ᾽ ἐπὶ νηός, ὃ δ᾽ ὑµῖν µυρίον ὦνον / ἄλφοι, ὅπῃ περάσητε 
κατ᾽ ἀλλοθρόους ἀνθρώπους (“I could lead him on ship, and he could bring you a huge price 
wherever you convey him for sale among foreign people,” 452-3). To the Phoenician nurse, we 
can imagine that this kidnapping is commensurate with the injury she has suffered. We are, after 
all, talking about exactly the same series of actions.  Eumaeus’ father did not kidnap her 441
himself, but he clearly benefited from her injury by availing himself of her services. But 
Eumaeus does not seem to agree with this assessment. When discussing his removal from Syria, 
he uses none of the usual language we have seen applied so far of kidnapping scenes. Neither the 
Phoenician nurse nor Eumaeus himself are taken against their will, by necessity, force, or 
otherwise. And the nurse says that she would very willingly (ἐθέλουσά γε) offer Eumaeus as a 
return for her passage on board the Phoenician ship (449). In addition, when she leads Eumaeus 
out to the harbour, he follows out of folly (ἑπόµην ἀεσιφροσύνῃσι, 470). This very willingness is 
pathetic. The child quietly trusts the nurse as she betrays him.  And, as in the beggar’s tale, 442
there is divine retribution. Although Zeus gives the crew good sailing, Artemis strikes down the 
nurse. She falls like a bird and is cast overboard to be a find (κύρµα) for seals and fish 
 She also suggests stealing gold from the household (15.448), which is presumably also understood to be 441
consistent with the actions of the Taphian pirates who kidnapped her.
 Cf. Golden (1990, 145-63) for paidagōgoi and female nurses as especial focal points of the “dialectic of trust and 442
suspicion” owners placed on slaves in Classical Athens.
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(475-81).  As if the direct action of a god were not clear enough, the blatant dishonouring of 443
the nurse’s corpse goes without punishment, and the smooth sailing continues.  Eumaeus 444
portrays the woman as having received her due. 
 Interestingly, in the middle of the tale, Eumaeus uses ōnos twice to apply to wares, a 
meaning unique to this passage in early Greek hexameter. The nurse encourages the Phoenicians 
to pursue a purchase price for their wares (ἐπείγετε δ᾽ ὦνον ὁδαίων, 445), so that they can leave. 
And later the Phoenicians get the female members of Eumaeus’ father’s oikos haggling over 
prices (ὦνον ὑπισχόµεναι, 463) as a distraction, so that the nurse can escape with Eumaeus and 
some moveable goods (455-70). This frequent repetition of ōnos emphasizes the pejorative 
depiction of the Phoenicians as greedy and ruthless. Their portrayal probably does not reflect an 
Archaic Greek prejudice, as is often claimed.  On the contrary, van Wees and Peacock have 445
shown that the only two passages in Homeric epic where the supposed prejudice against the 
Phoenicians can actually be observed are in the present passage and in the beggar’s description 
of the Phoenician in his lying tale (14.285-95).  Note especially that the two speeches feature 446
the only uses attested in the Archaic Era of the probably pejorative trōktēs (‘nibbler’, 14.289 and 
15.416).  Eumaeus and the beggar – maybe at least partially to elicit the swineherd’s sympathy 447
in the latter’s case – take a dim view of the people because of their own potential misfortune at 
 One wonders if this phrase is to be understood in the same manner as Il. 1.4-5.443
 Even Elpenor, who is specifically described as not very impressive (10.552-3), can warn Odysseus that he will 444
become a cause of the gods’ wrath (θεῶν µήνιµα) if his corpse goes unburied (11.72-6; similarly Hector to Achilles 
at Il. 22.358-60). Cf. Burkert (1985, 270-1) and M. Clarke (1999, 185).
 Finley (1978, 102), Grossardt (1998, 70-3), Dougherty (2001, 116).445
 Van Wees (1992, 242), Peacock (2011, 25). I would extend this observation to all of early Greek hexameter. 446
Contrast in particular Odysseus’ lying tale to Athena, in which he says that the Phoenicians he hired did not wish to 
deceive him (οὐδ᾽ ἤθελον ἐξαπατῆσαι, 13.277).
 Cf. Σ Q and V ad Od. 15.416 Dindorf, Hsch. s.v. τρῶκται [τ 1599 Cunningham] and τρώκτης [τ 1600 447
Cunningham], and Heubeck and Hoekstra (1990 ad Od. 14.289).
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the traders’ hands.  The Phoenicians are only interested in profit, in finding a good ōnos for 448
their wares, be they human or otherwise.  
 Significantly, however, Eumaeus, when referring to his own sale, does not use the 
formulae we have looked at so far. After the death and disposal of his nurse, 
                    ‘αὐτὰρ ἐγὼ λιπόµην ἀκαχήµενος ἦτορ. 
     τοὺς δ᾽ Ἰθάκῃ ἐπελάσσε φέρων ἄνεµός τε καὶ ὕδωρ, 
     ἔνθα µε Λαέρτης πρίατο κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν. 
     οὕτω τήνδε τε γαῖαν ἐγὼν ἴδον ὀφθαλµοῖσι.’ !
     “Well, I was left grieved at heart. And the driving wind and water bore them to Ithaca, where 
     Laertes bought me with his property. So I laid eyes on this land here” (15.481-4). !
The phrase priato kteatessin heoisin is only used to describe the purchase of a slave by a member 
of Odysseus’ oikos (1.430 (Eurycleia by Laertes), 14.115 (Eumaeus by Laertes), and 452 
(Mesaulius by Eumaeus)). And priasthai is not attested anywhere else in Archaic epic, whereas 
there are a number of other ways to refer to the purchase or sale of a slave. We have already seen 
the combination of peraān and ōnon didounai/alphanein/haireisthai. Peraan may also be used 
by itself to describe the purchase and sometimes transportation of a slave (Il. 21.58, 78, 102, and 
453-4, 22.44-5, 24.751-2). Ktāsthai refers to a purchase alone (Od. 14.4, 450). And alphanein 
(‘to bring in’) may appear on its own with a direct object of the profit enjoyed from the sale of a 
slave (Od. 17.250, 20.382-3).  As we have seen, ōnos appears (usually with peraān) in contexts 449
where the sale as opposed to the purchase is the pertinent direction, and the focus is consequently 
on the profit made from the product. So, even though ōnon didounai refers to a payment, it 
always follows the story of how the item reached the (potential) buyer, thereby placing the focus 
 Cf. Marks (2003, 217-20) on Odysseus’ and Eumaeus’ hostility towards Aetolians.448
 Cf. Seaford (2004, 25 n. 19). In the previous chapter, the beggar's mother, a purchased (ὠνητή, 14.202) 449
concubine, is discussed.
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on the sale and on the profit made from it. In three of the four uses of priato kteatessin heoisin, 
on the other hand, the purchase of the slave appears in the context of that slave’s life on Ithaca. 
The one exception is the present case, where Laertes purchases Eumaeus at the conclusion of his 
journey from Syria. But the application of the other three examples would tend to indicate that 
the formula is to be understood directionally in terms of the purchase of the slave and not the 
sale. This draws the attention of the audience to the acquisition of the slave as opposed to the 
process of his deracination. He is arriving at his new home, disconnected from his prior 
suffering. We have recently observed that the audience has just heard the word ōnos six times 
within the last 650 lines, and nowhere else in the poem. With the exception of Mesaulius’ 
purchase by Eumaeus (αὐτὸς κτήσατο οἶος (“he himself alone bought him,” 14.450) and πρίατο 
κτεάτεσσιν ἑοῖσιν (“he purchased him with his own property,” 14.452)), who is anyway a 
member of Odysseus’ oikos, every reference to the sale of a slave within these lines features the 
word ōnos. If I am correct that ōnos is used in these two books in such a way that the focus is 
placed on the profit made from a sale, this contributes to the portrayal of the slavers in the stories 
told by the beggar and Eumaeus as essentially greedy and nefarious. We are led by the hostile 
portrayal of Eumaeus’ nurse and her death at Artemis’ hands to expect a similar use of ōnos at 
the end of the story. Eumaeus’ selection of priato kteatessin heoisin turns the tide of his story and 
contributes to our sense that the conclusion is paradoxically happy, that he will come to flourish 
in his new home. Laertes’ purchase of Eumaeus is dissociated from the treachery and suffering 
that led to it. The house of Laertes is full of benevolent masters.  So, although Eumaeus 450
 Thalmann (1998b, 33-4) is certainly correct to argue that the essential ideological difference between Eumaeus 450
and his nurse is that his nurse betrays the household to which she has come to belong, whereas Eumaeus is loyal – 
and correctly so from the point of view of the poem. We note that the language used to describe the purchase of the 
nurse (ἄξιον ὦνον ἔδωκε (“he gave a worthy purchase-price”, 15.429)) is in her words, not Eumaeus’.
!139
understands all too well the threat of slavery, he does not treat his own particular tale as 
unfortunate in the end. 
 As we have seen, the biographies of the beggar and Eumaeus share many similarities. But 
the central one from a thematic standpoint is the threat of slavery – a threat that has become 
reality in Eumaeus’ case. The poet invokes the Cretan mode of the Odyssey with this beggar’s 
tale, suggesting that what happened to the beggar could also have happened to Odysseus. And in 
fact throughout the Odyssey all manner of dire fates threaten Odysseus. Hence, when he washes 
ashore in an unknown land, he worries whether he has reached hospitable people or hybristai 
(‘insolent men,’ 6.121-2 = 9.175-6 = 13.201-2). And indeed the Odyssey’s prototypical hybristai, 
Penelope’s suitors, threaten to sell the disguised Odysseus into slavery on Sicily (20.382-3). The 
difference between Odysseus and Eumaeus in this respect is that Odysseus perceives the 
possibility of slavery as a misfortune, whereas Eumaeus has come to terms with his fate, as 
unpleasant as the transition may have been.  
 Nonetheless, they have much in common, which is why Eumaeus sympathizes with the 
beggar:  
     ‘ἆ δειλὲ ξείνων, ἦ µοι µάλα θυµὸν ὄρινας 
     ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγων, ὅσα δὴ πάθες ἠδ᾽ ὅσ᾽ ἀλήθης. 
     ἀλλὰ τά γ᾽ οὐ κατὰ κόσµον, ὀΐοµαι, οὐδέ µε πείσεις 
     εἰπὼν ἀµφ᾽ Ὀδυσῆϊ.’ !
     “Alas, poor stranger, deeply indeed have you stirred my heart by saying each of these things,  
     namely how much you have suffered and wandered. But the following at least was not in  
     good order, I think, and you will not persuade me with what you said about Odysseus” 
     (14.361-4). !
This is full of common epic formulae, but the beggar’s response to Eumaeus’ own story shares 
some unique similarities: 
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     ‘Εὔµαι᾽, ἦ µάλα δή µοι ἐνὶ φρεσὶ θυµὸν ὄρινας 
     ταῦτα ἕκαστα λέγων, ὅσα δὴ πάθες ἄλγεα θυµῷ. 
     ἀλλ᾽ ἦτοι σοὶ µὲν παρὰ καὶ κακῷ ἐσθλὸν ἔθηκε 
     Ζεύς, ἐπεὶ ἀνδρὸς δώµατ᾽ ἀφίκεο πολλὰ µογήσας 
     ἠπίου ὃς δή τοι παρέχει βρῶσίν τε πόσιν τε      490 
     ἐνδυκέως, ζώεις δ᾽ ἀγαθὸν βίον· αὐτὰρ ἐγώγε 
     πολλὰ βροτῶν ἐπὶ ἄστε᾽ ἀλώµενος ἐνθάδ᾽ ἱκάνω.’ !
     “Eumaeus, deeply indeed have you stirred my heart in my breast by saying each of these  
     things, namely how many pains you suffered in your heart. But for you Zeus placed good  
     alongside bad when you, having suffered much, reached the halls of a gentle man who kindly  
     provides you with food and drink, and you live a good life. I, on the other hand, come here in  
     my wandering to many cities of men” (15.486-92). !
The similarities between the first two lines are unique to these two passages. Thȳmon orinein is a 
fairly common combination, appearing 30 times in early Greek hexameter. But these are the only 
occurrences of the second person, thȳmon orinas, and we note that they occur in the same 
metrical position. And there are only two other examples of the verb in thȳmon orinein in the 
second person being used of someone actually (as opposed to hypothetically) stirring up 
emotion. These involve Odysseus in the first case, and Eumaeus and Philoetius on account of 
Odysseus in the second.  By far the norm for thȳmon orinein is a relatively impersonal 451
narrator’s third-person report that someone’s speech stirred the heart of his or her interlocutor.  452
But in the present two cases we have the much more personal, responsive acknowledgement that 
each has moved the other with his story. The case is much the same with ὅσα δὴ πάθες. Not only 
 Odysseus rebukes the Phaeacian Euryalus: ὤρινάς µοι θυµὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισιν / εἰπὼν οὐ κατὰ κόσµον 451
(“you have stirred my heart in my own breast by speaking out of order,” 8.178-9). Note also that (οὐ) κατὰ κόσµον 
with εἰπὼν only appears elsewhere in Eumaeus’ response to the beggar’s lying tale. The transferral of the speaker of 
a phrase to its addressee with slight modifications has been observed between the Iliad and the Odyssey (di 
Benedetto 2001.9-10), but not, to my knowledge, within the Odyssey alone. The final second-person indicative use 
of thymon orinein occurs when Antinous rebukes Eumaeus and Philoetius for weeping over the bow of their master, 
thereby stirring the heart (ὀρίνετον) of Penelope (21.85-8). The hypothetical examples of thymon orinein are 
Achilles warning Priam twice not to anger him (Il. 24.467 and 568), and Patroclus potentially moving Achilles to 
action (11.792, which is picked up in the first person by Patroclus himself at 15.403).
 Il. 2.142, 3.395, 4.208, 5.29, 9.595, 11.804, 13.418, 468, 14.459, 487, 16.280, 17.123, 150, 18.223, 19.272, Od. 452
18.75, 20.9, 24.318, Hes. fr. 51.3 M.-W., H. Ap. 524.
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is this phrase unique to these two passages, but again a second-person indicative form of 
paschein is quite rare. And it is only used elsewhere of Odysseus and his companions in the 
Odyssey (11.458).  Given the close and unique similarity between these two passages, it is 453
highly likely that this is a case of close interformularity, with these two passages referring to 
each other. It is no wonder, then, that Montiglio finds that, “in the Odyssey, only Eumaeus 
identifies with the wandering stranger, because he himself wandered far from his home and 
parents.”  And Odysseus acknowledges their shared experience again when he uses polla 454
mogein to describe Eumaeus’ suffering. In the Odyssey, this phrase is very closely attached to the 
suffering of Odysseus in particular, and it is also used once of Laertes. Of its fifteen appearances, 
it describes Odysseus twelve times (2.343, 3.232, 5.223, 449, 6.175, 7.147, 8.155, 19.483, 
21.207, 23.101, 169, 338).  A variation also appears when Menelaus says that Odysseus πολέας 455
ἐµόγησεν ἀέθλους (“underwent many hardships,” 4.170). And, in the last book of the poem, we 
arrive at Laertes’ farm, ὅν ῥά ποτ᾽ αὐτὸς / Λαέρτης κτεάτισσεν, ἐπεὶ µάλ᾽ πόλλ᾽ ἐµόγησεν 
(“which Laertes himself once obtained, once he had suffered very much,” 24.206-7). When 
Odysseus himself uses the phrase to apply to Eumaeus’ experiences, then, he shows his 
awareness of their similarity and perhaps even hints at a bond of kinship between them.  The 456
combination of the unique second-person verbs of emotion and the application to Eumaeus of 
phraseology peculiar to Odysseus indicates that Montiglio’s assessment is surely correct. 
 Menelaus’ acknowledgement to Antilochus that he has suffered much (πόλλ᾽ ἔπαθες, Il. 23.607) is the only other 453
example in early Greek hexameter.
 “By contrast, the aesthetic detachment with which the Phaeacians respond to Odysseus is in keeping with their 454
blissful existence, removed from wandering” (Montiglio (2005, 257)).
 The appearance of the formula at 3.232 may appear to be an exception, but Nestor is saying what he would prefer 455
if he were Odysseus. Algea also appears four times, agreeing with polla (2.343, 3.232, 16.19, 19.483), and it may be 
implied even when it is not used. De Jáuregui 2013.39 discusses the formula’s use when Odysseus is supplicating 
someone.
 The other application of the phrase to Eumaeus (16.19) is discussed below.456
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Eumaeus has a unique understanding of Odysseus. 
 Eumaeus is not merely similar to Odysseus, however. He also fills his role in several 
respects. He takes the best care of Odysseus’ livelihood (οἱ βιότοιο µάλιστα / κήδετο, 14.3-4), 
making improvements to the estate on his own (9).  He tells Odysseus’ Cretan lie for him in an 457
abbreviated form to Telemachus when he appears (16.61-6). He also, as has already been 
observed, fills Odysseus’ role by hosting the beggar as his guest. And here we return at last to 
Eumaeus’ second sacrifice.  Of especial note is the following, fascinating passage: 458
     ‘ἄξεθ᾽ ὑῶν τὸν ἄριστον, ἵνα ξείνῳ ἱερεύσω 
     τηλεδαπῷ· πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοὶ ὀνησόµεθ᾽, οἵ περ ὀϊζὺν 
     δὴν ἔχοµεν πάσχοντες ὑῶν ἕνεκ᾽ ἀργιοδόντων· 
     ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἡµέτερον κάµατον νήποινον ἔδουσιν.’ !
     “Bring the best of the boars, so that I may sacrifice it for the stranger from far away. And we  
     ourselves will also have some enjoyment, who for a long time have had toil, suffering for the 
     sake of the white-tusked swine. And others eat our labour with impunity” (14.414-17). !
This passage is deeply ironic. On the one hand, Eumaeus is surprisingly attempting to be 
subversive. More than one scholar has invoked two Hesiodic parallels, in which the consumption 
of the product of someone else’s toil (kamatos) is the source both of the narrator’s fierce 
disapprobation and of divine anger (Th. 594-602, Op. 298-307).  Nēpoinos, in turn, signifies in 459
the Odyssey that the suitors have inflicted gratuitous harm without paying appropriate 
compensation (poinē).  As A. Edwards points out, “Eumaeus appears to presuppose that an 460
 Also οἱ βιότου περικήδετο νόσφιν ἐόντος (“he took care of his livelihood in his absence,” 14.527). Cf. Penelope’s 457
report that Odysseus instructed her to be mindful of his parents in his absence (ἐµεῦ ἀπονόσφιν ἐόντος, 18.268).
 Petropoulou (1987) argues that this sacrifice is an offering of first fruits, but it has often been seen as anomalous 458
in Homer, perhaps containing classical elements. See Stocking (forthcoming) for a review of the literature.
 A. Edwards (1993, 67-8), Stocking (forthcoming); cf. C. Brown (1997, 75-7) on the ‘bee-woman’ in Semonides 459
(83-93 West²).
 So Stocking (forthcoming). Cf. Wilson (2002, 25) on the Iliad: “the word poinē is used to signify paying back a 460
loss resulting from gratuitous harm, whether in goods or by suffering a corresponding loss.”
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individual, even a slave, ‘owns’ his own physical efforts, and continues to own them even after 
they have been incorporated into another object or animal.”  This, of course, contradicts 461
Eumaeus’ own statement that Odysseus owns this property (14.96-106). He is openly pilfering 
his master’s stores as a kind of revenge against the interlopers in the palace.  The obvious 462
reasons for this are so that he can show the beggar appropriate hospitality in his master’s absence 
and also enjoy a bonus meal himself (πρὸς δ᾽ αὐτοὶ ὀνησόµεθ᾽).  The irony, on the other hand, 463
is manifold. Eumaeus unwittingly steals from his master in order to eat and sacrifice with this 
same master. And he himself fulfils Odysseus’ own ordinary role as host with such an offering, 
albeit still on the very margins of the oikos. This offering sets Eumaeus and Odysseus apart from 
the suitors, who do not sacrifice appropriately (14.94), and honours the beggar.  464
 The final manner in which Eumaeus plays Odysseus’ role is expressed by his reaction to 
the sight of Telemachus on his return from his travels. First, he sees him, and, in his shock, ἐκ δ᾽ 
ἄρα οἱ χειρῶν πέσεν ἄγγεα, τοῖς ἐπονεῖτο / κιρνὰς αἴθοπα οἶνον (“and there fell from his hands 
the vessels with which he was working as he mixed the sparkling wine,” 16.13-14). The wine 
vessels falling from his hands are parallel to the symmetry discussed above, when the sandal falls 
from Eumaeus’ hand (14.34) and the sceptre falls from the beggar’s hand (31). As we 
established, these are the only examples of this phrase occurring in non-martial contexts.  This 465
extends the parallelism established above between Odysseus and Eumaeus to include 
 A. Edwards (1993, 68).461
 Newton (2015) argues that Eumaeus’ theft constitutes a counter-raid against the suitors.462
 On the magnitude of the offering here, see Newton (2015, 259 n. 6).463
 So Stocking (forthcoming).464
 A. Bowie (2013 ad Od. 14.31) suggests Eurycleia’s reaction (19.467-70) as a further parallel, and it may be an 465
abbreviated one.
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Telemachus upon his return. There then follows a remarkable simile: 
         ὡς δὲ πατὴρ ὃν παῖδα φίλα φρονέων ἀγαπάζῃ 
     ἐλθόντ᾽ ἐξ ἀπίης γαίης δεκάτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ, 
     µοῦνον τηλύγετον, τῷ ἐπ᾽ ἄλγεα πολλὰ µογήσῃ, 
     ὣς τότε Τηλέµαχον θεοειδέα δῖος ὑφορβὸς   20 
     πάντα κύσεν περιφύς, ὡς ἐκ θανάτοιο φυγόντα. !
     “And as a loving father welcomes his only, well-beloved son, who has come from a distant  
     land in the tenth year, and for whom he has suffered many woes, so then the godlike  
     swineherd wrapped his arms around godlike Telemachus and kissed him everywhere as if he  
     had escaped death” (16.17-21). !
At first blush, this simile can strike the audience as rather pedestrian, and such has occasionally 
been the interpretation.  The return from a distant land of the only son in the simile evokes the 466
fact that Odysseus, both an only son himself and Telemachus’ actual father, has just returned 
from Troy after many years. But here the situation appears at first to be reversed, as it is 
Odysseus who is to be welcomed by his only son, Telemachus.  This passage is part of a 467
network of similes that stretch over much of the poem. The closest simile to the present one is 
the first to appear in the Odyssey, in which Telemachus addresses Mentes: ξεῖν᾽, ἤτοι µὲν ταῦτα 
φίλα φρονέων ἀγορεύεις, / ὥς τε πατὴρ ᾧ παιδί (“stranger, you say these things in a kindly way, 
like a father to his son,” 1.307-8). Mentes, like Eumaeus, is similar to a father because of his 
 Fränkel (1977, 91), for example, finds little beyond the implication that Eumaeus loves Telemachus so much that 466
his relatively short trip seems like it has taken ten years.
 This apparent reversal of father and son would be difficult to account for. Expanding upon H. Foley’s (1978) 467
argument about reverse gender similes, however, we might hypothesize that the reversal would indicate that 
Telemachus is playing his father’s role as well as possible under the circumstances. And a great deal of scholarship 
has been devoted to showing how Telemachus, as childlike as he is before his departure to the mainland, returns to 
Ithaca willing and able to fill his father’s shoes: H. Clarke (1963), Jaeger (1965, 29-34), Austin (1969), Roisman 
(1994), Heath (2001, 136-44), and Toher (2001, 149-53). Wissmann (2009, 424-5), on the other hand, protests that 
“it is unclear what Telemachus  … was supposed to learn from his trip.” And Gottesman (2014) prefers to think of 
Telemachus constructing authority rather than growing up. Some support for this reading of the present reverse 
simile may be found in the fact that Telemachus later uses a similar one when he describes Nestor’s welcome in 
terms similar to Eumaeus’ (17.110-12). It is noteworthy in this light that the two similes occur after and not before 
Telemachus’ return. However, as I will argue below, this simile probably defies such a straightforward explanation.
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kindliness (φίλα φρονέων).  On this note, Felson has convincingly argued that one of the major 468
themes in the Odyssey is the effectiveness of the kind and gentle father as opposed to one who 
opts for more of an Oedipal relationship with his son. And in the poem, Odysseus is the 
paradigm of the ēpios patēr (‘gentle father’).  This point is made by Telemachus, Mentor, and 469
Athena, all of whom say that Odysseus ruled over (βασίλευε or ἄνασσε) his people like an ēpios 
patēr (2.47 = 234, 5.12).  Hence Telemachus’ sarcastic rebuke of the suitor Antinous, saying 470
that he must care for him well, like a father for a son (µευ καλὰ πατὴρ ὣς κήδεαι υἷος), when he 
encourages him to remove a stranger from his house (17.397-9). Such advice is hardly the mark 
of an ēpios man, and the implication is that Antinous probably cannot expect to match 
Telemachus’ real father.  Returning to Eumaeus, as we noted above, O. Patterson has shown 471
that the ideal of the gentle father can easily be mapped onto the gentle basileus or slave-
master.  And indeed Eumaeus refers to Odysseus as ēpios (14.139), a description which the 472
beggar is happy to reinforce (15.489-90). But Eumaeus himself shares this quality to a certain 
extent as well. Athena, Telemachus, and the narrator all describe him as having kindly thoughts 
(ἤπια οἶδε(ν)/εἰδώς) about members of Odysseus’ oikos (13.405, 15.39, 557).  This phrase has a 473
meaning very similar to the φίλα φρονέων of the present passage. Eumaeus remains a kindly, 
 Podlecki (1971, 82) suggests that this simile extends to Odysseus because of his close connection to Athena.468
 Felson (2002b). Nestor also fills such a role (15.152, 17.111-12). Contrast Agamemnon’s imperative to Odysseus 469
in the underworld: τῷ νῦν µή ποτε καὶ σὺ γυναικί περ ἤπιος εἶναι (“therefore, from now on don’t you too ever be 
kind, even to your wife,” 11.441). Cf. also the sarcastic remarks of Mentor (2.230) and Athena (5.8).
 During Hector’s funeral in the Iliad, Helen says that Priam is like an ēpios patēr to her (24.770). Interestingly, 470
ēpios patēr is not attested outside of a simile. Odysseus himself says in somewhat passive-aggressive terms that 
Athena at least used to be kindly disposed towards him (µοι πάρος ἠπίη ἦσθα, 13.314). On Athena’s disposition 
towards Odysseus in the Odyssey, see Clay (1983, 9-53).
 So Fränkel (1977, 90).471
 Cf. de Romilly (1979, 16): “la douceur que (ἤπιος) exprime est le fait due père envers ses enfants et, par 472
extension, du roi envers ceux dont il a la charge.”
 On eidenai with a neuter plural adjective to express an attitude in Homer, see Sullivan (1988, 95-8).473
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paternal presence even for a relatively mature Telemachus.  474
 We also have in this simile the second appearance of polla mogein used of Eumaeus. 
Here, however, there is a unique restriction of this phrase to suffering on behalf of another (τῷ 
ἐπ᾽), namely the long lost son. So, while the phrase again reflects an overlapping of Eumaeus and 
Odysseus, it is limited to a particular member or members of Odysseus’ oikos, like ēpia eidenai 
above. This implies that at least some of the overlap between Odysseus and Eumaeus is confined 
to Odysseus’ oikos. Odysseus is like an ēpios patēr for his people (e.g. λαῶν, 5.12), whereas 
Eumaeus only plays this role in a relatively domestic setting. And finally we find that Eumaeus’ 
embracing and kissing (κύσεν περιφύς) Telemachus can be compared to the greeting of Odysseus 
by Amphithea, his maternal grandmother (περιφῦσ’ Ὀδυσῆϊ / κύσσ’, 19.416-17). Closer parallels, 
however, may be found in Odysseus’ both contemplating and then actually kissing and 
embracing Laertes (µερµήριξε… / κύσσαι καὶ περιφῦναι ἑὸν πατέρ’, 24.235-6; κύσσε δέ µιν 
περιφὺς ἐπιάλµενος, 320) at the end of the poem. We observe both that, as in the present passage, 
the latter examples appear at the beginning of the line and not the end, and that they take an 
accusative as opposed to a dative object. This similarity leads me to my final point about the 
present simile. Scholars have frequently read it as a ‘reverse simile.’ They observe, as above, that 
the comparandum is Odysseus, the father, who is to be welcomed by his son and not his father.  475
But Odysseus will also be greeted at the end of the poem by Laertes, who has similarly suffered 
for a long time on behalf of his only son. We note, on the other hand, that he will not do the 
kissing and hugging but will be the recipient of his son’s affection. And there is little doubt that 
 Although one must be wary of the documentary fallacy, Severyns (1929) argues with some reason that Eumaeus 474
must be understood to be younger than Odysseus, but of the same generation. 
 Podlecki (1971, 82), Moulton (1977, 132-3), H. Foley (1978, 8), de Jong (2001 ad Od. 16.17-21).475
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the relationship between Odysseus and Telemachus is also to be read into the simile, given their 
physical proximity on its occasion. I would argue, however, that it is all three living generations 
of Odysseus’ patriline who are referenced in this simile.  It is the fragility of a line of single 476
sons that is the point. Note, for example, the emphasis achieved in the present passage through 
the similarity between τηλύγετον and Τηλέµαχον, which both scan in the same way, have an 
accent on the antepenult, and appear in the same metrical position in consecutive lines. 
Telemachus is, of course, prominent in his family’s affection because he is an only son (µοῦνον); 
as is Odysseus.  Eumaeus’ reaction in the present simile highlights the fragility of Laertes’ line 477
and the euphoria in response to its preservation. The simile also inserts Eumaeus into this line – 
not in the sense that he occupies a spot on the family tree, but rather in that he duplicates some of 
these familial roles and potentially benefits from them as well. That Odysseus can only stand by 
and watch while his double celebrates as he himself cannot is perhaps the most poignant 
expression of the distance he still has to travel to return to the centre of his oikos. 
 When, in the event of their success, Odysseus promises to make Eumaeus a companion of 
Telemachus and his son (21.214-16), there is certainly a degree of cynical manipulation on his 
part. Odysseus is using a technique that we can still observe today, according to which the master 
takes advantage of the ideology of ‘pseudo-kinship’ to reinforce the social death of his slaves. 
And, as we have seen from the language he uses, Eumaeus is invested in Odysseus’ oikos in a 
manner consistent with the successful application of this technique. But we cannot so easily 
dismiss this relatedness, and Odysseus himself is not untouched by this process. He has a double 
 So Suksi (forthcoming).476
 Cf. Il. 9.482, as well as Telemachus’ observation that his patriline is marked by single sons (Od. 16.113-20); cf. 477
Goldhill (2010) and Eur. Andr. 1083.
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in Eumaeus, who both shares and reflects much of his past, his role, what could have been, and 
his current, uncertain situation. In this slave, Odysseus finds the first and in some ways the only 
mortal who can identify with his position. This mutual identification becomes more and more 
acute in the latter half of the poem until it reaches its climax in the simile at the beginning of 
Book 16, when Eumaeus is inserted by way of comparison into Odysseus’ role as the only son of 
Laertes and the father of the only son, Telemachus. Although Eumaeus is the focalizer in this 
simile, Odysseus is nevertheless the sympathetic figure, witnessing another man play his role, a 
role which has long been an integral element of his own identity, but which also has long been at 
a remove. In this remarkable passage, the audience experiences the uncanny most poignantly.  478
This simile is also the most effective example of the other most important function of the double, 
which, as we have noted above, is to represent that tension which is pertinent to the primary 
figure. In this case, the major tension is Odysseus’ inability to be himself, especially in the 
presence of his longed-for philoi, such as, for example, his son. Eumaeus, on the other hand, is 
under no such constraint, and so he plays Odysseus’ role, even to the point of telling his Cretan 
tale for him. Of course Odysseus is able to reveal himself to his son in short order (16.172-212), 
but he is still only able to do so temporarily. We find, then, that Eumaeus has a remarkable role to 
play in the Odyssey. He duplicates and elucidates Odysseus on the margins of his oikos. He is the 
first kin he meets on his return. He represents the gap Odysseus must span if he is truly to 
become himself again. 
!
 Cf. Freud’s (1955, 227) definition of the uncanny as that “which leads back to something long known to us, once 478
very familiar.” Odysseus left home when Telemachus was very young, but his identity as the young man’s father 
nonetheless remains important to him even in the tradition of the Iliad (2.258-60, 4.350-5).
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CHAPTER THREE: PHOENIX AND ACHILLES AS EXILES 
 More than any other figure, the exile reveals the extent to which kinship is elastic in 
Homer.  It was partly for this reason that I used Phoenix as an illustrative example in the 479
introduction, showing how kinship is to a large extent a matter of perspective. In this chapter, I 
expand this treatment, looking first at the concept of exile as it appears in Homer. To discuss this 
subject at length requires some justification. E. Bowie has recently demonstrated that there is no 
developed “rhetoric of exile” in early Greek poetry.  And, as I will show, this point is 480
reinforced by the fact that there is only one extremely rare word in early epic for the exile, 
namely metanastēs. However, I will quibble with E. Bowie inasmuch as, despite the relative 
infrequency and brevity with which the exile receives mention in early Greek poetry, there is a 
fairly developed rhetoric of exile in particular contexts, most notably in Phoenix’ lengthy speech 
to Achilles (Il. 9.434-605).  The story of Phoenix’ departure from his natal oikos and his 481
incorporation into a new one far away is effective in part because it is underpinned by a typology 
of exile that we can observe in miniature ubiquitously in early Greek poetry. Phoenix’ identity as 
exile and incorporated member of Achilles’ family is the ultimate persuasive basis of his speech, 
and it relies on an understanding of how exile stories usually proceed. In particular, the audience 
can easily appreciate that the sterilization of Phoenix by Amyntor and Phoenix’ subsequent 
avoidance of patricide through going into exile is a variation of the murder-and-flight motif, 
according to which a hero murders a member of his community, is forced into exile, and resettles 
elsewhere. But the whole significance of Phoenix’ use of his own story cannot fully be 
 This is not to say that slavery is preferable to exile: cf. Thgn. 1211-16.479
 E. Bowie (2007, 22).480
 On rhetoric in Homer, see most recently Knudsen (2014).481
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appreciated without situating it in its rhetorical context. As I will argue, Phoenix, in his speech to 
Achilles, appropriates the unenviable lot of the exile as a disincentive. He paradoxically subverts 
the typology of exile to recast Achilles as one himself should he decide to return home. We learn 
from Phoenix’ brilliant speech just how mobile the concepts of family and home can be. 
Although Achilles rejects Phoenix’ rhetoric, it would be possible for him to conceive of the 
Achaean camp as his home and Agamemnon as a father figure, especially if he should marry one 
of his daughters. 
 Exile, emigration, and wandering are ubiquitous in ancient Greek literature, a 
preoccupation which is reflected by the steady flow of scholarship on the subject.  To a certain 482
degree, one must agree with Murray, who says of early Greece that “all Hellas was ἀνάστατος, 
driven from its home by the constant war paths and uprootings of peoples.”  For example, R. 483
Parker, in his study of ritual pollution, finds no less than 53 people exiled for murder alone in 
Greek myth.  This ubiquity is exacerbated by the fact that, as E. Saïd has famously 484
acknowledged, just about anyone may be considered an exile in a certain sense or from a certain 
point of view.  Seneca the Younger defines exilium as “a change of place” (loci commutatio, 485
Dial. 12.6.1).  And he is even concerned that he might seem to restrict the sense (angustare 486
 Including only major works from the last decade or so, we have Forsdyke (2005), Montiglio (2005), Perry 482
(2010), Garland (2014), and two collections: Gaertner (2007) and Hunter and Rutherford (2009).
 Murray (1934, 207); so Garland (2014, 133).483
 Parker (1983, 375-92). See Forsdyke (2005, 30-79) for several case-studies of exile in the Archaic Period. Also 484
see E. Bowie (2007, 27-49) on the figure of the exile in non-epic poetry of the Archaic Period. J. Roisman (1984-6) 
summarizes the evidence on exile from the Archaic Period in general. Grasmück (1978) and Seibert (1979) are the 
most exhaustive treatments of the subject in antiquity generally.
 E. Saïd (2000, 179-81). Cf. Plutarch’s interpretation in the de Exilio (607d) of Emp. DK 31 B 115: οὐχ ἑαὐτὸν, 485
ἀλλ᾽ ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ πάντας ἀποδείκνυσι µετανάστας ἐνταῦθα καὶ ξένους καὶ φυγάδας ἡµᾶς ὄντας (“he indicates not 
himself, but that, starting with him, all of us here are migrants and strangers and exiles”). 
 Quoted in Perry (2010, 1). I am aware that exilium cannot be equated entirely with Greek terms for exile, like 486
phygē: Grasmück (1978, 20-9 and 64-102), Montiglio (2005, 30), Gaertner (2007, 2-3). But the two languages 
conceive of the idea in manners that are similar enough for the very general point I am making at the moment.
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videar vim, ibid.) of the term with such a simple definition. After all, exile is both a complex 
concept and one that can very easily be extended metaphorically. The earliest Greek example of 
this kind of metaphorical extension of which I am aware occurs in Hesiod, who says of his father 
that he left Cyme and sailed to Boeotia, οὐκ ἄφενος φεύγων οὐδὲ πλοῦτόν τε καὶ ὄλβον, / ἀλλὰ 
κακὴν πενιὴν, τὴν Ζεὺς ἄνδρεσσι δίδωσιν (“not in flight from riches or wealth and happiness, 
but from dire poverty, which Zeus gives to men,” Op. 637-8). Hesiod’s father is conceived of as 
driven from his native land by poverty. Obviously this cannot literally be true. The poet is 
mapping the concept of involuntary exile onto leaving one’s homeland in search of a more 
prosperous life.  As various as the uses of exile can be in discourse, whether it be in antiquity 487
or today, however, I intend to restrict my focus in the present chapter to literal exile, namely the 
migration of a person or persons caused by their forcible or legally enforced removal, or flight 
from anticipated violence or oppression in their homeland. This definition corresponds more 
closely to one usage of the Greek phygē (‘flight’), or even the Latin exilium (‘exile’), than the 
modern ‘exile’, which is generally restricted to “involuntary departure, sanctioned by political or 
judicial authorities.”  As implied by my definition, phygē can also apply to voluntary departure 488
in the sense that flight from anticipated violence or oppression is voluntary. Today we might call 
a person in the latter situation a refugee or a fugitive. My reason for studying the literal exile or 
fugitive alone is that his situation is more straightforwardly pertinent to kinship relations than the 
 Cf. Ephorus FGrH 70 F 100 = Σ ad Hes. Op. 633 Pertusi: Ἔφορος δέ φησιν τοῦτον εἰς Ἄσκρην ἐλθεῖν, οὐ δι᾽ 487
ἐµπορίαν ἀλλὰ φόνον ἐµφύλιον ἐργασάµενον (“Ephorus [of Cyme] says that this man [Hesiod’s father] went to 
Ascra not because of trade, but because he had killed a kinsman”). Obviously we have no reason to believe Ephorus 
here: M. West (1978 ad Hes. Op. 638). But his assertion that murder, namely the most common cause of exile in 
epic poetry, was what drove Hesiod’s father from home perhaps helps to show how easily one thinks of exile in this 
passage. See below on Arist. fr. 524 Rose and for more on the metanastēs. According to Martin (1992, 16-17), 
Hesiod’s father’s identity as an immigrant also contributes to his rhetorical position as outsider. See Seibert (1979, 
2-3) on the difficulty of distinguishing between the two basic meanings of phygē, namely ‘flight’ and ‘exile,’ in 
particular contexts.
 Gaertner (2007, 2).488
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various metaphorical extensions turn out to be. 
 One potential problem with studying the figure of the exile in early epic is that, as 
opposed to the case of the nothos and the dmōs, etc., there is no ready term for the exile in early 
Greek poetry. The usual later word, phygas, is not attested in early epic.  Alētēs (‘wanderer’), 489
derived from alaomai (‘to wander’), only appears in earlier poetry in the latter half of the 
Odyssey and in an elegiac fragment of the late-Archaic poet Asius (fr. 14.1 West). Montiglio says 
of alētēs that it embraces a range of roles from the outcast to the “inquisitive traveler.”  But in 490
the Odyssey and Asius its meaning is fairly specific. In the Odyssey, only the disguised Odysseus 
(17.483, 576-8, 18.18, 20.377, 21.400) and the beggar Irus (18.25, 333 = 393) are called alētai. 
The disguised Odysseus is hardly an outcast. His story is that he escaped kidnapping and 
enslavement (14.337-59). Odysseus portrays a man who is wandering because of bad luck, not 
because he fled his home or because he would be persona non grata there. He is technically free, 
but, as someone who wanders, he is a kind of slave to his belly (gastēr, 15.344-6, 17.286-9, 
473-4, 18.53-4, 376-80), a motif that occurs in the Odyssey long before Athena disguises 
Odysseus (6.130-4, 7.216-21).  Turning to Irus, while we do not get his backstory, his 491
description nonetheless accords with our understanding of the disguised Odysseus’ professed 
story. Irus is also a beggar (πτωχός, 18.1; πτωχεύεσκ᾽, 18.2) and the only legitimate figure (as 
opposed to the disguised Odysseus) on Ithaca who is not tied to an oikos (πανδήµιος, 18.1). He 
wanders about, delivering messages on command (18.7), and, in return, he seems to be fed fairly 
 For the vocabulary of exile in the Classical Period and beyond, see Forsdyke (2005, 9-12).489
 Montiglio (2005, 3).490
 See Russo (1992 ad Od. 18.44) and Crotty (1994, 130-59) on this motif. Pucci (1987, 173-82) argues that the 491
gastēr is treated as a base version of the Iliadic thūmos (‘disposition’) when Odysseus is in disguise. Bakker (2010) 
develops this thesis, arguing that, like the Iliadic thūmos, Odysseus’ gastēr impels him to complete his nostos 
(‘homecoming’).
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generously when he comes begging (18.1-3). Here the needs of the gastēr are similarly 
emphasized (18.2-3). The difference is that, while Odysseus is a slave to his gastēr out of 
necessity, Irus’ is described as ‘greedy’ (µάργη, 18.2).  For this reason, Irus has sometimes been 492
seen as an early anticipation of the parasītos, the comic layabout who “gnaws away ceaselessly 
and destructively at other people’s substance.”  So, both the beggar and Irus are wanderers in 493
the sense that circumstances force them to wander around and beg for food and shelter. This can 
result in disrespect and mockery (18.32-50, 99-100). But they are clearly not outcasts; they are 
vagrants.  494
 Asius in turn presents a colourful picture: 
      
     χωλός, στιγµατίης, πολυγήραος, ἶσος ἀλήτῃ 
          ἦλθε κνισοκόλαξ, εὖτε Μέλης ἐγάµει, 
     ἄκλητος, ζωµοῦ κεχρηµένος· ἐν δὲ µέσοισιν 
          ἥρως εἱστήκει βορβόρου ἐξαναδύς· !
     “Crippled, tattooed, very old, like a wanderer came the fat-flatterer, uninvited, in need of  
     soup, when Meles was getting married. And in the middle stood a hero emerged from mud” 
     (fr. 14 West = fr. 14 Gentili-Prato ap. Ath. 3.125b-d).  495!
Much about this fragment is uncertain, and this will likely remain the case. The security of the 
text is a matter of debate.  And it is unclear whether the fat-flatterer is also the subject of the 496
 So C. Brown (2006, 38 n. 14): “in this way Irus serves as a foil to the returning hero.”492
 Tylawsky (2002, 7-16), who proposes Irus and Odysseus as the first clear examples of this character-type; so also 493
Iannucci (2004, 372-3). Thalmann (1998a, 100-1) and Steiner (2010 ad Od. 18.1-100) see Irus alone as a forerunner 
of this figure. Nagy (1999, 228-32) argues that Irus is to be associated with the related figure of the glutton in blame 
poetry. And of course the suitors are also important early figures of gluttony: S. Saïd (1979), C. Brown (2006, 38).
 For further comparison between the beggar and Irus, see Pucci (1987, 177-8). Hammer (1997, 346) and Horden 494
and Purcell (2000, 385) suggest that this sort of figure would not have been uncommon for most of the human 
history of the Mediterranean.
 On the stigma (‘tattoo-mark’), see Jones (1987).495
 Kaibel follows Bergk in suggesting Ἶρος ἀλήτης (“Irus, a wanderer”) in place of ἶσος ἀλήτῃ in the first line of 496
the fragment, a line ending which is attested at Od. 18.25. This emendation holds some attraction, but it must remain 
speculative.
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last clause.  If he is, he is rather an odd figure for a hero. But it is clear enough from the 497
vocabulary used to describe him (κνισοκόλαξ… ζωµοῦ κεχρηµένος) that he is a glutton.  And 498
the fact that he is uninvited (presumably to Meles’ wedding) seems to suggest that he is an 
intruder. A parallel to this figure may be found as early as Archilochus (fr. 124b).  In this sense, 499
the knisokolax in the Asius fragment is dissimilar to the alētai in the Odyssey inasmuch as they 
seem to be accepted – or at least tolerated – not as invited guests but as an unfortunate reality. 
The knisokolax, however, is not an alētēs but rather is like (ἶσος) an alētēs. I interpret this to 
mean that he shows up like an alētēs would, namely uninvited and with the intention of 
consuming food. The difference is that, while the alētēs is at least tolerated, the knisokolax is 
little more than an intruder. This fragment of Asius helps to confirm that the alētēs is not an 
outcast or an exile so much as a kind of vagrant who lives on the margins of his community and 
relies on others for sustenance.  Because of the extreme marginality of this figure, he will only 500
be of use to us as a contrast in this chapter. If the alētēs does have kin, as Odysseus’ beggar does, 
they are far away. Because they are wanderers, no one seems to claim any relatedness with them. 
 The term metanastēs, the subject of a fair amount of scholarship, has also been translated 
 Edmunds (1981, 229-30) argues contra Wilamowitz that he is. But he agrees with Wilamowitz that he is a 497
revenant.
 The context of the fragment’s quotation in Athenaeus seems to indicate that Athenaeus sees the κνισοκόλαξ in 498
this light as well, as Iannucci (2004, 370-1) shows.
 Cf. especially πολλὸν δὲ πίνων καὶ χαλίκρητον µέθυ… οὐδὲ µὲν κληθεὶς <u – x> ἦλθες (“drinking much and 499
unmixed wine… and you came uninvited,” 1-3). See C. Brown (2006, 37-8), who compares Pericles, the subject of 
this fragment, to Irus in the Odyssey. He also provides further early examples of gluttons (39 n. 21).
 It is possible that the term came to be a poetical form of phygas by the Classical Period: φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ 500
ἀλήτης, Emp. DK 31 B115.13; φυγὰς δ᾽ ἀλήτης τῆσδε γῆς ἀπόξενος, A. Ag. 1282; cf. ἐγὼ δ᾽ ἀλήτης τῆσδε γῆς 
ἀπόξενος, Ch. 1042, although the text is uncertain (Garvie (1986 ad Ch. 1042-3)). It is unclear whether the 
combination of φυγάς and ἀλήτης is a pleonasm, as the LSJ entry (s.v. ἀλήτης) would imply, or if it is a hendiadys, 
with ἀλήτης standing in for ἀλώµενος vel sim. (cf. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ πατρῴας φυγὰς ἀλητεύων χθονός, Eur. Hipp. 1048, with 
alēteuein being a denominal form of alētēs (Beekes (2010 s.v. ἀλάοµαι))). But it is tolerably clear that, by the first 
half of the fifth century, the alētēs could be an exile. Garvie (1986 ad A. Ch. 1042-3) observes that alētēs only 
occurs in Aeschylus on the two lines quoted above. He seems to presume that the lines should be read as mutually 
allusive, which is sensible considering their similarity, an unusual feature in Aeschylus.
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as ‘exile’ or ‘outcast’. But there are different schools of thought on this. In terms of etymology, 
the apparently ancient derivation from µετ-ανα-στῆ-ναι (e.g. Hdt. 9.51.3) is generally rejected, 
and *µετα-ναι-ειν is now favoured (cf. νάσθη, Il. 14.119).  So, etymologically, at least, a 501
metanastēs would originally have been a migrant. If this is correct, then, as Leumann observes, 
metanastēs is roughly cognate with metanaietēs (‘fellow dweller’, Hes. Th. 401) and 
metanaietān (‘to dwell with’, H.Dem. 87).  Two interpretations have arisen from this 502
etymology. The first is that the metanastēs is a wanderer, someone who has left his natal 
community but failed to find welcome in a new one.  The second is that he is a former exile, an 503
immigrant, who has failed fully to incorporate himself into his new community.  While the 504
former interpretation is favoured by a potential Mycenaean etymology,  the latter is universally 505
supported by every subsequent use of the term prior to the death of Alexander. This interpretation 
would mean that metanastēs is more or less synonymous with the later metoikos (‘settler from 
abroad,’ ‘metic’), although not with all of the technical meanings that the latter came to have.  506
And it appears to have gone unnoticed that the ancient and Byzantine lexicographers uniformly 
make precisely this comparison, presumably drawing it from a common source (µετανάστης· 
µέτοικος, φυγάς, Apollon. Lex. s.v. µετανάστης = Lexica Segueriana s.v. = Phot. s.v. [µ 325 
 For *µετα-ναι-ειν, see Leumann (1950, 183 n. 30), Hofmann (1966 s.v.), Chantraine (1968-80 s.v. µετανάστης), 501
Frisk (1970 s.v.), Beekes (2010 s.v.), contra e.g. LSJ s.v.
 Leumann (1950, 183).502
 So Chantraine (1968-80 s.v.), Adkins (1972, 14), Schlunk (1976, 205-6), Hainsworth (1993 ad Il. 9.648), 503
Hammer (1997, 344-7), Perry (2010, 27-8), Garland (2014, 17).
 Leaf (1900-02 ad Il. 9.648), Calhoun (1962, 434), Arieti (1986, 23-4), Martin (1992, 18), Kelly (2008, 197), 504
Tsagalis (2008, 123), Beekes (2010 s.v.), Alden (2012, 115). H. Mackie’s (1996, 147-9) position on this question is 
unclear.
 Bartonĕk (2003, 184 and 376-84).505
 On the status of the metic in Classical Athens, see Kamen (2013, 43-54). Unlike the metic, the metanastēs cannot 506
be a freed slave. See also (Beekes 2010 s.v. µετανάστης), who describes the word as “an old parallel formation to 
Att. µέτ-οικος”; so Wackernagel (1957, vol. 2, 246-7).
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Theodoridis] = Synagoge s.v. = Suid. s.v. [µ 714 Adler]).  Herodotus reports the opinion that 507
the Athenians are the only Greeks who are not metanastai (µοῦναι δὲ ἐόντες οὐ µετανάσται 
Ἑλλήνων, 7.161.3). The point is that some people, or at least the Athenians themselves by the 
time of the Classical Period, seem to have thought of the Athenians as autochthonous (Pi. I. 
2.18-22, Eur. fr. 360 7-13 Kannicht, Hdt. 1.56.2, Th. 1.2.5, 2.36.1).  In other words, the rest of 508
the Greeks came from somewhere else and settled. So metanastēs in this passage corresponds to 
the second interpretation, since by and large the other major Greek populations have settled.  509
Similarly Aristotle transmits the opinion that Hesiod’s father was a metanastēs who came from 
Cyme (τὸν δὲ πατέρα φησὶ µετανάστην γενέσθαι ἐκ τῆς Κύµης ἐλθόντα, fr. 524 Rose = Procl. fr. 
227 Marzillo = Σ ad Hes. Op. 633-40 Pertusi). And we know from the Hesiodic corpus (Op. 
639-40) that his father is supposed to have settled in Boeotia. Again the metanastēs seems to 
have found a new home. Although none of this evidence is conclusive with respect to the Archaic 
Period or early Greek hexameter, these later sources all seem to have interpreted in a consistent 
way what was an archaism at the time (although it did not remain so). So the balance of 
probability is in favour of the metanastēs being a kind of resident alien. Such a figure would be 
ideal for our purposes. Unfortunately the term only appears twice in the relevant corpus, with 
each example being used in the same formula and of the same situation (Il. 9.648, 16.59).  510
 Cf. Hsch. s.v. µετανάσται [µ 1029 Latte]· *µέτοικοι ASvgn. φυγάδες vg(AN). σύµµαχοι. Arist. Pol. 1278a is also 507
highly suggestive, esp. ὥσπερ καὶ Ὅµηρος ἐποίησεν ‘ὡς εἴ τιν᾽ ἀτίµητον µετανάστην’ [Il. 9.648 = 16.59]· ὥσπερ 
µέτοικος γάρ ἐστιν ὁ τῶν τιµῶν µὴ µετέχων (“just as Homer said, ‘like some metanastēs without status’; for in the 
same way the metic is one who has no share of honours”). See also the comparanda in Theodoridis’ edition of 
Photius [µ 325]. Σ M ad Arat. 457 Martin, on the other hand, compares the planets (πλάνητες), which always 
wander, to metanastai.
 See Cohen (2000, 81-4) for further examples of this idea in the fourth century.508
 So Wackernagel (1957, vol. 2, 246), who translates Herodotus’ usage here as Umsiedler.509
 Martin (1992, 18-21) and Alden (2012) argue that figures like Phoenix are ‘metanastic,’ meaning that, as 510
metanastai, they occupy privileged, advisory rolls. Unfortunately neither Phoenix nor any other figure is actually 
referred to as a metanastēs in our text.
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 We can see that, with the extremely rare exception of metanastēs, there is no noun for the 
exile in early epic. But there are undoubtedly exiles all the same. To get a sense of the 
vocabulary that is used, let us consider Theoclymenus’ report of his situation to Telemachus in 
the Odyssey, a report which is typical in many ways: 
     ‘οὕτω τοι καὶ ἐγὼν ἐκ πατρίδος, ἄνδρα κατακτὰς 
     ἔµφυλον· πολλοὶ δὲ κασίγνητοί τε ἔται τε 
     Ἄργος ἀν᾽ ἱππόβοτον, µέγα δὲ κρατέουσιν Ἀχαιῶν· 
     τῶν ὑπαλευάµενος θάνατον καὶ κῆρα µέλαιναν 
     φεύγω, ἐπεί νύ µοι αἶσα κατ᾽ ἀνθρώπους ἀλάλησθαι. 
     ἀλλά µε νηὸς ἔφεσσαι, ἐπεί σε φυγὼν ἱκέτευσα, 
     µὴ µε κατακτείνωσι· διωκέµεναι γὰρ ὀίω.’ !
     “‘So I too am away from my fatherland, since I slew a member of my band.  And he had  511
     many brothers and kinsmen  throughout horse-feeding Argos, and they are greatly powerful 512
     over the Achaeans. I got beyond their reach and am fleeing death and a dark fate, since now it  
     is my lot to wander among men. But put me on board your ship, since I have supplicated you  
     in my flight so that they won’t kill me. For I think they are chasing me’” (Od. 15.272-8). !
Theoclymenus is in the midst of the process that the typical exile undergoes in early Greek 
hexameter. This process can include as many as five steps, but it is often highly abbreviated 
when it is reported. Theoclymenus’ case is useful because it always features the most common 
vocabulary. The first step is the event that precipitates the flight. Theoclymenus murders a 
member of his band, which is the most frequent first step in this poetry. Of the possibly twenty 
exiles in early epic, at least thirteen flee as a direct consequence of having murdered someone, 
namely Tlepolemus (Il. 2.661-70), Medon (13.694-7=15.333-6), Lycophron (15.430-2), Epeigeus 
(16.571-4), Patroclus (23.83-90), the generic exile in the last simile of the Iliad (24.480-2), 
Odysseus in his lying tale to Athena (Od. 13.256-86), an unnamed Aetolian (14.379-85), 
 On the phȳlon as a band, see Donlan (1985, 295-8).511
 Gates (1971, 28-9) persuasively argues contra Stagakis (1968) that etēs probably means something like 512
‘kinsman’ rather than ‘friend’.
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Odysseus’ hypothetical exile (23.118-20), Amphitryon (Hes. fr. 195.11-15 M-W), Hyettus (fr. 
257), Achilles (Aeth. arg. Bernabé), and Tydeus (Alcmaeonis fr. 4 Bernabé; cf. Il. 14.119-25).  513
Some form or compound of kteinein (‘to kill’) is used in all of these examples, except in the case 
of Epeigeus (ἐξεναρίξας (literally ‘having despoiled’), Il. 16.573). The second step is the actual 
departure from home, usually, as in Theoclymenus’ case, because of fear, although anger is also 
possible (Il. 2.628-9, Od. 15.253-4). As here, this departure is often marked by pheugein (‘to 
flee,’ Il. 2.665, 9.448, 478, Od. 13.259, 23.120, Hes. fr. 257.3 M-W), and we also see reference to 
movement away from one’s patris gaia (‘fatherland’, Il. 13.696 = 15.335, 24.480, Od. 23.120, 
Hes. fr. 195.12 M-W). The third step consists of wandering, presumably in search of a new 
home. The vocabulary in this step can vary widely (cf. Il. 6.200-2, Od. 13.272-86), and it is often 
omitted altogether. The fourth step is the arrival at a potential new home, a step which sometimes 
involves the supplication of a basileus. Hiketeuein (‘to supplicate’) can be used, as with 
Theoclymenus in the present passage (so Il. 16.574, Hes. fr. 195.13 M-W; cf. Il. 24.478-84).  514
The fifth and final step is the acceptance of the exile into his new home. Theoclymenus has not 
yet reached this point, and whether he will is a question that the Odyssey leaves open. But nearly 
all of the other exiles do find one. On the other hand, any or all of the last four steps can be 
summarized by a simple naiein (‘to inhabit’, Il. 13.695 = 15.334, Hes. fr. 195.14 M-W) or 
aponaiein (‘to resettle’, Il. 2.629, Od. 15.254). We see, then, that, while there are some common 
 The poet does not say why Bellerophon goes into exile (Il. 200-3), which Alden (2000, 137) interprets as 513
suggesting “that divine favour is capricious.” And Hes. fr. 43a.81-91 is too fragmentary to tell if his exile is even 
mentioned. In Pi. I. 7.43-8, he is punished for trying to ascend to the dwellings of the sky (ἐς οὐρανοῦ σταθµούς, 
45). See Gantz (1993, 313-16) for later traditions on Bellerophon. In any case, the Iliadic passage is awkward and 
frequently the subject of grave doubts: Graziosi and Haubold (2010 ad Il. 6.200-2). But see D’Alfonso (2008) on 
this whole question in more detail.
 Interestingly, neither gounazesthai nor lissesthai are ever used. This is probably because hiketeuein is the most 514
humbling form of supplication and is often used to refer to the initiation of xenia (‘guest-friendship’): Gould (1973), 
Alden (2000, 281-92), Naiden (2006, 8-18).
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lexical items and even phrases in various passages, the only word or phrase that appears in even 
a small majority of cases is kteinein, which is hardly a rare verb in a poem like the Iliad, or even 
in the Odyssey. In addition, although we find that many of the five steps may be observed in the 
stories of many of the exiles, it is only in Phoenix’ narrative (Il. 9.444-95) that we see them all. It 
is also possible that, for example in Tlepolemus’ case (2.661-70), some of these steps are not 
simply omitted but are understood not to have occurred.  All the same, this five-step model will 515
be useful as a typology. 
 Since the interaction between Phoenix and Achilles is the most complete, it will stand as 
our central case study in this chapter. The context in which it appears is difficult and vexing from 
a textual point of view. The major passages featuring Phoenix in Book 9 of the Iliad feature two 
of the most infamous cruces in all of Homer. To begin with, there are the notorious duals used 
apparently to refer to two or more of Phoenix, Odysseus, Ajax, and even possibly the heralds 
Odius and Eurybates (9.182-204). This problem has been the subject of a more than ample 
amount of study, and there is no need to revisit it all in too much detail here.  It must be noted, 516
however, that, of the nine traditional schools of approach to these duals as outlined by Scodel, six 
argue that Phoenix is left out or at least taken for granted. And all three of the remaining theories 
have received little support on account of their dubious nature.  The reason that Phoenix is left 517
out is generally seen to be either on account of his status being too low or his being simply taken 
 So Garland (2014, 131-2) on Tlepolemus in the Iliad.515
 See Scodel (2002, 160-7) for an admirable and exhaustive summary of the scholarship, adding Louden (2002 and 516
2006, 120-34).
 Scodel (2002, 162-3). She herself argues that the duals refer to Odysseus and Ajax, “and the narrator used them 517
in order to cause perplexity” (170). Nagy (1999, 49-55) suggests that Phoenix is left out prior to the embassy’s 
arrival at Achilles’ tent, at which point Odysseus is left out. That Phoenix is not a proper member of the embassy is 
also a frequent claim in the scholia: Σ A ad Il. 9.168, 169, 180, 182, 192, 197, bT ad 9.168 Erbse.
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for granted because he is so closely associated with Achilles.  While Odysseus and Ajax 518
certainly have higher standing than Phoenix, Phoenix nonetheless retains an acknowledgeable 
status, ruling over the Dolopians (Δολόπεσσιν ἀνάσσων) on the furthest edges of Phthia 
(9.484).  This plethora of theories goes to show how tenuously Phoenix has often been seen to 519
fit into the poem, from antiquity until today. He was a favourite target of the analyst school, 
featuring, for example, as the key argument in Page’s rearguard defense of this outmoded 
approach.  Page’s argumentation is extreme, but his basic point that Phoenix’ appearance in 520
Iliad 9 is awkward is undeniable.  In addition to the duals, why is Phoenix never mentioned 521
before Iliad 9 and only sporadically thereafter?  He has the longest speech in the poem at 522
9.435-605, but scarcely figures elsewhere.  As Hainsworth puts it, “Book 9 is well integrated 523
into the idea of the Iliad but not so well integrated into the text.”  Phoenix lies at the centre of 524
this tension. There is no straightforward solution to this problem. We can only proceed by 
 Köhnken (1975 and 1978) remains the major proponent of the former argument, with Tsagarakis (1979) rather 518
vehemently disagreeing. Martin (1989, 236-9) is the most prominent supporter of the latter argument. Kullmann 
(1960, 133) argues acutely that the relationship between Phoenix and Neoptolemus in the Cypria and the Nostoi 
likely closely resembled his relationship to Achilles in the Iliad.
 So Tsagarakis (1979). While it is true that Phoenix himself makes this claim in a passage which, as I will argue 519
below, is highly rhetorical, it is unlikely that the audience is to think that Phoenix is simply lying in a speech 
delivered for the benefit of Achilles, who would surely be expected to know. 
   The argument that Phoenix is taken for granted because he is associated with Achilles is based on the assumption 
that the diegetic narrator, who uses the duals before Achilles appears on the scene, is adopting Achilles’ perspective 
for the moment. Scodel (2002, 166-7) rightly points out, however, that this ad hoc premise is unlikely owing to the 
fact that the narrator and Achilles tend to have strikingly different perspectives elsewhere.
 Page (1972, 297-300); so, for example, Focke (1954, 260-2).520
 Even Louden’s (2002 and 2006, 123-34) recent and brilliant proposal on structural grounds that Phoenix actually 521
is one of the characters referred to by the duals fails to answer the larger questions about Phoenix’ role in the Iliad.
 He leads the fourth company of Myrmidons when Patroclus goes to battle as Achilles (16.196). Athena takes 522
Phoenix’ form to have a conversation with Menelaus (17.553-66). Along with Odysseus, Idomeneus, and Nestor, he 
tries to comfort Achilles and encourages him to eat (19.309-13). And he helps Achilles referee the chariot race at the 
funeral games (23.358-61). Aristonicus reports that Zenodotus preferred that Poseidon take Phoenix’ form over that 
of an unnamed old man (Σ A ad Il. 14.136a Erbse). But this has been condemned by all major modern editions as 
well as Aristonicus himself.
 Cf. Martin (1989, 108): “length is a positive speech value. The assignment of length in speech by the narrator 523
Homer produces our impressions about the importance of a given episode and also of a speaker.”
 Hainsworth (1993, 55).524
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examining his story with especial care, particularly since he himself reports it in a rhetorically 
charged context. He is trying to convince Achilles not to depart for Phthia, but to accept 
Agamemnon’s propitiatory gifts and stay and fight the Trojans. 
 Knudsen describes the structure of his speech in Aristotelian terms.  The first section 525
(9.434-95), the one with which we are centrally concerned for the moment, uses pathos, an 
appeal to emotion.  Phoenix implicitly contends that Achilles owes him goodwill (an ēthos 526
argument, namely one based on the character of the speaker) because of his tragic story and good 
service to Achilles and his family.  Knudsen goes so far, and it is unlikely that anyone would 527
seriously disagree. Somewhat less clear, however, is the paradigmatic strategy behind Phoenix’ 
use of his own story.  Phoenix sleeps with his father’s favourite concubine, is cursed by his 528
father, flees to Phthia, and finds a new life in Peleus’ court. How does this undoubtedly 
interesting series of events pertain to Achilles’ quandary?  The bT scholion suggests that, just 529
as Phoenix obtained forgiveness for his mistake (ἁµαρτών) in sleeping with his father’s 
courtesan, so Achilles is supposed to seek forgiveness from Agamemnon for his own mistake 
(ἁµαρτήσας) over Briseis (Σ ad Il. 9.449 Erbse). This reading remained the standard one as late 
as the 1970s.  However, it has since been recognized that, while there is some parallel between 530
 Without referring to Aristotle, Held (1987, 247 n. 10) notes that Priam’s exchange with Achilles at the end of the 525
poem (I presume he means 24.486-551 and 599-620) has a similar structure.
 Pathos is central to the entire speech as well: cf. Beck (2012, 66-73) on Phoenix’ use of the verb lissesthai (‘to 526
supplicate’) throughout.
 Knudsen (2014, 61-2). She outlines the applicability of Aristotelian categories of rhetoric (using Arist. Rh.) to 527
speeches in Homer at 38-50. For a slightly different rhetorical analysis of this speech, see Wilson (2002, 96-104). 
Phoenix’ contention becomes explicit only at the very end of this section of the speech (9.492-5).
 See Willcock (1964), Held (1987), and Knudsen (2014, 42-4 and 77-9) on the paradeigma (‘example’) in Homer 528
and more generally.
 Hainsworth’s (1993 ad Il. 9.447-77) assessment of the passage as “inconsequential” is perhaps hastily dismissive.529
 So Schlunk (1976, 204-5) and Rosner (1976, 316-18).530
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the concubine and Briseis, it is difficult to see how Peleus’ role matches that of Agamemnon. 
Peleus has nothing to do with Phoenix’ activity back home in Hellas.  The parallel seems rather 531
to be twofold. First, both Phoenix and Achilles have engaged in a quarrel over a woman with 
someone more powerful than themselves. Second is the issue of flight. On account of a woman, 
Achilles has just threatened to return home to Phthia and enjoy Peleus’ wealth (9.356-400). He 
does not frame this potential decision in terms of flight, but it is easy to see the parallel. When 
Phoenix flees (φεύγων, 448; φεῦγον, 478) his home, he takes refuge with Peleus, who makes him 
a rich man (µ᾽ ἀφνειὸν ἔθηκε, 483). Phoenix is strikingly a negative paradeigma, therefore.  532
This is clear both from the fact that Phoenix is claiming to have done precisely what he is trying 
to dissuade Achilles from doing, and from what he reports to have followed. He is entirely 
positive in his description of his treatment at Peleus’ hands, but the reality is nonetheless that, as 
mentioned above, he has come to inhabit the furthest reaches of Phthia, albeit in the capacity of 
ruler (483-4).  The parallel between the two situations is obviously not exact. Phoenix has fled 533
a domestic dispute, whereas Achilles proposes to withdraw from the war against the Trojans. 
Nonetheless, the implied comparison between Phoenix’ flight and Achilles’ withdrawal cannot 
fail to sting the warrior Achilles, despite his occasional implication that he has ceased to care for 
tīmē (e.g. 318-19).  Phoenix is playing a delicate rhetorical game here. On the one hand, he 534
 So Scodel (1982, 131-3; 2008, 16), Falkner (1995, 118), J. Griffin (1995 ad Il. 9.447ff.), Alden (2000, 221-2). 531
My own analysis here is much indebted to Scodel (1982), which remains the watershed moment in the analysis of 
Phoenix’ speech. For a different reading, see more recently Alden (2012, 124-5). The location of Phoenix’ natal 
home in Hellas is a problem. We are told as recently as Il. 9.395, for example, that Peleus rules over Hellas; cf. Eust. 
762.30 and Page (1972, 304) for more detail. Van Thiel conjectures ἴδον (‘I saw’) in place of λίπον (‘I left’) at 9.447, 
and this would solve the problem.
 So Scodel (2002, 169), Wilson (2002, 96), and Ready (2011, 146-7).532
 See Martin (1992, 16-18) on Phoenix’ relatively reduced status in Phthia. Cf. E. Bowie (2007.26 on Il. 9.464-70) 533
as giving “a hint of the prosperity on which he was turning his back.”
 Cf. J. Griffin (1995 ad Il. 9.447ff.): “this is what the choice of long life without κλέος could be made to look like; 534
Achilles cannot behave like this.”
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paints himself as a negative exemplum with respect to his actions in his natal home. On the other 
hand, despite having just undermined his own character from a warrior’s point of view, Phoenix 
needs to convince Achilles that he is worth protecting. In other words, he needs to establish that 
he is owed goodwill (the aforementioned pathos argument) for services rendered. This may 
motivate Phoenix’ emphasis on his kourotrophic relationship with the young Achilles (485-95), 
as opposed to any more typically masculine service he may have performed. 
 Phoenix’ unimpressive character is built into the structure of his story. The first step, the 
motivation for his departure, is constructed so as to disappoint the audience’s expectations, 
thereby highlighting that he is to be understood as a negative exemplum. Phoenix introduces his 
autobiography in a manner reminiscent of Nestor in particular:  
     ὣς ἂν ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπὸ σεῖο, φίλον τέκος, οὐκ ἐθέλοιµι 
     λείπεσθ᾽, οὐδ᾽ εἴ κέν µοι ὑποσταίη θεὸς αὐτός 
     γῆρας ἀποξύσας θήσειν νέον ἡβώοντα, 
     οἷον ὅτε πρῶτον λίπον Ἑλλάδα καλλιγύναικα 
     φεύγων νείκεα πατρός, Ἀµύντορος Ὀρµενίδαο. !
     “So, dear child, I wouldn’t then be willing to be left far from you, not even if a god himself  
     should undertake to scrape off my old age and make me young and in my prime, as when I  
     first left Hellas, which is full of beautiful women, fleeing reproaches from my father,  
     Amyntor, son of Ormenus” (9.444-8).  535!
The invocation of a lost youth followed by a transitional phrase like οἷον ὅτε to introduce a story 
from this youth is not dissimilar to Nestor’s habit (e.g. οἷον, 1.263; ὡς ὁπότ᾽, 11.671). Based on 
the parallels involving Nestor, I suggest that, up until the end of line 446, the poet creates the 
expectation of a glorious story from Phoenix’ youth, ideally one involving martial valour.  We 536
 On the sense of scraping away old age in this passage, see S. West (2001, 12 n. 44) and C. Brown (2014).535
 Schadewaldt (1966, 83-5) compares the structure of Phoenix’ speech to Nestor’s storytelling practice. On how 536
Nestor uses his youthful war stories to his advantage, see Martin (1989, 106-9) and Allan and Cairns (2011, 117-19 
and 135-6).
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also note that the closest verbal parallel to Phoenix’ transition comes from the Odyssey, when 
Circe encourages Odysseus and his companions to eat and drink until they recover their vigour, 
“as when you first left your fatherland of rough Ithaca” (οἷον ὅτε πρώτιστον ἐλείπετε πατρίδα 
γαῖαν / τρηχείης Ἰθάκης, 10.460-1). Given that these men left home when they were twenty years 
younger to fight in the Trojan War, making them virile, warlike figures, this parallel would seem 
to support my reading. But Phoenix disappoints the expectation created when he says, in the very 
next line, that he left home in flight from a domestic dispute – and one with his father no less.  537
The use of neikos (‘dispute’) is possibly significant here. This noun and the denominal neikein 
can refer to war, but the pertinent usage here is a dispute between two parties or, more narrowly, 
negative criticism levelled by one party at the other.  Neikos leads to bitterness, anger, and even 538
war. When it comes from one’s father, it is something to be endured, as the sons of Priam do (Il. 
24.248-69).  To get angry or flee is by no means praiseworthy in a son.  That Phoenix is to be 539 540
understood as a negative exemplum in this case is unmistakeable. 
 But what precipitates this quarrel between father and son is not immediately clear. 
Phoenix’ narration in this portion of his autobiography is in some ways as problematic as the 
 Note that the quarrel (νεῖκος) that breaks out in Nestor’s story (Il. 11.670-2) is of a more valorous sort.537
 Distinguishing between neikos and eris (‘strife’) is not always a simple matter. Some scholars, such as Nagy 538
(1999, 309-14), seem not to draw any distinction at all. But see Hogan (1981), who, while he finds eris to be 
pejorative in Homer and Hes. Th., predictably does not in Hes. Op. Nagler (1988) acknowledges this distinction 
while finding none himself in actual practice. LfgrE s.v. νεῖκος B also makes the useful point that neikos often refers 
to an event which is a subsidiary of eris.
 Paris even endures Hector’s neikos (3.38-59, 6.325-333). Odysseus discourages Alcinous from criticizing 539
(νείκεε) Nausicaa on the grounds that she has acted appropriately (Od. 7.303-7). There is no suggestion, however, 
that Alcinous would be out of line in doing so. One could also argue that Achilles rejects (Il. 9.391-2) Agamemnon’s 
offer to make him his son-in-law (9.141-56) at least in part because he would have to endure the kind of neikos (e.g. 
2.376) that he can now reject; cf. Calhoun (1962, 456), Wilson (2002), and Allan and Cairns (2011, 123). Nagy 
(1999, 222-42) contends that neikos in the Iliad reflects the praise and blame traditions of Greek poetry. And Martin 
(1989, 68-77) explores some of the rhetorical conventions in neikos discourse in the Iliad.
 It is not clear to me whether Amyntor’s neikea constitute an instance of flyting (on which see Martin (1989, 540
65-77) and Ready (2011, 197-209)). Wilson’s (2002, 98) claim that “the account of Phoinix’s quarrel (neikos) with 
Amyntor is meant to evoke Achilleus’ quarrel with Agamemnon” is attractive, but I am not convinced that there is 
sufficient evidence to show that the reference is so specific.
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duals from earlier in Book 9: 
     ὅς µοι παλλακίδος περιχώσατο καλλικόµοιο 
     τὴν αὐτὸς φιλέεσκεν, ἀτιµάζεσκε κ᾽ ἄκοιτιν, 
     µητέρ᾽ ἐµήν· ἣ δ᾽ αἰὲν ἐµὲ λισσέσκετο γούνων 
     παλλακίδι προµιγῆναι, ἵν᾽ ἐχθήρειε γέροντα. 
     τῇ πιθόµην καὶ ἔρεξα· !
     “[Amyntor], who was angry with me on account of a concubine with beautiful hair whom he 
     himself held dear, and he had contempt for his wife, my mother. And she was always at my  
     knees, supplicating me to sleep with the concubine in his place so that she might come to  
     loath the old man. I obeyed her and did it” (9.449-53).  541!
There is much about Phoenix’ story that is unsavoury. Amyntor’s preoccupation with a 
concubine, while it is hardly praiseworthy, is not particularly problematic per se. It is apparently 
only fear of his wife’s anger that prevents Laertes from having sex with Eurycleia (Od. 
1.429-33). And Agamemnon is not ashamed to announce before the assembled Achaean host that 
he wants to keep Chryseis, even comparing her favourably with his wife, Clytemnestra (Il. 
1.111-15). But the preference by Amyntor and Agamemnon of concubines to their own wives is 
folly, especially in contrast with Laertes’ prudence, because it creates an “unhealthy domestic 
situation.”  On the other hand, Phoenix again hardly emerges without blemish himself, since he 542
favours his mother over his father and commits something approaching incest.  The phrase ἵν᾽ 543
ἐχθήρειε γέροντα is perhaps surprising. Assuming the text is sound, it cannot seem to mean 
 In translating the hapax προµιγῆναι, I am following Σ A ad loc. Erbse: πρὸ τοῦ πατρὸς µιγῆναι (“to have sex 541
before his father”). Cf. Eust. 762.47: ἣν ὁ πατὴρ Ἀµύντωρ οὔπω µὲν ἔγνω… εἰς τοῦτο δὲ ἀνέτρεφε (“The father, 
Amyntor, did not yet know her… he was bringing her up for this purpose”). Falkner’s (1995, 117) suggestion that it 
is a euphemism for rape is unlikely both because there is no apparent reason for coming to such a conclusion and 
also because it is hard to see how Phoenix raping a concubine would be perceived as such by an ancient audience.
 Falkner (1995, 117).542
 So ibid. and Felson (2002b, 262). There is, however, S. Tr. 1221-9, where Heracles orders his son, Hyllus, to 543
marry his concubine, Iole. That he is talking about marriage is beyond dispute: Segal (1994b). And it is worth noting 
that Hyllus objects that she is responsible for the deaths of his parents (1232-7), and not that such a marriage would 
be problematic on account of her having had sex with Heracles. As far as I can tell, the nearest parallel to Phoenix’ 
seduction of his father’s concubine is as late as I Corinthians 5.1 (so A. Edwards (1987, 225)). 
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anything other than that the purpose of Phoenix’ having sex with the concubine would be that she 
would come to loath his father, presumably by comparison with the younger man. The scholiasts 
express the belief that women lose sexual interest in old men when they have had experience of 
young and more vigorous men because old men are not as potent.  And this seems to be the 544
understanding here.  But why would he care if she loathes him? Her feelings about him would 545
hardly affect his access to her.  I would argue that the fact that Amyntor is angered by Phoenix’ 546
action must mean that he is in love with the concubine (φιλέεσκεν, 9.450).  The only reason he 547
cares about her feelings is that he cares about her. We might perhaps be reminded of concubinage 
later in antiquity. While a man’s relationship with his concubine (pallakē after Homer, starting in 
Hdt. 1.84.3, 1.135, etc.) is certainly less dignified than the one he has with his wife, concubinage 
is frequently, and even typically, portrayed as more affectionate than marriage.   548
 In fact, Amyntor’s preoccupation with his concubine also helps to explain his apparently 
self-destructive sterilization of his son. Consider how the gruesome deed is described: 
            πατὴρ δ᾽ ἐµὸς αὐτίκ᾽ ὀϊσθείς 
     πολλὰ κατηρᾶτο, στυγερὰς δ᾽ ἐπεκέκλετ᾽ Ἐρινῦς, 
     µὴ ποτε γούνασιν οἷσιν ἐφέσσεσθαι φίλον υἱόν 
     ἐξ ἐµέθεν γεγαῶτα· θεοὶ δ᾽ ἐτέλειον ἐπαράς, 
 Σ b ad Il. 9.452 Erbse: ῥᾷστα γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀφίσταται γέροντος γυνὴ νέα πειραθεῖσα νέου καὶ ἰσχυροτέρου 544
ἀνδρός· ἦττον γὰρ οἱ γέροντες ἀφροδισιάζειν δύνανται (“for a young woman is wont to stand aloof from an old 
man, if she has had experience of a young and more vigorous man. For old men are less potent at sex”). The T 
scholiast and Eust. 762.45 express a similar view. The phrase did not meet with universal approval, however. The T 
scholiast also records that γέροντα was sometimes emended to γέροντι, an idea which is not without appeal. But 
having to read echthairein as ‘to be a source of hatred’ or ‘to make hateful to’ here is far from ideal, although cf. 
ἀπεχθαίρει at Od. 4.105 and S. West (2001, 4 n.13). Alden (2000, 218-20) discusses how the Greeks took a dim view 
of favouring the mother over the father.
 Cf. Mimnermus’ lament that an old man is “loathsome to children and without value for women” (ἐχθρὸς µὲν 545
παισίν, ἀτίµαστος δὲ γυναιξίν, 1.9 West²). West’s plausible emendation of γυναιξίν to γυναικί would make the old 
man without value to his wife as opposed to women as a group.
 Cf. S. West (2001, 4): “the concubine’s inclinations are of secondary importance.”546
 Cf. Od. 18.325: ἀλλ᾽ ἥ γ᾽ Εὐρυµάχῳ µισγέσκετο καὶ φιλέεσκεν (“but she kept having sex with Eurymachus and 547
held him dear”).
 Kapparis (1999, 12-13, with primary sources cited on 9).548
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     Ζεύς τε καταχθόνιος καὶ ἐπαινὴ Περσεφόνεια. !
     “My father learned about it straightaway and cursed me greatly, and he called upon the  
     hateful Erinyes, that I should never set on my knees a dear son born from me. And the gods  
     accomplished the curses, subterranean Zeus and dread Persephone” (9.453-7).  549!
Falkner observes of this passage that Amyntor’s “excessive interest in his concubine has 
destroyed his son and perhaps doomed the oikos to extinction.”  This is true if Phoenix is 550
Amyntor’s only son. Phoenix does not mention any brothers, but would that be the only means 
by which Amyntor could maintain his oikos? Surely he could produce children by his favoured 
slave woman (ἐκ δούλης, Od. 4.7), as Menelaus does. Of course, for Menelaus, to use such a 
method to produce an heir is an alternative measure, Helen having produced no sons 
(4.10-14).  Amyntor, on the other hand, has a wife who has had a son, and one who has reached 551
his youthful prime (ἡβώοντα, Il. 9.446) at that. The closest parallel to this situation in early 
Greek hexameter epic is Odysseus’ Cretan lie that he was born from a concubine (παλλακίς, Od. 
14.203). And, as we noted in the first chapter, Odysseus claims that his father treated him just as 
well as he treated his legitimate children. But of course the legitimate children were quick to 
assert their superior position on the death of the father (14.199-210). Rather than read Amyntor 
as essentially committing suicide by ending his line, therefore, it seems more likely that we are to 
understand the preference of the pallakis to Phoenix’ mother and her consequent jealousy and 
anger as motivated at least in part by the threat of the creation of an alternate line, one which 
 On οἷσιν as referring to Phoenix’ knees rather than Amyntor’s, see Steinrück (1998).549
 Falkner (1995, 117). S. West (2001, 8-9) and Alden (2012, 124) argue persuasively that a reference to castration 550
underlies this passage.
 One other potential parallel to this situation may be found in Euripides’ Andromache. Andromache, who has had 551
a son by Neoptolemus, is the object of violent aggression from his apparently barren wife, Hermione. While it is left 
as a matter of doubt whether Andromache’s son would be accepted as heir by the Phthians in the event of 
Hermione’s continued inability to bear children (cf. Andromache’s sarcasm at 201-4), this is clearly a source of 
concern to Hermione (32-5, 155-62). Of course the context is rather different, as the Andromache is likely concerned 
with the issue of bigamy in the setting of a late 5th-century polis: Torrance (2005), Vester (2009).
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could potentially receive equal or even more favour from Amyntor. 
 Returning to the question of Phoenix’ speech in its rhetorical context, however, we have 
already established that he portrays himself as a negative exemplum for quarrelling with his 
father and then running away. But this would seem at first blush to be undermined by Amyntor’s 
apparently disproportionate response. After all, the effect achieved by portraying Phoenix as a 
negative exemplum is considerably lessened if Amyntor is straightforwardly a worse one. We 
must consider parallel examples of this story-type in order to obtain some sense of how such 
drastic action by the father would be perceived. We will find that, while filicide is hardly 
portrayed as a palatable act, it does not seem to be entirely unacceptable in particular contexts. 
Unfortunately for us, this sort of treatment of a son at the hands of his father is extremely rare in 
antiquity. This is hardly surprising. Deliberate destruction of a mature, male descendant was 
close to suicide. A mother might be considered capable of such a thing in extreme circumstances, 
but surely not a father.  One is consequently forced to stray rather far afield in search of 552
parallels to Phoenix’ story, the closest of which I am aware is most fully laid out in Photius’ 
epitome to Conon, a mythographer from late in the 1st century BCE: 
     ὡς Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Πάριδος καὶ Οἰνώνης, ἣν ἐγήµατο πρὶν ἢ τὴν Ἑλένην ἁρπασαι, παῖς 
     Κόρυθος γίνεται, κάλλει νικῶν τὸν πατέρα. τοῦτον ἡ µήτηρ Ἑλένῃ προσέπεµψε, ζηλοτυπίαν 
     τε κινοῦσα Ἀλεξάδρῳ καὶ κακόν τι διαµηχανωµένη Ἑλένῃ. ὡς δὲ συνήθης ὁ Κόρυθος πρὸς 
     Ἑλένην ἐγένετο, Ἀλεξανδρός ποτε παρελθὼν εἰς τὸν θάλαµον καὶ θεασάµενος τὸν Κόρυθον 
     τῇ Ἑλένῃ παρεζόµενον καὶ ἀναφλεχθεὶς ἐξ ὑποψίας εὐθὺς ἀναιρεῖ. !
 But even examples of maternal filicide are extremely rare in Greek literature: see Mastronarde (2002 ad. Eur. 552
Med. 1282). “Perhaps this is because society so much abhors the murder of children that it refuses to regard it as 
anything but the rarest and most outrageous of deviations” (Easterling (1977, 186)). And it is worth noting that even 
the most famous example of this, Medea’s murder of her sons by Jason, may have been a Euripidean innovation. Σ B 
ad Eur. Med. 9 Schwartz transmits the story that Euripides was accused of being bribed by the Corinthians for 
transferring the blame for the murder onto Medea. How seriously we take this claim would partially depend upon 
the dating of Neophron’s Medea: Page (1938, xxx-xxxii), Knox (1977, 193-6), Luschnig (2007, 85 and 97-8); pace 
Mastronarde (2002, 52-4).
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     “How of Alexander Paris and Oenone, whom he had married before he abducted Helen, a son, 
     Corythus, was born, surpassing his father in beauty. His mother sent him to Helen, trying to  
     stir envy in Alexander and contriving something bad for Helen. Once Corythus had become 
     close to Helen, Alexander entered the bedroom at some point, saw Corythus sitting next to  
     Helen, and killed him straightaway in a suspicious fit of pique” (FGrH 26 F 1.23 = 23  
     Brown). !
In response, Oenone curses Paris and prophesies his destruction (ibid.). Parthenius, apparently 
citing Hellanicus, adds the detail that Corythus fell in love (ἠράσθη) with Helen on his arrival at 
Troy (34 Lightfoot). We can only trace this story back as far as Hellanicus (FGrH 4 F 29 = fr. 29 
Fowler) in the fifth century, and the figure of Corythus is only rarely attested elsewhere.  553
Oenone herself, while eventually quite a popular figure, does not appear any earlier, unless 
Lobel’s hesitant supplement to Bacchyl. fr. 20D.3 Maehler is correct.  In light of the late date 554
of the sources and the peculiar nature of the story, this tale about Paris, Oenone, and Corythus is 
in all likelihood a local myth, possibly associated with a particular cult, which would be 
consistent with the antiquarian tastes of Conon and Parthenius. Nonetheless, it shares such 
obvious similarities to Phoenix’ autobiography that it will be useful to examine it for typological 
reasons. The anger of Oenone at Paris is usually read as an example of the motif of “the mortal 
who is loved by a nymph or goddess and punished for his unfaithfulness.”  However, 555
Sourvinou-Inwood also finds in this story an example of the son disturbing the ordinary 
succession of his patriline by favouring his mother’s interests over his father’s.  According to 556
 Lyc. 57-60, where he is apparently sent by his mother to spy on the Trojans (Σ ad 57 Leone, with no mention of 553
the subsequent altercation with Paris); Dictys 5.5, where he is killed by a falling roof. For allusions see Fowler 
(2013, 528-9, esp. n. 24).
 It is unpopular: M. Brown (2002, 167), Fowler (2013, 528 n. 23), Hornblower (2015 ad Lyc. 65). But Stinton 554
(1965, 43) defends it with some plausibility. On Oenone’s popularity, see LIMC s.v. “Oinone". That she is absent 
from Euripides is possibly significant, considering the playwright’s obvious preoccupation with Paris’ early life: 
Stinton (1965, 13-40).
 Stinton (1965, 45). First suggested by Rohde (1960, 117-20), and also followed by Lightfoot (1999, 391) and M. 555
Brown (2002, 169). Egan (1971, 156) compares Potiphar’s wife.
 Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 251-8), and her model is adopted by Forsdyke (2005, 254-5) and Alden (2012, 123-4).556
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Sourvinou-Inwood, this story type has four basic characteristics.  I have altered them slightly to 557
fit more precisely with the data she adduces. First, the son initiates hostility with his father, or at 
least the father perceives him to be doing so. Second, another woman (or other women, in the 
case of Periander and Lycophron below) motivates the son’s aggression by somehow reducing 
his mother’s position vis-à-viz his father, often simply by supplanting her. Third, the father 
retaliates, resulting in death or a death-like state (i.e. exile, sterility, blindness, etc.) for the son. 
Fourth, the father does not die, but he is harmed. I would also add a fifth characteristic, namely 
the retaliatory curse, usually by the father against the son, but, in the case of Corythus, by the 
mother against the father, and partially as retribution for the murder of the son.  We can see in 558
the case of Corythus that Paris understands him as having a physical relationship with Helen, and 
that it is Oenone’s jealousy which ultimately causes what might be a misunderstanding. The 
epitomator is careful to say that Corythus and Helen are sitting together and not lying together. 
But what is Corythus doing in Helen’s thalamos (‘bedroom’) in the first place? Surely it is not 
particularly surprising that Paris possibly misconstrues the situation. If, as in Hellanicus’ version, 
Corythus is smitten with Helen, then Paris’ anger is all the more understandable, even though his 
reaction is excessive.  559
 A second parallel may be found in Theseus’ curse on his son, Hippolytus, the earliest and 
most detailed extant version of which is probably Euripides’ second play on the subject.  560
Aphrodite causes Phaedra, Theseus’ wife and Hippolytus’ stepmother to conceive of a terrible 
 Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 252).557
 Parental curses were apparently considered to be particularly efficacious: Pl. Lg. 931b-c; cf. Gregory (2009, 42).558
 Pi. O. 7.27-30 is a comparable situation, although it does not feature filicide.559
 On the few traces we have of Euripides’ less popular Hippolytus (so-called Kalyptomenos: fr. 428-47 Kannicht), 560
see Barrett (1964, 15-45), Gibert (1997), Hutchinson (2004), and Gregory (2009).
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longing (ἔρωτι δεινῷ, Eur. Hipp. 28) for Hippolytus. When she realizes that she cannot have him, 
she kills herself and accuses Hippolytus of rape in her suicide note (856-86). Theseus, upon 
reading the note, calls upon Poseidon to kill Hippolytus (887-90) and also casts him out of 
Athens (971-80). No sooner does Hippolytus leave Athens than he is fatally wounded, thus 
fulfilling Theseus’ prayer (1173-1248, 1316-19). One might debate which of these elements 
predates Euripides, but Gregory compellingly argues that Phaedra’s unfortunate lust for 
Hippolytus, her false accusation, and Theseus’ curse “constituted the unalterable core of the 
Hippolytus myth.”  If this is correct, then all five of the characteristics are met in this tale as 561
well. What may be a Euripidean elaboration is the emphasis he places upon the conflict between 
the interests of Hippolytus and those of Phaedra’s children. When Phaedra contemplates suicide, 
her nurse tries to dissuade her by arguing that she will be betraying her sons, who will lose their 
share in their father’s house (πατρῴων µὴ µεθέξοντας δόµων, 306), presumably because they 
will not have their mother to protect their interests in the face of an elder brother.  Interestingly, 562
the brothers are consistently referred to as gnēsioi (309, 963, 1455), whereas Hippolytus is 
nothos (309, 962, 1083). Barrett probably rightly argues that Hippolytus is considered nothos 
because his mother, the Amazon Hippolyta, is a pallakē from the spoils of war.  One 563
unsurprising implication of the nurse’s argument is that Hippolytus should be treated as an 
enemy because, contemporary Athenian legalities aside, he poses a threat to Phaedra’s sons, 
 Gregory (2009, 36), using M. West’s (1999, 33) distinction between fundamental and secondary elements of a 561
myth, which seems to me to be essentially a structuralist model.
 So Barrett (1964 ad. 304ff.).562
 Ibid., although it is worth noting that she is never called such in the play, nor is there any attestation of Euripides 563
ever using the term. There is certainly no doubt that Phaedra is Theseus’ wife.
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particularly with respect to their patrimony.  The better-attested Euripidean iteration of this 564
myth at least to some extent treats it as an object lesson in the problems underlying amphimetric 
strife, hardly a surprising twist in light of the particular aversion to any kind of ‘mixed’ 
household in contemporary Athens.  565
 For the third and final parallel, Sourvinou-Inwood compares Lycophron and Periander in 
Herodotus (3.48-53).  Lycophron, having learned from his maternal grandfather that his father 566
Periander has killed his mother, refuses to speak to his father and is consequently barred from the 
oikoi of Periander’s people (3.50). And anyone who speaks to him is to pay a fine to Apollo 
(3.52.1). Lycophron is eventually sent to Corcyra, and he only agrees to return years later on the 
condition that Periander move to Corcyra. Lycophron is then murdered by the Corcyraeans to 
prevent Periander from moving there (3.52-3). This story can be seen to fit Sourvinou-Inwood’s 
model. Lycophron is certainly perceived by his father as initiating hostility, albeit in a somewhat 
passive-aggressive manner. And, while Herodotus, being in some respects slightly lacunose, says 
nothing about the murder of his wife beyond the simple fact that it took place (τὴν… Μέλισσαν 
… ἀπέκτεινε, 3.50.1), Diogenes Laertius reports that Periander ὑπ᾽ ὀργῆς βαλὼν ὑποβάθρῳ ἢ 
λακτίσας τὴν γυναῖκα ἔγκυον οὖσαν ἀπέκτεινε, πεισθεὶς διαβολαῖς παλλακίδων, ἃς ὕστερον 
ἔκαυσε (“killed his pregnant wife in a rage, either by by striking her with a stool or by kicking 
her, having been persuaded by the slanders of his concubines, whom he later had burned alive,” 
1.94 = Periander T 9 Gentili-Prato). Diogenes is considerably later than Herodotus, but the fact 
that his supplement perfectly fits Sourvinou-Inwood’s typology surely helps to support her basic 
 Cf. µισεῖν σε φήσεις τήνδε, καὶ τὸ δὴ νόθον / τοῖς γνησίοισι πολέµιον πεφυκέναι (“will you say that she hates 564
you, and indeed that bastardy is by nature hostile to legitimate children?”, 962-3).
 Cf. Ebbott (2003, 85-107), who treats this aspect of the play at considerable depth.565
 Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 245-84).566
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claim that ancient myths and narratives are structured “according to particular models of 
organizing experience.”  One also perhaps gets a hint of what Diogenes reports in Herodotus as 567
well. While Periander murders his wife in Book Three, Herodotus later claims that he 
subsequently had sex with her corpse (5.92η3). This behaviour could possibly constitute a 
twisted reunion scene following Periander’s discovery that his courtesans have slandered his now 
deceased wife.  In any case, it seems tolerably clear that Lycophron’s hostility towards his 568
father is a delayed reaction to his mother’s murder through the machinations of Periander’s 
concubines. I would further argue that Periander’s retaliation results in a death-like state for 
Lycophron even in the short term, since, as we have already established, exile is often seen as a 
sort of death-like state. Sourvinou-Inwood also argues that Periander’s decrees, barring 
Lycophron from the oikoi of his people, and forcing anyone who speaks to him to pay a fine to 
Apollo, function as curses. Lycophron is treated as if he is polluted by these decrees.  569
 That the father could potentially be cleared of wrongdoing in some of these tales is 
probable. The Conon epitome is too brief to give us any sense of the tone of Paris’ relationship 
with Corythos. But in the Hippolytus, Artemis informs Theseus that, as far as she and Poseidon 
are concerned, Theseus is to blame for his son’s misfortune because he did not do the appropriate 
research before cursing his son (1320-4). This implies that Theseus would have been justified in 
cursing Hippolytus if he had been guilty of raping Phaedra. In a similar vein, Herodotus has 
Lycophron’s sister, admittedly hardly a divine authority, firmly take Periander’s side in the 
 Ibid. 245.567
 On how this act fits the larger portrayal of the tyrant in Herodotus, see Soares (2014, 227-30). Eidinow (2007, 568
262 n. 60) compares Paus. 3.17 and suggests that Periander is really trying to appease Melissa’s shade when he 
sends messengers to the necromanteion in Thesprotia (Hdt. 5.92η2).
 Sourvinou-Inwood (1991, 259).569
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dispute (3.53.2-5).  Of particular note is the aphoristic statement, πολλοὶ δὲ ἤδη τὰ µητρώια 570
διζήµενοι τὰ πατρώια ἀπέβαλον (“and many before now have thrown away their father’s 
property in seeking their mother’s,” 3.53.4). As Asheri et al. suggest, this probably refers to 
inheritance suits, in which, at least in Attic law, an heir could potentially be disinherited by his 
father if he put too much effort into claiming his maternal inheritance.  At issue, of course, is 571
Periander’s tyranny, which he wishes Lycophron to inherit, and so it is natural for the sister to 
speak in such terms. But this statement really encapsulates the whole dispute between father and 
son. Periander’s position is pretty clearly that loyalty to one’s mother may be all well and good, 
but, if it comes at the expense of allegiance to the father, then it is foolish and even reprehensible 
to side with the mother. To conceptualize this tension in terms of material inheritance is 
advantageous because it helps his argument. He is offering Lycophron Corinth, whereas Melissa 
is dead, and her father, Procles, has been captured as retribution for letting Lycophron on to 
Melissa’s fate (3.52.7). 
 We might say in general, therefore, that filicide by the father in these stories is an extreme 
but probably not entirely unacceptable expression of power over the hierarchy of women in his 
household. The son is perceived to be attempting to assert himself in this respect, and the father 
finds the manner in which he does so to be utterly intolerable. To return to Phoenix and Achilles, 
then, it would seem that Phoenix is again presenting himself in a less than complimentary light 
 Asheri et al. (2008 ad loc.): “the whole of para. 4 is composed of five maxims or sayings… more apt to the father 570
than to the daughter.” The sister addressing her brother with ὦ παῖ (“child,” 3.53.3) also suits a parent more than 
even an elder sibling (Golden (1985)). On the other hand, while she has received instructions from her father 
(διδαχθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς, 3.53.5), the speech is probably not meant to be read as a verbatim delivery of 
Periander’s words. For example, ἄπιθι ἐς τὰ οἰκία (“go away home,” 3.53.3) would be awkward if spoken to 
Lycophron from Corinth.
 Asheri et al. (2008 ad loc.). Cf. πατρῷα καὶ µητρῷα λέγονται τὰ ἐκ πατέρων καὶ µητέρων ἀποθανόντων 571
καταλειπόµενα τοῖς τέκνοις (“what is left from deceased fathers and mothers to their children is called patrōia and 
mētrōia, Fragmentum Lexici Graeci 57, Hermann (1801, 327)); also cf. Phot. s.v. πατρῴων, πατρίων καὶ πατρικῶν 
[π 494 Theodoridis] as well as the comparanda in Theodoridis’ edition.
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for rhetorical purposes. His sterilization by Amyntor is harsh, but it is not beyond the pale. 
Phoenix’ bedding of his father’s concubine, on the other hand, certainly is, particularly in light of 
her importance to the old man. Earlier, we rejected the idea that Phoenix is implicitly comparing 
Peleus to Agamemnon in his autobiography. It is more likely, in fact, now that we have examined 
Sourvinou-Inwood’s story-type, that he intends Amyntor to be understood as the Agamemnon 
figure. As Phoenix should not have quarrelled with his father over a concubine, so Achilles 
should not do so with Agamemnon, who is after all a kind of putative father-figure for 
Achilles.  572
 The full effect of Phoenix’ autobiography as a negative paradeigma can only be felt, 
however, when it is compared to the Meleager tale that Phoenix tells later in his speech. The 
structural similarities between these two sections of the speech are significant and deliberate. So, 
that we find another example of filicide in the Meleager tale – this time of the maternal variety – 
is hardly coincidental. Unlike with paternal filicide, maternal filicide is never justified, and, as in 
the present case, it is frequently motivated by an excessive and inappropriate loyalty to the 
mother’s natal family. In his Litae parable, Phoenix tells the story of the anger of the great 
warrior Meleager at his mother, Althea, who has cursed him with death (Il. 9.565-72). Phoenix is 
almost certainly alluding to a tradition that predates the Iliad, meaning that the poet is not 
necessarily inventing any particular detail in an ad hoc fashion.  Phoenix references Meleager 573
as another paradeigma – in this case a negative one. Meleager refused an ample gift from the 
 Wilson (2002) argues very persuasively that Agamemnon tries to make himself into a father figure for Achilles, 572
but Achilles refuses. On Agamemnon as an undesirable father figure for Achilles, see Avery (1998), Wöhrle (1999, 
17-22), and Felson (2002a, 39-40).
 Tsagalis (2014, 240-1) summarizes the history of the argument showing that the poet alludes to a *Meleagris 573
here. For the more cautious position, see Currie (2015, 290-1) with bibliography.
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Aetolians in exchange for fighting, only to fight later in any case when the gift was off the table. 
Achilles, therefore, should avoid this possibility and fight now.  Meleager also rejected the 574
entreaties (litai) of those dear to him, only relenting when his wife Cleopatra took part 
(9.574-99). Achilles should be wary of following Meleager here as well, lest he provoke the 
anger of the gods by refusing entreaties (9.513-23).  575
 Having established the rhetorical context of Phoenix’ reference to Meleager, then, let us  
consider the tale itself. As I have said, its structure is strikingly similar to Phoenix’ 
autobiography in many places. Interestingly, while the parallels between the two stories to the 
quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon have often been noted, very little detailed comparison 
between them has been done per se.  We begin with a war between the Curetes and the 576
Aetolians (9.529-33), paralleling the neikea of Amyntor mentioned above. The origin of the 
quarrel is in each case neglect by the father. Amyntor neglects his wife, Phoenix’ mother, and 
Oeneus neglects Artemis in his sacrifices (9.533-7). The result of this neglect is the anger of 
Phoenix’ mother and Artemis (χωσαµένη, 9.534; χολωσαµένη, 538) respectively. We must infer 
 The significance of this myth to Achilles’ situation is well-studied: see especially Willcock (1964, 147-53), 574
Rosner (1976, 320-7), and Nagy (1999, 103-9). Alden (2000, 191-290) provides what is probably the subtlest and 
most thorough analysis of all, showing how Phoenix cleverly, although not always consistently, rhetorically places 
Achilles in a double bind.
 Kakridis (1949, 20-7 and 151-64) famously observed that the various entreaties of a hero by his philoi are 575
typically organized into an “ascending scale of affection.” Strangely, the friends are promoted ahead of their usual 
position in Phoenix’ Meleager tale. Willcock (1964, 150) and Lohmann (1970, 258-61) suggest that this is a 
rhetorical amplification of the importance of friends, implicitly encouraging Achilles to listen to the present 
delegation with more sympathy. But there is no evidence that this ascending scale of affection existed before the 
tradition reflected here (Alden (2000, 242)), so it is difficult to assert anything with certainty.  
     Much has been made of Achilles’ later anticipation of the Greeks coming to entreat him at his knees (περὶ 
γούνατ᾽… λισσοµένους, 11.609-10) to fight again, as if they have not already (cf. 9.501, 520, 698, not to mention 
the parable of the Litae at 502-14). Page (1959, 305-7) is characteristically vociferous in observing the apparent 
contradiction. But Alden (2000, 181-92) is probably correct to argue that, while they do offer entreaty (litē), they do 
not engage in the more debasing supplication (hiketeia). This interpretation places great importance on the περὶ 
γούνατ’ at 11.609 (cf. Schadewaldt (1966, 81): “die Achaier haben den Achill im I nicht ‘kniefällig’… gebeten”; 
also cf. Beck (2012.72-3)), but it may very well be correct.
 Lohmann (1970, 268-9), Bannert (1981), and T. Walsh (2005, 191-4) are notable exceptions.576
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that Phoenix’ mother is angry, which is the usual reaction to suffering dishonour (ἀτιµάζεσκε, 
450).  In order to obtain tīmē in an honour society, one must be born with it, take it from 577
somebody else, or be given it by way of reciprocity. The victim of such an attempt normally 
experiences some form of anger, be it cholos (‘anger’), kotos (‘resentment’), or, in particular 
cases, mēnis (‘wrath’). And there are also the common verbs cholousthai (‘to feel cholos’) and 
chōesthai (‘to be angry’).  While there are distinctions between these terms, we will not 578
concern ourselves overmuch with semantics here. The anger of Phoenix’ mother is structurally 
parallel to that of Artemis and Achilles, even if the precise quality of their anger may be different 
in each case.  Next, the anger of the one parent indirectly stimulates anger in the other parent 579
against the son, who is then effectively cursed with death. We have already observed how 
Amyntor is enraged by Phoenix and curses him with sterility when he finds out about the 
concubine. Althaea’s reaction to Meleager’s accidental (?) murder of her brother, which is 
ultimately a result of Oeneus’ negligence, is strikingly similar to Amyntor’s: 
     τῇ ὅ γε παρκατέλεκτο χόλον θυµαλγέα πέσσων, 
 “The narrator can also make it clear that a character is angry without using any word for emotion” (Scodel (2008, 577
52)). Cf. once again Laertes’ decision not to sleep with Eurycleia, thus avoiding the cholos (‘anger’) of his wife, 
Anticleia (Od. 1.429-33). The anger of the spurned woman must similarly be inferred of Proetus’ wife at Il. 6.160-5.
 This is not an exhaustive list. Extensive treatments of Homeric terms for anger may be found in Considine 578
(1966), Adkins (1969), and T. Walsh (2005). Bannert (1981) specifically compares the cholos of Amyntor and 
Meleager to the anger in Achilles’ quarrel with Agamemnon. The precise meaning of mēnis in the Iliad is a highly 
controversial question. With the exception of Agamemnon and Aeneas in individual instances (1.247 and 13.460 
respectively), Achilles is the only mortal to have mēnis (e.g. 1.1, 488, 9.517), probably indicating that his anger is 
somehow divine in nature. Scodel (2008, 52-3), however, makes a compelling case for mēnis denoting anger that is 
effectual. For more detail, see especially Watkins (1977), Muellner (1996), T. Walsh (2005, 10-14 and 192-4), 
Scodel (2008, 49-73).
 Some of these terms can sometimes be used of the same emotion in any case. For example, cholousthai (‘to feel 579
cholos') and chōesthai (‘to be angry’) are apparently interchangeable at Il. 1.80-1, 9.534-8, and 9.533-5. T. Walsh 
(2005, 192-3) demonstrates that cholos is the technical term for the kind of anger that stimulates the withdrawal of a 
hero, and he cites examples of the cholos of Phoenix, Menelaus, and Achilles. One quibble with this parallel is that, 
as I will discuss below, the one example of cholos being used of Phoenix is at 9.459, the provenance of which is 
problematic. And Plut. Cor. 32.5 reads τρέψε φρένας (“changed my mind”) in place of παῦσεν χόλον (“checked my 
anger”). Nonetheless, T. Walsh’s evidence is otherwise convincing, and, as I will argue below, the cholos of Phoenix 
can easily be understood. On anger as a part of this story type’s structure, cf. 9.524-5 and J. Griffin (1995 ad loc.).
!178
     ἐξ ἀρέων µητρὸς κεχολωµένος, ἥ ῥα θεοῖσιν 
     πόλλ᾽ ἀχέουσ᾽ ἠρᾶτο κασιγνήτοιο φόνοιο, 
     πολλὰ δὲ καὶ γαῖαν πολυφόρβην χερσὶν ἀλοία 
     κικλήσκουσ᾽ Ἀΐδην καὶ ἐπαινὴν Περσεφόνειαν, 
     πρόχνυ καθεζοµένη, δεύοντο δὲ δάκρυσι κόλποι, 
     παιδὶ δόµεν θάνατον· τῆς δ᾽ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐρινύς 
     ἔκλυεν ἐξ Ἐρέβεσφιν, ἀµείλιχον ἦτορ ἔχουσα. !
     “He [Meleager] lay beside her [Cleopatra], brooding over his painful anger, angered by the  
     curses of his mother, who, grieving over the murder of her brother, prayed to the gods many  
     times; and she, kneeling, the folds of her gown wet with tears, also beat the nourishing earth  
     many times with her hands, calling on Hades and dread Persephone to give her son death.  
     And Erinys, who travels in darkness and has a pitiless heart, heeded her from Erebus”  
     (9.565-72). !
The Iliadic presentation of Meleager’s murder of his maternal uncle (9.543-5) is more allusive 
than descriptive. But it differs from the two fuller and later narratives in Bacchylides (5.94-154) 
and Ovid (Met. 8.425-546), according to whom Meleager murders two uncles.  In each of these 580
versions, the result is the same: Meleager is killed by his mother through supernatural means. As 
I have said, though, the Iliadic version is remarkably similar to the curse of Phoenix by Amyntor. 
In both cases, the parent curses the son in anger (449, 454, 567). Amyntor calls upon the Erinyes 
(454), whereas Althaea calls to Hades and Persephone (569). And it is interesting to note that 
Hades and Persephone fulfil the curse for Amyntor (456-7), whereas Erinys (only one?) does so 
for Althaea (571-2). In each case, the punishment is an eye for an eye. Phoenix has somehow 
deprived Amyntor of his concubine and therefore offspring by her, and so he is cursed with 
sterility. Meleager has murdered Althaea’s brothers, and so he is cursed with death. Phoenix and 
Meleager both suffer at the hands of a parent for neglecting the kinship interests of that parent. 
 Willcock (1964, 148-54) provides a more detailed comparison and contrast. There are two Hesiodic variants. In 580
fr. 25 M.-W., Meleager is apparently not Althaea’s son at all (14), and he is probably killed by Apollo for some 
reason (12-13; cf. Paus. 10.31.3). And again, in fr. 280 M.-W., Apollo probably kills him (2-3), possibly because of a 
curse (9-10).
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 The final apparent similarity between the two tales is problematic. Phoenix and Meleager 
are both unsurprisingly angry in response to their parents’ curses (458-61, 565), resulting in their 
withdrawals (478-9, 555-6).  But lines 9.458-61 are of famously dubious provenance: 581
     τὸν µὲν ἐγὼ βούλευσα κατακτάµεν ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ· 
     ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων παῦσεν χόλον, ὅς ῥ᾽ ἐνὶ θυµῷ 
     δήµου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνείδεα πόλλ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, 
     ὡς µὴ πατροφόνος µετ᾽ Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίµην. !
     “I conceived of a plan to kill him [Amyntor] with sharp bronze. But one of the gods stopped  
     my anger. He put in my heart the talk of the people and the many reproaches of men, so that I  
     should not be called a patricide among the Achaeans.” !
This is entirely absent from extant papyri and manuscripts of the Iliad, appearing in full only in 
Plutarch (Mor. 26F), who claims that Aristarchus excised them (ἐξεῖλε) out of fear (φοβηθείς). 
The source of the fear adduced by Plutarch is generally thought to be the fact that the passage 
features the contemplation of patricide, a subject that does not appear elsewhere in Homer and 
may have been seen as inappropriate to the Iliadic tradition.  The scholarly community is split 582
on whether these lines should be retained. Wolf famously included them, but no major modern 
edition does without cruces at the very least. Similarly, Apthorp and Griffith, while they 
acknowledge that the lines are very much Homeric in style, argue forcefully against their 
inclusion in any kind of vulgate edition.  But this stance is by no means universal.  That such 583 584
 Scodel (1982, 130 n. 9) maintains that Phoenix’ anger is implied by οὐκέτι πάµπαν ἐρητύετ᾽ ἐν φρεσὶ θυµός (“no 581
longer did my heart in my breast hold me back at all,” 9.462). While similar expressions are used to describe the 
suppression of anger at 1.192 and 9.635, the closest parallel is actually applied to a man resisting the urge to flee 
(13.280). Without the four preceding lines, I would argue that the audience could quite easily interpret this phrase as 
referring to flight, especially since he does actually flee (9.448). Elsewhere, both Phyleus (2.629) and Polypheides 
(Od. 15.254) migrate on account of anger at their fathers (ἀπενάσσατο πατρὶ χολωθείς).
 A thorough review of the evidence and prior scholarship on the question of the ‘authenticity’ of these four lines 582
may be found in Apthorp (1980, 91-9). More recently, see Scodel (1982, 130), S. West (1982), Hainsworth (1993 ad 
loc.), J. Griffin (1995 ad loc.), Alden (2000, 221 n. 16), and S. West (2001).
 Apthorp (1980, 91-9), J. Griffin (1995 ad loc.).583
 Wilamowitz (1920, 66 n. 2), Cairns (1993, 51), and Wilson (2002, 201 n. 77) are just a few examples of the 584
widespread attempt to retain the passage.
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a split exists is surprising. While the lines undoubtedly fit almost seamlessly into our Iliad, the 
fact that not even the scholia show any awareness of them seems to indicate that Plutarch found 
the lines in some non-Aristarchan source.  We should not simply disregard the passage, 585
however. It is more than likely that it is taken from an alternative tradition, such as the Cypria or 
the Aethiopis.  And one can easily see how these lines made their way into some version of the 586
Iliad at some point. As Alden has observed, Phoenix’ contemplation of patricide is strikingly 
similar to Achilles drawing his sword as if to kill Agamemnon at the onset of the quarrel (Il. 
1.188-92).  And, as in Phoenix’ case, it is a god, this time Athena, who manages to dissuade 587
him (1.193-222). In addition, as we have already noted, Agamemnon is a kind of putative father 
figure for Achilles, so it is clear how Phoenix’ consideration of literal patricide could have been 
seen to be appropriate to his speech. While the lines do not belong in modern editions of the 
Iliad, it is possible that they correspond to an Archaic tradition about Phoenix. Furthermore, even 
if our iteration of the Iliad is not drawing upon this particular tradition about Phoenix, I would 
hazard nonetheless that these lines would not have been entirely out of place in the tradition 
referenced. As discussed above, murder is, as far as we can tell, the most common cause of 
fugitive status in early Greek literature about heroic characters. And, as Apthorp observes, 
Phoenix’ fugitive status in light of these four lines becomes a slight variation of the ‘homicide 
and flight’ theme, where Phoenix’ flight is presented as an alternative to patricide.  Since, as we 588
have argued, Phoenix’ story is probably not spun from whole cloth by the poet, it is likely that 
 M. West (2001, 208) suggests that this source might have been Seleucus.585
 So Kullmann (1960, 133) and S. West (2001, 11), who observes that Phoenix delivers an autobiography after 586
Achilles’ death in Q.S. 3.460, a scene which could possibly be derived from the Aethiopis.
 Alden (2012.124-5).587
 Apthorp (1980.96-7). It is probably a combination of the ‘homicide and flight’ theme and the ‘anger and 588
withdrawal’ theme.
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contemplated or even enacted patricide was the cause of his flight in at least one version current 
at the time of our Iliad. As we have seen in other cases of anger, Phoenix’ homicidal rage is 
probably understood, therefore, even in the absence of 9.458-61. As was frequently the case in 
Archaic epic, the audience would largely have been aware of the tradition abbreviated in 
Phoenix’ speech. 
 We find, then, that the Phoenix and Meleager stories share remarkably similar structures. 
On the one hand, this is hardly surprising. They frame a single speech and are essentially used 
for the same rhetorical purpose (namely as paradeigmata). It is easy to see how stories about 
reciprocal anger between parent and son, and the catastrophes that ensue, are relevant to 
Phoenix’ attempt to dissuade Achilles from prolonging his withdrawal from combat in light of 
his problematic relationship with Agamemnon. But what is the strategy behind including 
references to filicide and parental curses? One could argue that they just happen to be 
fundamental elements of two stories that are otherwise relevant. But then why bother to provide 
such details when we know that audiences would have been familiar with the two stories, and 
filicide is such an unpleasant – and therefore potentially distracting – subject? That this is a 
coincidence is especially dubious in light of the fact that, as we have noted, filicide is such an 
uncommon subject in classical literature. I would argue that Phoenix’ strategy in including these 
details is manifold. The first point is rather hyperbolic in its execution. In each case, the focus of 
Phoenix’ iteration of these stories is on the reaction of the son to the aggression of the parent. 
Phoenix, contrary to the wishes of his kin, flees (9.464-78) in response to his father’s curse. And, 
as we have already noted, Meleager withdraws in anger at his mother. While one might debate 
whether Phoenix in particular presents his own decision to flee as mistaken, there is no doubt 
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that the rhetorical purpose of this portion of the story is to convince Achilles not to depart for 
Phthia as Phoenix did. And the point of the Meleager story is explicit: Achilles would be wise not 
to emulate his withdrawal (9.600). Part of the reason why these comparisons might be considered 
effective is the stark contrast between the different causes of dispute. Phoenix and Meleager 
withdraw because of the deadly curses their parents have placed upon them. Achilles has 
withdrawn because Agamemnon has confiscated his favourite concubine, and he refuses to yield 
even when Agamemnon offers to return Briseis and compensate him handsomely for the slight. 
This contrast quite blatantly ignores several aspects of Achilles’ complaint, but it is potentially 
effective from a rhetorical point of view.  Why can Achilles not give in when he has only 589
suffered relatively slightly? 
 The second point has to do with how Phoenix conceptualizes home versus away and 
family versus friends, foes, and strangers. According to Ready, “Phoinix asks Achilleus to return 
to the battle and… to preserve the ‘house’ by acknowledging his role as son and saving the father 
figure.”  Ready’s use of ‘house’ is apt. It metonymically locates the collective identity of 590
Achilles’ (or anyone’s) family at wherever the patriarch happens to be. A surprising result of this 
formulation is that, from a certain point of view, home is where the father is. And this is precisely 
why Phoenix’ autobiography is relatively effective. Because he is rendered sterile, murdered in a 
way by his father, his relationship with Amyntor becomes intolerable. The natural consequence 
of this is his flight and eventual incorporation into the house of Peleus. In effect, he redefines his 
identity by selecting a new locality to call home and a new man to be his father figure. There is, 
then, a certain mutability in kinship identification here. And Phoenix attempts to take advantage 
 To my mind, Wilson (2002) remains the most convincing study of the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon.589
 Ready (2011, 146).590
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of this mutability by encouraging Achilles to protect him as a kind of father figure (9.492-5). 
This is a rather daring and ultimately self-defeating manoeuvre, since Phoenix himself has just 
claimed Peleus as a father figure as well. If Achilles’ best course is simply to protect his father 
figures, the most obvious decision would be to return to Phthia with Phoenix in tow, a prospect 
which in fact he does consider once Phoenix has said his piece (617-19).  
 The other implication of the parallel Phoenix draws between his own past and Achilles’ 
present situation is the association of Phoenix’ natal home with the Achaean camp. This reversal, 
to my mind, is the most brilliant rhetorical strategy in Phoenix’ speech. Through drawing a 
parallel between his own story and Achilles’, Phoenix implies that Achilles’ returning to Phthia 
would be the equivalent of his own flight from his father’s home. To Achilles, home is 
presumably his father’s oikos and the land where he spent his youngest days. But the parallel 
Phoenix draws cleverly recasts the Achaean camp as home and Phthia as away. Add to this 
Phoenix’ careful insertion of himself into Achilles’ patriline and his presence at the Achaean 
camp, and the implication gains some rhetorical force. If Phoenix’ interpretation of the situation 
were to hold sway, Achilles would become an exile if he embarked on a nostos (‘homecoming’) 
at this time.  Meleager, on the other hand, because it is his mother who has cursed him and not 591
his father, does not have to leave home in order to emancipate himself. As I have attempted to 
show, the father is the conceptual centre of the functional Homeric household. The mother is 
ordinarily also located at the centre, but in a restrictive manner; she is supposed to remain there 
 So Perry (2010, 55): “Achilles might like to view his departure as a principled and exemplary retreat (Il. 591
9.357-372, 417-418), but Phoenix responds by using the parallels between Achilles’ situation and his own 
experience of exile to suggest that in leaving for Phthia Achilles will in fact be acting in a manner that will mark him 
out as an exile, or something dangerously close to it, rather than as a hero.”
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at all costs.  She is constrained by the oikos. She does not define its parameters. And her 592
position is far less secure, being dependent upon the father or a strong son. In Althaea’s case, she 
has most definitely placed herself outside of Oeneus’ household by favouring her natal kin, 
namely her brother(s), over her son. So Meleager can simply retreat into his father’s household to 
mark his protest to Althaea’s betrayal. Given that the father’s household is the location to which 
Achilles is proposing to retreat as well (356-63), one might suppose that Phoenix is alluding to 
this possibility when he refers to Meleager’s withdrawal. But the rest of the story makes it clear 
that Achilles’ current position in his tent in the Achaean camp is the relevant parallel. Achilles 
and Meleager are both crucial to the success of their armies; they both grow angry with a (at least 
putative) parental figure and withdraw, receiving and rejecting the appeals of those close to them 
in order of increasing importance; and they both finally relent on account of their closest 
companion. Meleager retreats to the centre, whereas Achilles retreats to the periphery. Phoenix 
subtly recasts Achilles’ tent in the Achaean camp as home. By doing this, he encourages Achilles 
to conceive of leaving the Achaean camp before the conclusion of the war as entering a fugitive 
status, abandoning oikos and father. 
 In a certain way, Achilles is also capable of thinking of the Achaean camp as home. As 
we have observed above, he complains that Agamemnon has treated him like an ἀτίµητον 
µετανάστην (‘resident alien without status,’ 9.648 = 16.59), the closest we come to a noun for 
‘exile’ or ‘fugitive’ in Archaic epic. As the best of the Achaeans, Achilles is but one step removed 
from the centre of the group. But Agamemnon, in depriving Achilles of his prize, has, in 
Achilles’ eyes, relegated him to something like what Phoenix would have been at the time of his 
 On women in domestic space in the Archaic Era, see Konstantinou (2016, 1-5), with bibliography.592
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first acceptance by Peleus.  By complaining that he is being treated in such a manner, Achilles 593
necessarily implies that he should be honoured as a full member of the group. His claim, if we 
understand the term metanastēs correctly, is not made in terms of kinship but rather of 
membership in a polity. But the conception of the polity requires a set of oikoi.  When he 594
withdraws, he retreats to the margins of the polity and lives like a resident alien. But, as I have 
argued, Phoenix’ great rhetorical move is to present this group as Achilles’ home. And, if the 
Achaean camp is an oikos or set of oikoi, Agamemnon is undoubtedly its patriarch. As cleverly 
as Phoenix masks this implication, the logic of his argument requires Achilles to submit to 
Agamemnon as a father figure. And, in fact, this appears to be precisely what Agamemnon has in 
mind when he offers Achilles one of his daughters in marriage (9.144-7).  Given that Phoenix 595
cannot change the terms of the offer when his turn to speak comes, it is little wonder that 
Achilles, who is no fool, does not significantly alter his position in response to the old man’s 
speech. 
 The exile, then, shows what is perhaps the greatest extreme of the potential mobility of 
kinship. Fathers can kill or sterilize their sons, and sons can supplant their fathers or flee into 
exile. But the exile is not necessarily permanently deprived of kin. He can find a new home and 
even draw near to its centre.  While the exile is not a central figure in Homer, Phoenix’ rhetoric 596
uses his autobiography to show how mobile the concept of home can be. From a certain point of 
view, the entire Achaean army has come to a new home in a kind of exile of war. They have lived 
 Martin (1992, 18-21) and Alden (2012) maintain that Phoenix’ status is always ‘metanastic’. But, while we can 593
only be approximate with the term, the kind of honour Peleus pays him over time (9.481-4) would seem to suggest 
that he re-obtains an aristocratic status.
 So Kurke (1991, 8-9), with R. Parker (2005, 10-13) adding considerable nuance.594
 So Rosner (1976, 318) and Wilson (2002).595
 In colonization myths, he can even found a new home and line: L. Patterson (2010, 1-12).596
!186
in the same place for ten years; surely this must have become their home to some extent. For 
Achilles, as for Phoenix, his new home is the last he will ever know. As we have observed, the 
exile is often portrayed as an outsider, or at the very least a figure who can only approach a new 
centre through a long and painful process. But murder, death, and flight are so native to the 
Homeric poems that it becomes impossible to see Phoenix or any exile as an outsider in any 
meaningful sense. In a world full of such vicissitudes, one takes home and family where one can 
find it. 
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
!
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CONCLUSION 
 We have examined several examples of kinship relationships between figures on the 
margins of the oikos and those at the centre, in the latter case either the patriarch or one of his 
sons. We have found that the oikos is centripetal, with the more marginal members seeking the 
respect of the patriarch and his sons. In many passages, we have observed that the nature of the 
relationship between a marginal character and the centre of his oikos is a vital element of his 
identity. While one might object that this portrayal of marginal figures is little more than 
aristocratic propaganda, recent anthropological research has demonstrated that this kind of self-
identification with respect to a central male authority has been observable throughout Eurasian 
history.  The unsurprising corollary to this is that any attempt to ingratiate oneself with an 597
authority other than the patriarch is only acceptable if it is not perceived to be at his expense. 
And, as one might expect, this is especially the case with female figures of authority, such as the 
mother. So, for example, Teucer’s use of the bow is all well and good as long as it is in service of 
his father’s people. But when the least suspicion is raised regarding his conduct, the fact that his 
mother is Trojan is ruinous to him. And, in a similar vein, Phoenix’ acting on his mother’s behalf 
over such a relatively petty issue as a concubine results in his sterilization and ultimately in his 
emigration from his native land. The centripetal nature of the oikos can be a heavy burden for 
those unwilling or unable to commit their absolute loyalty. 
 The figures on the margins of the oikos are generally portrayed as occupying relatively 
static positions, as much as they might strive for promotion. So, I have argued that our Iliad 
reveals some awareness of the tradition that Teucer will soon be accused of attempting to inherit 
 See especially King and Stone (2010).597
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Telamon’s estate at Ajax’ expense. But in every surviving iteration of the Teucer myth, Telamon 
forces him to seek his fortune elsewhere. And Phoenix might be understood to entertain some 
hope of living closer to the centre of activity, should Achilles come to occupy Peleus’ seat. But in 
general he seems to indicate that he is fortunate to be in his current position (e.g. Il. 9.480-4). On 
the other hand, Heracles does appear to be promoted through marriage from bastard to son-in-
law, albeit in a manner only possible or appropriate for a god. And Odysseus promises to treat 
Eumaeus (and Philoetius) like Telemachus’ companion and brother, although it is unclear what 
exactly this is supposed to involve in practice. Such promotions as these suggest that some 
mobility is not absolutely outside the bounds of plausibility. But the general impression is that 
the structure of the oikos is quite static, with characters like the suitors threatening chaos rather 
than an alternative hierarchy. 
 It is also the case that these centripetal relationships can illuminate the patriarchal centre 
of the oikos. A powerful example of this is the interaction between Odysseus the beggar and 
Eumaeus. Eumaeus lives on the very edges of Odysseus’ oikos. But it is nonetheless through 
him, as much as through Penelope or Telemachus, that we are able to come to appreciate the 
difference between the Odysseus who wanders into other people’s houses and the Odysseus who 
is a central basileus (‘chief’) on Ithaca and patriarch in his own oikos. Eumaeus shows us what it 
is that Odysseus has lost and what he stands to regain. And in the Iliad, Phoenix, although he 
subtly misrepresents the state of affairs for rhetorical reasons, is able to use his autobiography to 
present Achilles’ situation in a fresh light. While it is arguable whether Achilles is particularly 
affected by this rhetoric in the grand scheme of things, the poet does not have Phoenix deliver 
the longest speech of the poem without reason. The logic of Phoenix’ tales requires Achilles to 
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conceive of Agamemnon as a paternal figure, which in fact he is in a way. Through the story of 
his own relocation, Phoenix is able to communicate to Achilles the gravity of the decision he is 
about to make. Achilles rejects the parallel in the end, but Phoenix does persuasively portray the 
Achaean camp as a kind of home for Achilles, which it must have become at least to some extent 
after so many years. Figures like Eumaeus and Phoenix may be marginal in the oikos, but they 
can paradoxically be used by the poet to treat the most intimate, domestic issues with their 
patriarchs. 
 Teucer, Heracles, Eumaeus, and Phoenix are just a few examples of figures on the 
margins of the oikos in Homer. It is my hope that the present work has suggested the advantage 
of thinking in a more flexible manner about early kinship. In addition, I hope also to have shown 
that focus on some of the more minor characters in Homer can be fruitful. If the Iliad and 
Odyssey really are just two examples of individual iterations of longstanding traditions, then it 
stands to reason that many of the apparently peripheral characters included in these poems must 
be abbreviated versions of – or at least references to – larger and more developed portrayals in 
other traditions or in other iterations of the same tradition.  Where possible, therefore, 598
examination of some of these characters with the same level of scrutiny and resourcefulness as 
has been applied to more central figures could potentially yield results as interesting as I hope the 
present series of studies has been. 
!
!!
 To some extent, these fuller versions are the subject of neoanalysis: cf. Willcock (1996) and Burgess (2009, 598
58-85). But neoanalysis has primarily been occupied with the more important figures of the Iliad especially.
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